**Individualised Philosophical Success Abstract**

There appear to be two claims about philosophical success and philosophical progress.

*Claim 1*Many philosophers reasonably think that they have successful arguments that answer (at least some of) the big questions of philosophy.

*Claim 2*There has not been significant convergence on answers to the big questions of philosophy.

Many have identified a tension between the two claims: if there are successful arguments for the big questions in philosophy then it appears there should be large collective convergence towards the successful arguments’ conclusions. This tension requires an obvious but often-unstated Bridging Claim which states:

*Bridging Claim*Successful arguments in philosophy are publicly recognised as such.

In response to the putative conflict between Claims 1 and 2, some philosophers have attempted to deny Claim 1 by arguing that philosophers do not have successful arguments in the appropriate sense (van Inwagen 2006; van Inwagen 2004); while others have denied Claim 2 arguing that there has been more philosophical convergence then has been reported (Stoljar 2017). This paper will take an alternative approach by arguing that Claim 1 and Claim 2 are simultaneously correct on an individualised definition of philosophical success and that this interpretation results in the Bridging Claim being erroneous. Consequently, this paper will argue for an individualised form of philosophical success that aligns with philosophical practice and resolves the conflict between Claims 1 and 2.

This paper will reach this conclusion by establishing the above claims primarily using data from PhilPaper’s 2009 Survey. Claims 1 and 2 will then be used to formulate three desiderata for philosophical success which will be used to assess three forms of philosophical success: logical, argumentative, and individualised. This analysis will promote an individualised definition of success based upon justifiable belief in philosophical arguments that can resolve the tension between Claims 1 and 2.