To better understand the above questions, this project proposes the first worldwide collection of data on referendums in peace processes aiming to identify the conditions under which referendums enable or impede negotiated agreements. Currently, the project’s website includes a pilot description of seven major case studies aiming to help guide future data collection on the topic. The project’s website will expand to allow users to identify a country of interest and access detailed narratives on the background of each conflict and the conditions leading to referendums or alternative ratification processes (or their absence).

It will include data on the design, scope and timing of each referendum, the wording of specific referendum question(s) and data on violence including levels, nature and duration of violent incidents before and after (non)referendums. It will also cover important disputes over territorial boundaries, issues of transitional justice (e.g. amnesty for rebels) and eligibility to vote for certain groups (e.g. recent settlers/migrants). Moreover, the dataset will provide a detailed analysis of key actors in referendum campaigns and their main arguments as well as positive or negative media and civil society input and final outcomes along with links to relevant surveys.

External Links:

The Economist has mentioned the project’s website on October 14th, 2010 with reference to a current bill in the Israeli Knesset debating a referendum on the current peace talks: view here.

The Israel/Palestine Centre for Documentation and Research has replicated the project’s database in its latest report on the current peace process in the Middle East

The dataset was cited by the CONSTITUTIONS AND PEACE PROCESSES
A PRIMER Berghof Foundation and the United Nations Department of
Political and Peacebuilding Affairs available here

Suggested Citation:

Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Open Access Publications:

Referendums in Peace Processes Project – media and publications

• Designing Peace book
• The European Journal of Political Research – article on peace referendums
• CNN interview
• Monkey Cage/Washington Post for the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement

Below is the draft of a dataset as it appeared in Designing Peace. We are currently developing as part of the Inclusive Peace project funded by ORA7.

Referendums

Spain, 6 December 1978

• Theme / Question
  To endorse or reject the draft Constitution that would replace the constitutional laws of the Francoist period (1939-1975) and the consolidation of a Parliamentary Monarchy.
  The question was framed as ‘Do you approve the draft Constitution?’
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  The government – Democratic Centre (UCD) – launched an expensive campaign for approval. Also, both parties of the left, the Communist Party (PCE) and the Socialist Party (PSOE), vocally supported the new Constitution.
  Certain sectors of the Popular Alliance (AP) and the Right campaigned for abstention or ‘no’ vote, highlighting the dangers for the territorial integrity of Spain.
• Outcome
  The result showed that 15,706,078 million Spaniards (87,87%) approved the draft Constitution, while only 7,83% (1,400,505) voted ‘no’. The turnout reached 67,11% (17,873,271).
• Other relevant information
  The turnout in the regions of Galicia and the Basque Country deviated from the nationwide level, reaching 50,2% and 45,5%, respectively.
  The new Constitution recognised the existence of Regions and Nationalities and their right to self-government.
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Estadísticas Históricas de España: Siglos XIX-XX’, p.1113.
• Suggested Citation: Iosif Kovras, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Basque Country and Catalonia, 25 October 1979

• Theme / Question
  To approve or reject the draft statute of autonomy of the Basque Country and Catalonia, respectively, that would restore the autonomous regional governments.
  The question in the Basque Country was ‘Do you approve the draft Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country?’
  The question in Catalonia was ‘Do you approve the draft Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia?’
• Eligibility
  Participation of the residents of the two autonomous regions.
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  In the Basque Country, the major regional-nationalist party, Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) supported the new Statute, while the main opposition came from the Rightists, fearing the disintegration of the Spanish territorial integrity, and the terrorist group ETA pushing for secession. The two major issues of contention were the control of the police and the control of the Navarre province which was claimed as part of the Basque homeland.
  The assembly of Catalan members of Parliament established a commission (‘Commission of Twenty’) that drafted the Statute and the major political parties supported the Statute.
• Outcome 
  Of the 1,541,775 Basque voters, 90,29% (832,105) voted ‘yes’ (turnout was 59,77%).
  In Catalonia, the results were similar with a strong 88,5% ‘yes’ vote (2,322.355), while the turnout was 59,70%.
• Other information
  The secessionist violence of the Basque terrorist ETA caused more than 114 deaths in 1979.
  The preceding statute of autonomy was established during the Second republic which was violently interrupted by the Spanish civil war (1936-1939) and the Francoist regime (1939-1975).
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Albert Carreras and Xavier Tafunell (2005) ‘Estadísticas Históricas de España: Siglos XIX-XX’, p.1113.
• Suggested Citation: Iosif Kovras, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

South Africa, 17 March 1992

• Theme / Question
  To endorse or reject President F. W. de Klerk’s reform policies to negotiate an end to white minority rule through talks with the black majority.  The referendum asked, “Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?”
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  De Klerk had promised to resign and hold elections if his reforms failed to win a significant majority. He warned that a “no” vote would return South Africa to international isolation, ruin the economy and bring uncontrollable black revolt.
  Spearheading the campaign against the referendum was CP leader Treurnicht, nicknamed “Dr. No” for his unwavering opposition to political reform. The ANC appealed to its white members to vote “yes.”
• Outcome
  Final results released March 18 showed that 1,924,186 million whites (68.6%) voted “yes” and 875,619 (31.2%) voted “no.” Of South Africa’s 3.28 million eligible white voters, 85% turned out for the ballot, one of the highest rates ever.
• Other relevant information
  The ANC issued a statement saying that the referendum benefited the negotiating process and emphasized that this should be the last occasion on which South Africa is subject to the indignity of a racial or ethnic referendum. More than 220 blacks were slain in township violence during the weeks leading up to the referendum, according to a New York Times article datelined March 13.
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports
  Lexis/Nexis & Factiva
  Interviews with Policymakers
• Suggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Canada, 26 October 1992

• Theme / Question
  To endorse or reject a constitutional reform package that sought to reconcile the conflicting interests of the country’s provinces, territories and aboriginal peoples (status of Quebec as ‘distinct society’). Quebec would always be guaranteed at least 25% of the seats in the lower house. The question was framed as:
  “Do you agree that the Constitution of Canada should be renewed on the basis of the agreement reached on August 28, 1992?”
• Eligibility to vote and electoral design
  The referendum was technically a non-binding guide for the 10 provincial assemblies, each of whose approval was needed for formal ratification of the accord. A “No” vote in any one province, however, had been widely viewed as effectively killing the accord as currently formulated.
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  Western Canadians tended to oppose the accord because they did not favour concessions to Quebec, whereas Quebeckers voted “No” because they thought the accord did not deliver enough rights to the French-speaking province. Many Canadians voted “No” to vent their anger against the political and business establishment in general and Progressive Conservative Party Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in particular.
• Outcome
  Nationwide, the “No” side outpolled the “Yes,” 54.4% to 44.6%, with 74.9% of eligible voters casting ballots. Metropolitan areas tended to line up behind the “Yes” side.
• Other relevant information
  The referendum defeat of the proposed reforms dealt a stunning blow to the nation’s leading political figures leading to Quebec’s independence referendum of 1995 where 50.58% of the province said “No” to independence while  49.42% voted “Yes”.
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports
  Lexis/Nexis & Factiva
  Interviews with Policymakers
• Suggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Bosnia, 27-28 August 1994

• Theme / Question 
  Serb only referendum to endorse or reject an international peace plan that would have given them control of 49% of Bosnia -Herzegovina and the Moslem-Croat federation control of the remaining 51%. The plan would have required the self-declared Bosnian Serb republic to give up about a third of the Bosnia n territory it had won during the 28-month civil war.
• Eligibility to vote and electoral design
  Only Serbs voted in the areas controlled by Bosnian-Serbs during the war. It was designed specifically to demonstrate the strong reaction of the Bosnian Serbs to the international peace plan.
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  The plan had been rejected by top officials of the self-styled republic. Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnia n Serbs’ leader, August 29 said, “We will ask for another map. We expect a new conference, new peace efforts.” Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had pressured the Bosnia n Serb leadership to accept the plan and had broken ties with the Bosnia n Serb republic, including closing the border, after previous rejections of the peace plan by Bosnia n Serb leaders.
• Outcome
  About 90% of voters opposed the plan. Electoral officers refused to say how many people had voted. Figures difficult to verify as voting lists were virtually meaningless in the war-ravaged region.
• Other relevant information
  Russian Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev said that the referendum in Bosnia was illegitimate and urged voters to reconsider their decision. Russia was one of the five members of the so-called contact group for Bosnia that had drafted the peace plan. The other members were the U.S., Britain, France and Germany. The overwhelming ‘no’ vote contributed to the decision of the mediators to ratify the subsequent 1995 Dayton Accord without a referendum.
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports
  Lexis/Nexis & Factiva
  Interviews with Policymakers
• Suggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, 22 May 1998

• Theme / Question
  Under the agreement approved in May 22, 1998 a new local assembly would be created to legislate many matters in the province. A North-South Ministerial Council would bring together lawmakers from Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic to discuss matters of mutual interest, and a new Council of the Isles would encourage policy cooperation between the British and Irish governments. The Republic removed territorial claims from its constitution. The question was “Do you support the agreement reached in the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and set out in Command Paper 3883?”
• Eligibility to vote and electoral design
  Separate referendums took place in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In the latter, there was no requirement for double majority but majority support in both the Catholic and Protestant communities was considered crucial for the effective enactment of the planned governmental changes. A failure to gain majority support among both groups would likely have crippled the planned Northern Ireland Assembly.
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  Most leading political figures in Britain and Ireland supported and hailed the strong support the peace plan garnered in the referenda. The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), one of Northern Ireland’s Protestant unionist paramilitary groups, May 15 declared a cease-fire. The same day, however, the group called on voters to reject the peace agreement in the upcoming referendum.
  Rev. Ian D. Paisley the longtime militant Protestant leader kept the Democratic Unionist Party out of the talks and called his voters to reject the agreement.
• Outcome
  In Northern Ireland, 676,966 voters, or 71.1% of the total, backed the peace plan, while 274,879 (28.9%) opposed it. In the separate referendum in the Republic of Ireland 1,442,583 voters, or 94.4% of the total, backed the agreement, and only 85,748 (5.6%) opposed the plan.
• Other relevant information
  Results of the voting in Northern Ireland were not officially broken down by religious background, but an exit poll conducted by Coopers & Lybrand found that the peace agreement had gained majority support from both Catholics and Protestants. Of the Catholics polled, 96% said they had cast “yes” votes in favor of the plan, and 4% said they had voted against it. Some 55% of Protestants in the exit poll said they had voted for the agreement, while 45% said they had voted against it.
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports
  Lexis/Nexis & Factiva
  Interviews with Policymakers
• Suggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Guatemala, 16 May 1999

• Theme / Question
  Constitutional amendments including granting rights to indigenous people such as official recognition of the languages and dress of Guatemala’s 24 Indian groups and  consultation of the indigenous groups before legislation affecting them was passed
• Eligibility to vote and electoral design
  The 47 reforms were divided into four broad categories and required voters to vote on each category separately. No separate majorities of indigenous non-indigenous were needed.
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  The passage of the reforms was supported by all of Guatemala’s major political parties.  While publicly supporting reforms in order to please the international community, the ruling Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) called on its party bases to vote no. After strongly opposing the reforms in Congress last year, the opposition FRG tried to make political gains by deciding to support the reforms at the 11th hour, a move seen merely as part of its electoral strategy. The FRG then blamed the outcome on the government.
  Against Liga Pro Patria—a civil rights organisation which convinced the constitutional court to suspend one of the reforms before the referendum—and Acción Reconciliadora Democrática (ARDE), under ther leadership of Francisco Bianchi, a protestant priest and presidential candidate.
• Outcome
  Of the 4.1m registered voters, 9.4% voted no and 7.5% voted yes to the four questions (turnout was only 18.5%). The strong no vote in Guatemala City (68% of those who voted here rejected the reforms) helped to sway the outcome.
• Other relevant information
  Defeat of the reforms represented a setback for the peace process in Guatemala following the 36-year civil war. (assassinations reported)
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports
  Lexis/Nexis & Factiva
  Interviews with Policymakers
• Suggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Cyprus, 24 April 2004

• Theme / Question
  Under the U.N. plan, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots would have each retained autonomy over most of their affairs under a loose federal system. Turkish Cypriot returned land in exchange for power-sharing. The question was “Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?”
• Eligibility to vote and electoral design
  Voting rights were determined by the communities. Greek Cypriots voted in the south (including those living in the north-the ‘enclaved’) while Turkish Cypriots and settlers voted in the north. Turkish Cypriots living in the south were not allowed to vote in the north. For ratification a double majority was required by both communities.
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  Tassos Papadopoulos, the Cypriot President, rejected the plan in a controversial   televised speech onApril 7, 2004. Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash also opposed the plan, which he said would lead to Greek Cypriot dominance. Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat backed the plan. Greek Premier Costas Karamanlis endorsed the U.N. plan, reportedly after being pressed to do so by U.S. President Bush.
• Outcome
  The plan was rejected by 76% of Greek Cypriots, while 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted in their own referendum to approve it. About 90% of the 480,000 registered Greek Cypriot voters turned out, as did 75% of the 143,000 Turkish Cypriot voters.
• Other relevant information
  Greek Cypriot voters rejected the plan hoping for an improved settlement after accession to the EU.  As a result, reunification did not take place. The following month, Cyprus formally joined the EU. However, the benefits of EU membership applied primarily to the Greek portion of the island
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports
  Lexis/Nexis & Factiva
  Interviews with Policymakers
• Suggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Iraq, 15 October 2005

• Theme / Question
  The new constitution called for a federalist system where Kurds and Shiites could form strong autonomous regions in the north and south, respectively, potentially isolating Sunnis in Iraq’s impoverished central regions.
• Eligibility to vote and electoral design
  Under Iraqi law, the constitution would have failed if a two-thirds majority in three of Iraq’s 18 provinces had voted against it. Though a majority of voters did reject the document in the provinces of Anbar, Salahuddin and Nineveh, the Nineveh vote was fairly close, with 55% voting “no”–a percentage that fell short of the two-thirds majority needed to defeat the constitution. The other two provinces rejected the charter by more than a two-thirds majority.
• Supporters vs. Opponents
  The vote was split along factional lines, with most of Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab population voting against the constitution, and the larger Shiite Muslim and ethnic Kurdish groups strongly backing it.
• Outcome
  The IECI said that about 63% of Iraq’s 15.5 million registered voters had cast ballots in the referendum. The constitution was approved by 78.6% of voters, and rejected by 21.4%. Nevertheless, the vote was considered close since the constitution only narrowly escaped defeat in Nineveh.
• Other relevant information
  The Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni political group that had backed the constitution, October 25 charged that voting fraud had influenced the referendum’s results in Nineveh. Sunni politician Saleh Mutlaq called for the vote to be held again in three provinces where results had been disputed, and branded the constitution’s drafting process “a falsified operation”.
• Sources: Facts on File World News Digest.
  Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports
  Lexis/Nexis & Factiva
  Interviews with Policymakers
• Suggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Referendums in Peace Processes Dataset, Queen’s University Belfast.

Conferences

‘Referendums in Peace Processes: Psychological, Political and Legal Aspects’, 26-27 October 2016

Governments and international organisations engaged in peace mediations across the world are frequently confronted with the dilemmas of whether the public should be consulted at critical junctures for the peace process and if so how. Conventional wisdom assumes that the people should be directly engaged in peace processes whenever they face important decisions. By extension, peace settlements should be more effective and sustainable when bolstered by widespread expressions of public support. Successful referendums are described in the peace and conflict literature as adding legitimacy and durability to a negotiated settlement. In the cases of South Africa (1992) and Northern Ireland (1998) referendums have been viewed as facilitating peace settlements by engaging broader segments of the society and limiting the role of violent opposition groups. Moreover, successful peace referendums could be special moments in the development of peace settlements–a litmus test of a society’s capacity to overcome deep divisions and to bring forward new political dynamics.

At the same time, evidence from conflict-ridden societies suggests that the merits of referendums should not be overstated. Referendums could fail, even under promising conditions, as in the Colombian peace process or inflame already unstable ethnic relations as suggested in East Timor and demonstrated in the cases of Kyrgyzstan, Egypt, and Crimea. Empirical evidence suggests that only a handful have so far been successful while “illegitimate or wrongly designed” referendums could inadvertently turn into conflict-inducing rather than conflict-mitigating opportunities (e.g. Iraq). Even when they aim to facilitate positive political transformation, referendums might have unintended side effects by excluding important groups (e.g. minorities, vulnerable groups or the diaspora) or by creating opportunities for the protest vote.

The two-day conference in Nicosia will aim to address these debates and to present a new conceptual map in the study of referendums and their impact in peace mediations drawing on experts’ views particularly in the comparative analysis of public opinion surveys, communication strategies and alternative institutional designs. Quintin Oliver, the event’s keynote speaker, is a leading international conflict expert and the director of Stratagem International. He has previously served as the Chairman of the “YES Campaign” during the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement referendum in Northern Ireland.

The Conference invitation and programme and the Conference flyer.

Below are the data used for Designing Peace (Chapter 5 you can access the book here.