

'Human Security in a Globalizing World'

GCRF COMPASS Early Career Researcher Training School
ADA University, Baku,
15-19 February 2021

Working proceedings

26 November 2021

GCRF COMPASS: Comprehensive Capacity-Building in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Central Asia:
research integration, impact governance & sustainable communities (ES/P010849/1)



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Table of Contents

PREFACE	3
ANASTASIYA IHNATOVICH – CLIMATE CHANGE AS THE PRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGE	5
ALICJA PROCHNIAK – HOW IDENTITY POLITICS AND USE OF POLITICAL MYTHS AFFECTED THE FORMATION OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY STRATEGIES IN POLAND, 2008 – 2016?	17
DARYA SAVATEEVA – THE PROBLEM OF UNEQUAL ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION IN GERMANY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY	31
UGO GAUDINO – SECURITY AND LEFT-WING PARTIES: GOVERNING MEDITERRANEAN IMMIGRATION THROUGH HUMANITARIAN SECURITIZATION	38
NARGIZA SODIKOVA – IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC ON THE RESILIENCE OF EU: THE MAIN PROBLEMS AND SHORTCOMINGS	55

Preface

ADA Training School (TS) 2021 'Human Security in a Globalizing World' was held on 15-19 February 2021. The TS reviewed security phenomena from across different disciplines and sectors such as the economy, environment, migration, and health. The aim of the TS was to promote a wider understanding of peace, security, and international stability in the region and globally by evaluating human security as a crucial component of security policy.

Human security represents an emerging paradigm that seeks to shift the meaning of security from its traditionally military-oriented and state-centric focus to being more "people-oriented". As noted in General Assembly resolution 66/290, "human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people. It calls for "people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people".¹ Human security draws together the expertise and resources of a wide range of actors from governments, the private sector, civil society, and local communities. Thus, this TS sought to understand current processes, factors, crises, conflicts, and challenges related to aspects of human security in both the local and international context.

TS 2021 was aimed at engaging early career researchers, graduate (PhD and MPhil) students, and practitioners from different research streams. Topics were wide-ranging, covering all aspects of human security such as economics, sociology, international affairs, peace studies and conflict resolution, social work, social development, etc. The key-note speakers of the conferences included distinguished scholars, practitioners in the field, researchers.

The approach of the TS was interdisciplinary, with the participation of scholars from social sciences, humanities, and law. Papers are focused exclusively on pressing global challenges including COVID-19, peace and security, ecology and climate change, economy and employment, inequality and well-being and international and national responses to current and emerging challenges.

The [GCRF COMPASS project](#) (ES/P010849/1, 2017-21) is an ambitious UK government capacity-building funding initiative, aiming to extend UK research globally, to address the challenges of growth and sustainability in the developing countries. Notably, the COMPASS project at the University of Kent, together with Cambridge University as research partner, seeks to establish '**the hubs of excellence**' at the top-level HEIs in Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, to enable them to

¹ General Assembly resolution 66/290 as of 10 September 2012


become the centres for knowledge sharing and transfer for **research integration**, **impact governance**, and **sustainable communities**.

[The ADA University](#) was founded in 2006 as Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, a training institute for young diplomats to meet the urgent needs of the expanding Foreign Service of the Republic of Azerbaijan. ADA was transformed into a full-fledged public university in 2014 and is accredited by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Azerbaijan. ADA is home to an international community of approximately 2500 students and approximately 200 faculty and staff from 46 countries around the world. ADA is a truly international University with more international students studying here than in any other university in the country. Through a curriculum built around a triad of rigorous major study, electives and general education, combined with experiential learning and exchange opportunities, western style of education, academic excellence, innovation and employability are in the heart of the education process. All courses at ADA are taught in English.

The University is made up of four academic Schools:

- School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA)
- School of Business (SB)
- School of Education (SE)
- School of Information Technologies and Engineering (SITE)
-

The Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF) COMPASS project has been shortlisted for the International Collaboration of the Year at the Times Higher Education (THE) Awards 2021, widely known as ‘the Oscars of Higher Education’.



ANASTASIYA IHNATOVICH² – Climate Change as the Pressing Human Rights Challenge

Introduction

Climate change poses a global ecological challenge which undermines ecosystems around the world. As a result, adverse impacts, such as extreme weather events, increasing global temperatures, floods, and rising sea levels, prevent persons and communities from full enjoyment of a range of human rights. Among them are the rights to life, water, adequate food and housing, as well as the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health. In resolution 7/23, the Human Rights Council has explicitly recognized that “climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world”,³ thereby averring to the complexities of climate change issues in the context of human rights. Given the unprecedented multidimensional implications of climate change for human rights in general, it also bears particular importance for human security.

According to General Assembly resolution 66/290, “human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people, calling for “people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people”.⁴ Furthermore, the document highlights the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights in the context of the human security discourse.⁵ This becomes particularly relevant in light of acute climate change problems, since the global debate on the latter increasingly revolves around the interconnectedness of human rights, security, development, as well as ecological well-being.⁶ Ramcharan rightly pointed out that “human rights define human security”,⁷ which adds value to the discussion of the pressing challenges of climate change precisely from the human rights perspective.

As neither existing academic literature nor international documents in this field have put forward any sound solutions to the whole panoply of legal problems relating to the nexus of climate change and human rights, there is a need for conducting in-depth research on the topic. Against this backdrop, the paper will first identify the impacts of climate change on human rights using the examples of affected human rights. Second, it will focus on the impact of climate change response measures regarding development and will then offer a critical review of such measures mainly through the lens of the human rights-based approach. In connection therewith, special emphasis will be given to the problems faced by developing countries in relation to their

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³ Human Rights Council Resolution ‘Human rights and climate change’ (28 March 2008), UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/23.

⁴ United Nations General Assembly Resolution (hereinafter – UNGA Res.) (25 October 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/66/290.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Fact Sheet No. 37 (2016), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

⁷ Ramcharan, available at: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Ramcharan.pdf>.

international obligations for development and combating climate change. Lastly, the paper will finish with relevant suggestions and concluding observations in this respect.

Human rights impact of climate change

The geography of the areas referred to in the present section includes mainly the indigenous territories, *inter alia*, those in Africa, the Arctic, Asia, Australia, the Caribbean, Latin America, North America, the Pacific, and the territories of Small Island Developing States (hereinafter – SIDS). As has been noted above, climate change impacts being global in scope and unprecedented in scale engender, among others, perverse outcomes for the realization of human rights. Thus, one of the deleterious climate change impacts manifests itself through posing risks to indigenous peoples who depend, to a large extent, on traditionally owned lands, territories, waters, coastal seas and other resources.⁸ The same is also true for SIDS whose populations are especially vulnerable to sea-level rise which is one of the more pressing effects of climate change.⁹ These events raise complex questions, such as the possibility of the full enjoyment of collective rights to self-determination and cultural rights.¹⁰

Among the climate change effects, identified in the academic literature, there is temperature increase, extreme weather events, sea-level rise, and natural disasters,¹¹ meaning that climate change may affect human rights in multiple ways. However, a detailed analysis of the climate change effects, and their impact is required when it comes to the determination of the scope of human rights threatened by climate change. To achieve this objective a causal connection between climate change effects, their impact, and the potential risk to human rights needs to be identified.

Within this context, for example, the increase in global temperatures has been identified as a severe threat to public health, coral reef ecosystems and to the preservation and development of reindeer husbandry. Accordingly, the scope of the affected human rights covers at least the rights to life,¹² to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,¹³ to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing,¹⁴ as well as indigenous peoples' cultural rights.¹⁵

⁸ United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (13 September 2007), UN Doc. A/RES/61/295, art. 25.

⁹ Adelman (2017), p. 19.

¹⁰ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966), in force 3 January 1976, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966), in force 3 January 1976, art. 1, 15; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, *supra* note 6, art. 8, 26.

¹¹ Adelman, *supra* note 7, p. 20; Calzadilla (2018); Robinson and Shine (2018), p. 565; Schapper (2018), p. 279; Shabalala (2018), p. 68; Solntsev (2018), p. 70.

¹² International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, *supra* note 8, art. 6.

¹³ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *supra* note 8, art. 12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, art. 11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, art. 15; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, *supra* note 6, art. 8, 26; Robinson and Shine, *supra* note 9; Schapper, *supra* note 9; Solntsev, *supra* note 9; Averina (2014), p. 27.

To give an illustrative example of the human rights impacts pertinent to this climate change effect, the following observations are important to consider. In this regard, climate change-related increase in temperature contributes to increased transmission of respiratory and infectious diseases, among others,¹⁶ which therefore may undermine the right to life and that to the highest attainable standard of health. Additionally, the destruction of coral reef ecosystems, given that the latter serve as the primary source of livelihood for indigenous peoples, poses risks to the realization of their right to adequate food and cultural rights. According to General Comment No. 21 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter – CESCR), one such right includes the right “to the lands, territories, and resources which they [indigenous peoples] have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired”.¹⁷ Lastly, the danger to reindeer husbandry emanating from the temperature increase manifests itself mainly through the reduction in snow cover and the ensuing disappearance of some areas of the tundra on the continent. This leads to the emergence of unsatisfactory conditions for the above-noted traditional occupation of the northern indigenous peoples,¹⁸ thereby exerting problematic outcomes for the enjoyment of their right to adequate food and cultural rights as well. Apart from these impacts, it seems possible to expand the list by including the increased temperature-related hazards to fisheries and agriculture. These are highly likely to entail the same negative human rights implications as those already discussed with respect to indigenous peoples.

As regards sea-level rise, there has not been considerable scholarly debate on the adverse human rights impact which primarily includes the risks associated with severe infrastructural damages and the disappearance of SIDS’ territories. Considering the relevant academic literature, one may identify at least the individual right to adequate housing and the collective rights, namely to self-determination and indigenous peoples’ cultural rights, as those that are presently at risk from this climate change effect.¹⁹

For instance, the destruction of infrastructure can pose a potential threat to the realization of the human right to adequate housing interpreted by the CESCR in the context of the availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure, *among other things*.²⁰ The submersion of SIDS’ territories, in its turn, may affect the right to self-determination, by virtue of which all peoples freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.²¹ Meanwhile, this climate change impact may interfere with the exercise of cultural rights which, as noted

¹⁶ ‘Floods and health: fact sheets for health professionals’, available at: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/252601/Floods-and-health-Fact-sheets-for-health-professionals.pdf?ua=1.

¹⁷ General Comment No. 21 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (21 December 2009), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, para. 36.

¹⁸ Solntsev, *supra* note 9.

¹⁹ Robinson and Shine, *supra* note 9; Schapper, *supra* note 9, p. 278; Adelman, *supra* note 7, p. 20.

²⁰ General Comment No. 4 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (13 December 1991), UN Doc. E/1992/23, para. 8.

²¹ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, *supra* note 8, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, *supra* note 8, art. 1.

previously, include the indigenous peoples' right to their traditionally owned lands, territories and resources.²²

Arguably, the detrimental impact of sea-level rise would likely hamper the enjoyment of other human rights, including those to life, to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, access to water and to own property.²³ In particular, floods caused by rising sea levels may lead to increased cases of drownings, heart attacks and mental health disorders, among others,²⁴ thereby undermining the realization of the human rights to life and to the highest attainable standard of health. The right to property, for its part, is seen as being negatively affected by sea-level rise due to the destruction of infrastructure. Regarding the human right to water, the CESCR has explicitly stated in its General Comment No. 15 that quality is one of the factors of the adequacy of water required for this right to be exercised, meaning that water "must be safe, ... of an acceptable colour, odour, and taste for each personal or domestic use".²⁵ In light of salinization of water resources because of sea-level rise,²⁶ the right to water will be infringed as well.

Especially notable in the context of the nexus of climate change and human rights, analysed in this paper, are extreme weather events, namely intensified droughts, and changes in precipitation, among others. Like sea-level rise, these abnormal weather events are slow onset climate change phenomena, which means that it may be difficult to establish a causal connection between the latter, their effects and the human rights at risk. It is a widely held scholarly view that soil erosion, threats to fisheries, agriculture and those of increased disease transmission are among the possible effects of extreme weather events. The former may result in the depletion of agricultural soils and therefore hamper the enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing. Thus, the range of human rights threatened by extreme weather events could be viewed as encompassing at least the rights to life, to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, to the highest attainable standard of health, and cultural rights.

Another environmental concern associated with climate change is an increase in natural disasters. Disasters like wildfires may result in "numerous casualties and significant economic damages to infrastructure and production assets".²⁷ The impacts of climate change related to wildfires are highly likely to produce negative outcomes for the realisation of the human rights to life, to the highest attainable standard of health, to adequate food and housing, to property, and cultural rights of forest-reliant indigenous peoples.

Yet, another consideration of climate change is the irreversible changes in ecosystems which are proposed to be seen as a general impact for both slow onset climate change effects and natural disasters. Such changes may impede mainly the enjoyment of the

²² General Comment No. 21 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (21 December 2009), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, para. 36.

²³ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948), UNGA Res. 217A (III), art. 17.

²⁴ Nunez, available at: <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/sea-level-rise/>; 'Floods and health: fact sheets for health professionals', *supra* note 14.

²⁵ General Comment No. 15 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (20 January 2003), UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, para. 12.

²⁶ Schapper, *supra* note 9.

²⁷ Chugunkova et al. (2018)

human right to a healthy environment, which is of crucial importance in the context of climate change. Specifically, as Knox put it, this right is “essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights”,²⁸ meaning that a favourable environment is necessary for the human well-being. It is relevant to note here that the significance of the right to a healthy environment in the context of climate change is reflected in the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter – Paris Agreement) and the Agenda for Sustainable Development for the Period up to 2030 (hereinafter – 2030 Agenda) which, among other international legal documents, are aimed at combatting irreversible environmental changes caused by the exploitation of the natural resources for ever-increasing human demands.²⁹

Based on the above, it seems strongly arguable that climate change effects may exert adverse impact on all spheres of a person’s life with ensuing deleterious implications for the realisation of a wide range of human rights. It is proposed that the scope of the latter should include at least human rights to life, to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, to water, to property, to a favourable environment, to self-determination, and indigenous peoples’ cultural rights.

Human rights impact of climate change response measures

The human right to development

Considering the present analysis of climate change and human rights discourse, special attention should be placed on climate change response measures viewed through the prism of their negative impact on human rights. To be more specific in this regard, one of the most severe effects of the action to combat climate change manifests itself in the limitation of States’ opportunities to achieve economic development mainly through natural resource-based industries, which is especially relevant in the case of many developing countries.

As a result, climate change response measures seriously threaten the realisation of the right to development. In accordance with Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development (hereinafter – DRD), this right is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realised.³⁰ Notably, many scholars³¹ adhere to the view that the right to development is presently at risk from climate action pertinent to States’ international obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.³²

²⁸ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (24 January 2018), UN Doc. A/HRC/37/59, para. 14.

²⁹ Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (12 December 2015), in force 4 November 2016; Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGA Res. 70/1 (21 October 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/1.

³⁰ United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development, UNGA. Res. 41/128 (4 December 1986), UN Doc. A/RES/41/128.

³¹ Boyle, Humphreys, Robinson, Schapper

³² Boyle (2018), p. 765; Robinson and Shine, *supra* note 9, pp. 566-567; Humphreys (2011), p. 50; Schapper, *supra* note 9, p. 280.

In particular, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement sets forth that “in order to achieve the long-term temperature goal set out in Article 2, Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible”.³³ On current projections, developing countries, such as India, Indonesia, Iran, will be at the level of the United States’ development in the 1890-s when reaching global peaks and rapidly reducing thereafter.³⁴ Furthermore, the problem analysed is exacerbated by the fact that the existing mechanisms to contribute to mitigation of carbon emissions are not efficient enough. So far, little progress has been made in relation to the improvement of financing climate change mitigation in developing and emerging economies. The same is also true for cooperative actions on new technologies’ transfer to developing and the least developed countries.³⁵ As follows from the above-mentioned, an appropriate legal framework is needed within which the acute issue of the impact of climate change and those of climate change response measures on human rights could be addressed.

The human rights-based approach to climate change response measures: critical evaluation

One of the current frameworks for combating climate change is the human rights-based approach (hereinafter – HRBA). According to the common understanding of the HRBA, all plans, policies and processes of development should be based on a system of rights and corresponding obligations under international law which require States to take actions to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights, including the right to development. The special emphasis given to the latter right is reiterated in the climate change context, namely that the mobilisation of resources to combating climate change should not compromise other governmental efforts to achieve the full realisation of all human rights in general, and the right to development.³⁶

The HRBA is reflected in numerous international legal instruments. For instance, the 2030 Agenda underscores the indivisibility and interdependence of sustainable development. More specifically, the goals of lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources should be in line with the goals of ending poverty, hunger and promoting sustainable, inclusive and sustained economic growth.³⁷ Similar wording is used in the preamble to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter – UNFCCC) which reaffirms that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic development.³⁸ The Paris Agreement, in its turn, acknowledges that Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, including

³³ Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (12 December 2015), in force 4 November 2016.

³⁴ Ibid.; ‘Zero carbon zero poverty the climate justice way’, available at:

<https://www.mrfcj.org/pdf/2015-02-05-Zero-Carbon-Zero-Poverty-the-Climate-Justice-Way.pdf>.

³⁵ Doshi and Garschagen (2020), pp. 14-15; ‘Climate action and support trends: based on national reports submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat under the current reporting framework’, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Climate_Action_Support_Trends_2019.

³⁶ ‘The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation: Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies’, available at: https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/6959-The_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Development_Cooperation_Towards_a_Common_Understanding_among_UN.pdf; ‘Understanding human rights and climate change’, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/COP21.pdf>.

³⁷ Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, *supra* note 29, para. 55.

³⁸ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (9 May 1992), in force 24 March 1994.

the right to development. Likewise, the 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction recognizes that “managing the risk of disasters is aimed at protecting persons..., as well as cultural and environmental assets, while promoting and protecting all human rights, including the right to development”.³⁹

According to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, human-made greenhouse gas emissions are the primary cause of climate change.⁴⁰ This is the core of the HRBA and requires States to reduce carbon emissions to comply with human rights obligations. The right to development, however, implies the right to emit greenhouse gasses to improve people’s livelihoods and to raising their material living standards, which is pertinent to developing countries.⁴¹ Hence, a difficult question arises when it comes to compatibility of such obligations, namely those on human rights affected by climate change and those on the right to development affected by action to tackle climate change. From this perspective, the implementation of the approach analysed may hinder urgent climate action. This is accounted for by the need to prioritise States’ obligations either on human rights threatened by climate change, which requires climate change response, or on the right to development, which is incompatible with such a response.

To shed light on the given problem, let us turn to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the difference of which in terms of the present discussion has been illustrated by Rudolf. Specifically, while under the former international legal document, it is equally important to address both developmental and environmental needs (Principle 3),⁴² the latter one, conversely, gives priority to development.⁴³ In a similar vein, the above-mentioned UNFCCC calls for the need to integrate climate change measures with development programmes (Article 3), thereby providing avenues for limitation of international environmental obligations to promote sustainable development. Given these observations, it has been suggested that a balance be struck between development and environmental protection.⁴⁴

It seems clear that to achieve such a balance one should bear in mind that there are two possible options: either by promoting the ecological dimension, for example, through forest conservation, tree-planting projects, sustainable management of land use, as well as alternative energy sources, including new low-carbon and energy technology,⁴⁵ or by reducing developmental needs. Robinson rightly stressed in this regard that if the countries of the world do not make the transition to a zero carbon society, everyone will suffer the adverse effects of climate change.⁴⁶ This needs to be seen in light of the fact that the global average temperature is predicted to increase by up to 6.4 degrees centigrade.⁴⁷ The likelihood of such a climatic scenario is evident

³⁹ Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030 (18 March 2015), para. 19.

⁴⁰ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report’, available at: https://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/ipcc/resources/pdf/IPCC_SynthesisReport.pdf.

⁴¹ Humphreys, *supra* note 31, pp. 15, 87; Robinson and Shine, *supra* note 9, p. 567.

⁴² Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (14 June 1992), UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I).

⁴³ Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (5 June 1993), UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 10 (I).

⁴⁴ In: Marks (2008), p. 115.

⁴⁵ ‘Understanding human rights and climate change’, *supra* note 35.

⁴⁶ Robinson and Shine, *supra* note 9, p. 568.

⁴⁷ McInerney-Lankford et al. (2011), p. 15.

from the Global Monitoring Laboratory's data indicating that the carbon dioxide concentration in the Earth's atmosphere is still rising.⁴⁸

As remarked earlier, international cooperation on climate change-related financial and technological support, which is needed to implement measures pertinent to ecological dimension, has not yet proved to be effective in terms of climate action at scale. That is what highlights the relevance of striking a balance between climate change response and development through the limitation of developmental needs. Based on the above, it seems reasonable that precedence should be given to climate change response measures, since they are aimed at preserving and maintaining a favourable environment that is vital for the survival of both present and future generations.

It is noteworthy that the aforementioned international legal instruments, namely the 2030 Agenda, the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, recognize the importance of protecting the climate for the present as well as for the future generations of mankind.⁴⁹ Apart from these documents, the notable example is the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development "The future we want" with its emphasis on the commitment of the international community to ensuring the promotion of an environmentally sustainable future for present and future generations.⁵⁰

In this respect, to address the problem of establishing an appropriate legal framework for urging response to climate change, it is suggested that the HRBA be interpreted as built upon the rights of future generations. It should be noted considering the present proposal that although universality is viewed as one of the HRBA's constituent principles,⁵¹ due consideration has not yet been given to the particular importance of its intergenerational component in the context of climate change discourse. While this issue has nevertheless been discussed in literature that builds upon the HRBA, the latter approach seems to be inaccurately viewed as providing tools for dealing with conflicting rights claims, such as those of present generations for livelihood security and the intergenerational claims for environmental protection.⁵²

Thus, under the HRBA's common understanding, this approach appears to be inconsistent with its essence when applied to climate action. Without underscoring its intergenerational dimension, the HRBA leads to contradiction between States' obligations relating to human rights affected by climate change as well as climate action. Against this background, according to the proposed HRBA's interpretation as based upon the rights of *future* generations, such an approach could help to tackle the

⁴⁸ 'Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide', available at: <https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/mlo.html>.

⁴⁹ Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGA Res. 70/1 (21 October 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/70/1, preamble; Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (12 December 2015), in force 4 November 2016, preamble; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (14 June 1992), UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), principle 3; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (5 June 1993), UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para. 11 (I).

⁵⁰ 'The Future We Want', UNGA Res. 66/228 (11 September 2012), paras. 1, 13.

⁵¹ 'Understanding human rights and climate change', *supra* note 35.

⁵² 'Human Rights Based Approach at Sida: Compilation of Thematic Area Briefs', available at: <https://publikationer.sida.se/contentassets/410e73f0f7074e8d83e7397ba13a5a6a/18253.pdf>.

problem of having to prioritise human rights obligations, through the temporary restriction of the right to development while improving the existing mechanisms, including technology transfer and climate finance, and developing new ones to ensure this right when reducing carbon emissions.

Regarding practical implementation of the proposed approach, it is necessary to mention that one of the basic principles underlying the right to development under the DRD is improvement of human well-being (Article 1-4, 8). Among other international legal documents, the ICESCR sets forth the right to a decent standard of living and to increasingly better living conditions (Article 11 of the ICESCR). As Schrijver rightly pointed out, “this treaty article could be seen as a ‘mini treaty’ on the right to development”, thereby forming part of the very essence of the human right to development.⁵³ It should be noted here that Article 4 of the ICESCR provides avenues for limitation of the right to a decent standard of living in accordance with certain criteria, namely compatibility with the nature of rights and the promotion of general welfare as a purpose of such limitation.

The first criterion refers to the CESCR’s minimum core obligations approach, under which there is an absolute bottom-line of States’ human rights obligations that should be complied with irrespective of the economic development level. This being the case, one of the contexts of human rights limitations when the CESCR used this approach calling on States to guarantee minimum essential levels is that of natural disasters, which appears relevant in terms of the aforementioned proposal.⁵⁴

With respect to the second criterion, one should consider the fact that the meaning of the ‘general welfare’ is not elucidated. However, according to the *travaux préparatoires*, reasons relating to maintaining public order or respecting rights and freedoms of others were rejected, which led to the understanding of ‘general welfare’ in literature as pertaining mainly to social and economic well-being.⁵⁵ Such understanding is particularly apt considering the climate change discourse, as the long-term well-being of humankind cannot be achieved without climate action at scale. From this perspective, it is through the limitation of the right to a decent standard of living, which constitutes the core of the human right to development, that the balance between developmental and environmental needs could be achieved.

Conclusion

Thus, based on the above-mentioned observations, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, in view of the interconnectedness between security and human rights, it seems relevant to address the human security concern through the human rights lens in the context of climate change and human rights discourse. Second, it has been revealed that the adverse climate change effects pose challenges to the realization of a wide range of human rights, including at least those to life, to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, to an adequate standard of living, to water, to property, to a favourable environment, to self-determination, as well as cultural rights. Third, it has been determined that, apart from climate change-related effects, their

⁵³ Schrijver (2020), p. 93.

⁵⁴ Müller (2009), pp. 569, 580.

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 569, 573.

impacts and the affected rights, there are threats from climate change response measures to the enjoyment of the human right to development. That is what appears to contradict the rationale underlying climate action at scale and therefore calls for the appropriate legal framework for urging response to climate change.

Finally, it is concluded that the HRBA under a common understanding is inconsistent with its essence, meaning that this approach cannot be applicable to all human rights threatened by both climate change and climate action. This is largely because such an approach leads to contradiction between States' human rights obligations when it comes to its operationalization. Given the lack of special emphasis on its intergenerational dimension, it is suggested that the HRBA be interpreted as built upon the rights of future generations, which would help to address the problem of having to prioritize human rights obligations. This is proposed to be achieved through the temporary restriction of the right to development, through the limitation of the right to a decent standard of living (Article 11 of the ICESCR) being viewed as a cornerstone of the human right to development. Meanwhile, due consideration should be given to improving the existing climate change mitigation mechanisms and developing new ones to ensure this right when reducing carbon emissions. The rationale behind this is the urgent need for climate action at scale to avoid the long-term negative human rights implications of climate change.

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ALICJA PROCHNIAK⁵⁶ – How identity politics and use of political myths affected the formation of foreign and security strategies in Poland, 2008 – 2016?

Introduction

Have identity politics together with the associated system of symbols in the form of political myths, introduced by the Polish government, determined threat assessment and response to the Ukrainian crisis? In recent years, an important shift took place in Polish foreign policy. This period is marked with the governance of a new party, which introduced and popularized a new vision of the Polish national identity. Together with the new definition and vision of national identity, a revised system of values in the form of new discourses, narratives and political myths was popularised in order to gain popular political support. The use of this type of framing was also designated to legitimise government policies, mobilise society and to initiate a new nation-building process which was to result in the construction of a cohesive nation, sharing a broadly accepted and unified system of values. The appeal to emotions and identity politics with the frequent use of political myths in the public political debate had however simplified political reality. The narrowed political debate has had a significant effect on the formulation of security strategies and foreign policy responses. The discourses and narratives loaded with emotional messages set paradigms and frameworks which hinder the perception of international affairs. They popularized a narrow view that does not allow the appearance and formulation of alternative definitions. The consistent implementation of narration characterized by the common use of political myths, designated for purely domestic use has influenced the way society, media and elites define and see international affairs. The political discussion dominated by those definitions can also affect the threat assessment and the foreign and security policy formation in the country. The main aim of the analysis is to explore whether identity politics and the use of political myths have obscured foreign policy and security assessment and, if so, how?

This work will argue that the national identity shift and identity politics aimed at gaining broader political support, mass mobilisation, and legitimacy had a significant impact on foreign policy and security strategies formation in Poland between 2008 and 2016. The implementation of identity politics was aimed at the initiation of the new nation-building process, the creation of the 3rd Polish Commonwealth. Together with the redefinition of national identity the state interest and its foreign and security policy had changed. The mobilisation of identity had significant repercussions and resulted in the escalation of tensions with neighbouring countries. The Annexation of Crimea in 2014 could be seen as the culmination point in this struggle. While the Crimean crisis had many other international causes discussed and analysed through realist and liberal perspectives by scholars, this work will concentrate on bringing to the light other aspects of the conflict and detailed local analysis. The study conducted from the realist or liberal point of view does not reveal important local factors, which exacerbated

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antagonisms in Eastern Europe. This study analyses the foreign policy of Poland drawing on a constructivist approach. The analysis conducted through the constructivist lens suggests that identity mobilisation which took place between 2008 and 2016 in Poland not only led to an escalation of the conflict in 2014 but it continues to intensify pressure in the region and in effect entailed the largest military mobilisation seen in the region since 1989.

Foreign Policy and the Role of Identity

Both Realism and Liberalism concentrate on two different aspects of foreign policy. The theory of realism analyses foreign policy through the realm of power facets as military, economy, or army. Liberalists on the other hand, concentrate mostly on development, modernisation, freedom, influence, soft power and attraction.⁵⁷ The events in Crimea are mostly seen in the context of power politics, the great power rivalry between East and West, and are narrowed down to development, democratisation and modernisation issues.

Realists argue that the Russian intervention in Crimea was largely geopolitical. Liberalism sees the conflict in terms of competition between Russia who was planning to incorporate Ukraine into the structure's alternative to the European Union (EU). According to constructivism, the national identity of the country is an important element in the process of foreign policy formation.⁵⁸ Identity defines and constitutes state interest.⁵⁹ The shifts and changes in national identity will also be reflected in foreign policy choices. National interest will be defined differently depending on the governing group and their system of values.⁶⁰ The foreign and security policies, and threat assessment are benchmarked and evaluated according to the national interest as defined by the governing group. Constructivism allows analysing international affairs through the lens of identity and cultural context in which these actions take place. Constructivists analyse foreign and security policy, taking into account the role of different national groups that present their vision of national identity.⁶¹

Constructivists argue that the social context defines the formation of national identity and national interest. Therefore, the development of such interest should be carefully studied.⁶² In the last decade, Poland has undergone significant changes in its national identity. This is also reflected in its foreign policy, which since 2001 has a rather revisionist character. The constructivist approach allows analysing those identity shifts and its effects on security and foreign policy formation. This type of analysis can help in understanding how identity politics and political myths can affect the formation of security and foreign policy.

The current academic enquiry into narratives in Polish foreign policy concentrates mostly on limited criticisms towards the establishment of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI). Several authors have written about the geopolitical aspect of the project.⁶³ The

⁵⁷ Tsygankov (2016)

⁵⁸ Tsygankov (2016)

⁵⁹ Wendt (2012)

⁶⁰ Ripsman (2014)

⁶¹ Tsygankov (2016), Bucher and Jasper (2016)

⁶² Tsygankov (2016), Wendt (2012)

⁶³ Engdahl (2017), Kratschke (2018), Babel (2017), Kandrik (2017)

authors pointed to the fact that TSI in many ways is similar to an old Polish geopolitical project called Intermarium.⁶⁴ Others see it as an example of Polish imperialism⁶⁵ and investigated the geopolitical situation in which the Intermarium concept emerged.⁶⁶ Others criticized TSI for encouraging the emergence of regionalism which may negatively affect European unity.⁶⁷

Rafal Riedel's work on Intermarium presents it as the emancipatory narrative which emerged as a counternarrative to the European integration project.⁶⁸ Drawing from a critical approach, Riedel analysed the narratives of various political actors and how they were employed in contemporary discourse. The analysis found not only that the narrative represents a counterbalance to European integration but also that it is constructed to challenge Western domination and serves the ambitions of the 'narrative entrepreneurs' who aim to establish Poland as a regional power.⁶⁹

Other important contributions to the analysis of Polish foreign policy narratives include the work presented by Monika Sus.⁷⁰ She did in-depth analysis of the Polish-Russian relationship focusing on how the Ukrainian crisis affected affairs in the years 2014-2017.⁷¹ Her work analyses the dominant topics in the Polish debate about Russia after 2013. This insightful research also illustrates how Warsaw's priorities and position influenced EU policy towards Russia.

The constructivist-led inquiry as presented by Agnieszka Cianciara provides another detailed analysis of Polish foreign policy narratives. Her main topics of interest are the re-orientation of the Polish EU policy, shifts in narratives of the European Neighbourhood and European integration (ENP). Cianciara's interest, however, lay mainly in Polish narratives towards the European Union and Polish relationships with the European Union. None of the existing literature critically investigated the core assumptions and axioms of the Polish security and foreign policy strategy. This work is an attempt to critically assess the main assumptions of the debate and to show the influence of identity politics and political myths on its formation.

Theoretical Framework - Foreign Policy Formation and Identity

On the state level, identity is negotiated between three distinct and interrelated groups – leadership, political elites, and society.⁷² Each identity or interest group forms and promotes their own visions. Identity is a product of discursive competition among different groups and coalitions.⁷³

The contestation of identity or interests takes place until one of the available visions becomes predominant. All groups seek to achieve social recognition and convince

⁶⁴ Kandrik (2017)

⁶⁵ Ištók and Koziak

⁶⁶ Ištók, Kozárová and Polačková (2018)

⁶⁷ Masson 2018, Bebel (2018)

⁶⁸ Riedel (2021)

⁶⁹ Riedel (2021)

⁷⁰ Sus (2018)

⁷¹ Sus (2018)

⁷² Tsygankov (2014)

⁷³ Bucherand Jasper (2016)

society of their interests and arguments. When the persuasion is complete the state appropriates the dominant vision of national identity and interests as a guide in policymaking. Foreign policy changes and evolves according to that dominant vision of national identity.⁷⁴

Similarly, the political elites or different political groups may use identity or interests as a way to achieve popular support and social mobilization. By appealing to certain interests and emotions, individual leaders can reflect the group's visions of national identity and interests in their own political programme to gain popular support. The term "identity politics" refers to movements that mobilise around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power.⁷⁵ Identity politics and the use of strategic communication are often used as tools by which political groups can influence the outcome of discursive identity formation. Re-igniting memories of past conflicts and forming new identities in relation to those conflicts works well for mobilising public opinion but at the same time shapes attitudes which cannot be easily abandoned. Incorporation of political myths into official political communication makes messages and narratives effective.⁷⁶ Myths create the common, "mythical" ground that does not need to be backed by the political debate or arguments.⁷⁷ National political myths appear in historically simplified or selective stories about the founding of the state.⁷⁸ They are the legends, told around specific historical figures and events, that were crucial in the nation-building process, and a part of state ceremonies, celebrations, and rituals.⁷⁹

In the construction of political messages, political actors can use strategic and tactical communication to influence audiences. Using political myths governing elites can extract resources and mobilise domestic support to undertake ambitious foreign policy goals more effectively.⁸⁰ Political myths embedded in historical narratives can be seen as tools, communicated tactically to dominate the agenda.⁸¹ Once implemented into the debate, they serve as a cultural lens through which a nation's views about the outside world are shaped. These types of messages set parameters for understanding international affairs and marginalise competing points of views.⁸² The high concentration of myths in the debates do not allow true deliberation or reconceptualization of national identity.⁸³

State leaders such as the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, occupy critical positions in the administration and are the actors responsible for the formation of foreign policy and security strategies.⁸⁴ They are the key figures who analyse the risk, design the most appropriate security strategies and define paradigms of national interests.⁸⁵ Identity politics that includes an appeal to historical and mythical

⁷⁴ Ripsman (2016)

⁷⁵ Kaldor (2007)

⁷⁶ De Guevara (2016)

⁷⁷ Munch (2016)

⁷⁸ Munch (2016)

⁷⁹ De Guevara (2016)

⁸⁰ Schweller (2014)

⁸¹ Yanow (2016)

⁸² Hall (1982)

⁸³ Yanow (2016)

⁸⁴ Lobell (2014)

⁸⁵ Lobell (2014)

symbols, while may be very effective domestically (helps to mobilize society and to achieve the political aims), can also obscure security assessment and formation of foreign policy. Domestic actors provide or deny political support for such narratives. Therefore, the action of the government has to be aligned with the electoral message, otherwise they may lose the political support of important groups internally. In this way, the high concentration of political myths can determine the formation of security strategies and foreign policy.

Case Study: Poland

Since regaining independence over the creation of its foreign policy in 1989, the majority of Polish government parties have had a very pro-Western orientation. They mainly subscribed to an identity compatible with western values. The beginning of the 21st century however brought changes in Polish foreign policy creation. Around the period 2001 – 2005, a new political party with a distinct political vision and ideas of national identity, became popular in Poland, with the height of its popularity marked in 2005. In that year both the President and the Government elections were won by the representatives of the same political faction, called the Law and Justice party.

Previously, governing parties had more of an internationalist orientation, the direction of thought in a foreign policy called 'Piast'. The vision was constructed mainly on a liberal or centre-left vision of politics with a paradigm promoting openness, dialogue and cooperation with neighbouring countries.⁸⁶ This school of thought could be linked with an outward leaning vision of foreign policy which fostered overseas investments, international exposure and strong international links. Domestically supporters of this line of the foreign policy included mostly export-orientated firms, large banking and financial services, and skilled labour, groups for which future interest lay in the country's enhanced participation in the international system.⁸⁷ That trend in politics included membership in multilateral international organisations, participating in conventions, treaties and collective security arrangements.⁸⁸

In 2005, a new political party and vision took hold in Poland. The group had mainly a nationalist orientation and the vision of foreign policy inspired by politics conducted by the Jagellonian dynasty of kings who established the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 16th century. The strong influences of Józef Piłsudski, Giedroyc and Mieroszewski can be also noted. In line with this dominant rhetoric as set by Intermarium concept and the Giedroyc Doctrine, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a joint policy initiative was presented by the foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008. The EaP aimed to deepen and strengthen relations between the European Union and its six Eastern neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership was inaugurated by the European Union in Prague, Czech Republic on 7 May 2009.

⁸⁶ Maciążek (2011)

⁸⁷ Lobell (2014)

⁸⁸ Lobell (2014)

The essence of Jagiellonian politics is a conviction that Poland should cooperate closely with other Eastern European countries and become the regional leader to counterbalance the strong position of Russia and Germany. The 'Jagiellonian' vision in international politics mostly concentrates on a bid for regional hegemony to counter influences of other strong powers in the region. The group around the Law and Justice party was mostly orientated towards maximisation of national gains. It was supported by non-internationally competitive sectors and domestically oriented actors.⁸⁹ These are the groups which possess few foreign assets or ties and companies which compete with imports. The strong supporters included inefficient industries (e.g., coal industry), agriculture, import-substituting manufacturing and labour-intensive industries.⁹⁰ This interest group contests ideas of international engagement because it undermines their domestic power and position. The foreign policy shift orientated towards the bid for regional hegemony signalled more revisionist intentions. The period of 2008 – 2016, from 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia and the establishment of the TSI in 2016, could be seen as the period when those tensions systematically grew due to intensive identity politics and their mobilisation in the region. The (TSI) members included mostly former communist countries from Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Established in 2016, the project primarily aimed to develop transport and communication infrastructure and diversify energy supplies among partners.

While both the 'Piast' and 'Jagiellonian' vision of Polish foreign policy see the independence of Ukraine as crucial for Poland's sovereignty, the 'Piast' paradigm does not attempt a revisionist approach.

Set within this context, this paper considers that identity politics together with the associated system of symbols in form of political myths introduced by the government in Poland 2008 – 2016 determined and, to large extent, shaped the formation of security and foreign policy in Poland.

Methodology

I have conducted the analysis using Polkinghorne's Analysis of Narratives method.⁹¹ This method uses pragmatic cognition, a technique which classifies the general features and common themes of the story into different categories.⁹² The texts and publications are analysed to identify larger, common patterns, general concepts and categories. The method is called the analysis of narrative or discourse analysis. The categories and codes are inductively derived from the data. I have analysed publications issued in the years 2007 – 2016. I analysed the official government documents and speeches including interviews of senior political figures, e.g. Prime Minister, President, and the party leaders. The analysis included policy papers and publications issued by the most influential and recognized organizations as the

⁸⁹ Lobell (2014)

⁹⁰ Lobell (2014)

⁹¹ Oliver (1998), Kim (2015)

⁹² Kim (2015)

Warsaw Institute, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Relations, European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis, Jagiellonian Institute, Institute for Eastern Studies – Economic Forum, and the Republican Foundation. All institutions have an international reputation, and their reports and expertise are presented at international conferences. I also analysed main publications issued by governmental bodies as the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, and Ministry of National Defence.

The analysis of narratives helped to identify those narratives which function as political myths in a public debate, and which structured this debate. Christopher Flood introduced a definition of a political myth as ‘an ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essentials by a social group’.⁹³ The presence of a strong ideological factor in the message of a political myth, for example, in the form of a symbol, and revoking the past or collective experiences, make them more influential than just ordinary narratives. Political myths are narratives with pre-structured and mythologised meanings.⁹⁴ The analysis distinguished the main themes and the characteristics of the debate. The identified overarching themes in the documents were classified as:

- the Russian Threat,
- Nation and State Building Theme,
- Identities Representations Build on Binary Oppositions,
- Use of emotional language associated with positions of fear, pride, and resentment.

The identified structure of representation in rhetoric reflects the construction of relationships as contained in discourses recognised as biased in international relations. The main arguments and rhetoric in the texts draw strongly from foundational and biographical narratives⁹⁵ which function as political myths.

Analysis – identification of the myths which led to the creation of TSI

The preliminary narrative analysis conducted identified the presence of several myths in the political debate. The myths which influenced the formation of the strategic aims of foreign policy are also clearly referenced in the texts produced by the leading politicians, ministries and think tanks. In this section, I present how the existence and reference to myths steered the formation of the TSI.

The Discourse of the ‘West and the Rest’

The term “West”, when used in political texts and messages, relates to an idea, concept, or type of society. Hall argues that the term itself was produced within certain historical processes and operates in a particular context and specific historical circumstances.⁹⁶ In political discourses and narratives, the term provides a model of

⁹³ Flood (2002)

⁹⁴ Esch (2010)

⁹⁵ Subotic (2016)

⁹⁶ Hall (1992)

comparison with non-western actors, often by putting them in opposition.⁹⁷ According to this narrative, Poland belongs to the Western civilization while Russia does not share the same, western values, tradition, or heritage.

The Discourse of 'the Clash of Civilizations'

Another related myth which can be identified is the myth of 'the Clash of Civilizations'. The departure argument point in dominant foreign and security policy discourses is the view that the Polish and Russians cultures, perception and mentality are different and historically incompatible. Because of fundamental differences, they are a potential source of conflict and chaos. This argument is largely built on the writing of Samuel Huntington who wrote "The Clash of Civilization".⁹⁸ The central theme of "The Clash of Civilizations" book is a statement that identity will define the conflicts in the post-Cold War world. Cultural identities and civilization would become the features of future conflicts between groups from different civilizations.⁹⁹ Thus, highlighting the strict and sharp differences between Poland and Russia and underlining that both belong to different civilizations can be considered as revoking a political myth. The myth is present in the narratives by showing the cultural or perceptual differences which function in Russia and Poland.

The myth shapes the security debate and choice of foreign policy, as well as the choice of allies and enemies. The US is presented as a friendly, safe and secure power. While other blocks are seen as dangerous and suspicious.

The presence of the myth in narrative structure perception of current political affairs describes conflict with Russia along civilizational lines. The justification and foundation of the conflict are seen in civilizational differences and choice of values. This structure poses a serious consequence for future conflict analysis or resolution. When the problem/conflict is defined according to civilizational or identity lines, it becomes nearly impossible to propose an effective solution to growing tensions.

The presence of both myths defines the aims and goals in foreign policy and forms the bases of political strategy. The myth structures political assessment and calculation along geopolitical lines between 'Western' and 'non-Western' civilizations. Where 'western' is seen as familiar, friendly and something to aspire to and the 'eastern' as foreign, suspicious, and far off or removed from themselves. The representation, characterisation and description of actors are constructed along these simplistic lines. Moreover, they function as an overarching paradigm which guides the formation of the opinion in the broader national community. With time, the myth develops into the narrative of unquestioned authority which narrows down political choices. The presence of 'The Clash of Civilization' myth justifies and legitimizes the choice of allies structured by the 'West and the Rest' discourse. The debate and narratives influenced by the myth tell us not only that 'Western' is friendly but also that it is 'good'. In this way the myth of the 'Clash of Civilizations' elevates the values of one civilization over another.

⁹⁷ Hall (1992)

⁹⁸ Huntington (1997)

⁹⁹ Huntington (1997)

Myth of Intermarium

The myth of Intermarium entered Polish political debate in 2012. It was largely associated with the publications issued by institutions which advocated for the primacy of transatlantic relations in Polish foreign policy.¹⁰⁰ Intermarium refers to the mythical creation of the land between three seas, Adriatic, Baltic and the Black Sea. It refers to The Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth, The Crown of The Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It was considered one of the biggest and most powerful countries in the 16th and 17th century. With the creation of the Union, Poland was powerful enough to counterbalance the strong position of Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The geopolitical project of Intermarium was developed by Józef Piłsudski (1867 – 1935), the Polish Chief of State (1918 -1920), and envisioned a federation of Eastern European states which together was to create a strong union similar to The Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth discussed below.

Józef Piłsudski in cooperation with Sir Harold Mackinder was trying to implement the idea to counterbalance Russian influence in the 1920s.¹⁰¹ While the TSI has mainly economic character, the idea is largely anchored in both Intermarium and the Polish - Lithuanian Commonwealth. The main assumptions and core strategy are closely interconnected.

Myth of Piłsudski

The influence of this myth is probably the most significant. In this mythical narrative, Piłsudski is seen as a founding father of the Second Polish Republic which regained independence in 1918 after 123 years of partition implemented in 1795 by Austria, Prussia and Russia. Piłsudski believed in the ideals, traditions and culture of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and hoped to establish a similar union with Ukraine and Lithuania.¹⁰² In the years 1918 until 1922, Piłsudski served as Poland's Chief of State. He retired from politics in 1923 but returned to power three years later in the May 1926 coup d'état. His strong leadership skills earned him the status of a Polish strongman. This type of governance brought him a specific cult of personality which has lasted well into the 21st century. His main foreign policy strategies were aimed at enhancing the existing security measures and securing newly regained independence. He wanted to strengthen national independence movements among nations which had become part of the Soviet Union. His second aim was the creation of tight cooperation or union of the Eastern European states, the countries located in an area between the three seas.¹⁰³ Both goals remain the axioms of Polish foreign policy up to this day. They are also condensed in the main objectives of TSI and EaP.

The myths present in the political debate developed mythologised, sacred and divine strategies and aims which are rarely questioned. It was the nature of Ukrainian

¹⁰⁰ Chodakewicz (2012), Atlantic Council (2016)

¹⁰¹ Pelizza (2016)

¹⁰² Czubiński (1988), Davies (2001)

¹⁰³ Czubiński (1988), Davies (2001)

economic relations which postponed the integration with the European Union. Russia remains the biggest exporter for the Ukrainian economy. The economic and infrastructure interdependencies in Eastern Europe do not always permit smooth and swift integration with European structures. Today, Hungary and Moldova still remain nearly entirely reliant on energy imports from Russia.¹⁰⁴ The uncritical attachment to the main security paradigm prevents the formation of more adequate and more nuanced foreign policy and security responses to unfolding events.

The high reference to the concept of Intermarium and personality cult of the chief of State, Piłsudski, justifies and legitimizes government choices. Yet, the project suffers from the same shortcomings as its predecessor. The shortcoming of the TSI remains the same as the shortcoming of the previous Intermarium project. The presence, cultivation and use of myths do not allow to sufficiently address those problems:

- Over-reliance on Western allies.
- Ideological approach.
- Different political and economic realities among Eastern European countries as presented by the case of Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary and Moldova.

Conclusion

Political actors, leaders and influential groups continually shape and reshape the nature of international relations through language, actions and interactions. Language plays a key role in this process because identity is shaped by written and spoken communication between peoples and different groups. The political language in the form of discourses, narratives and political myths influences identity formation.¹⁰⁵ Language has the ability to change social reality as it shapes and determines actions, norms, values, attitudes and perceptions of reality.¹⁰⁶ The constructivist lens of international relations goes beyond the material reality and includes the effect of identities, interest, ideas and beliefs on foreign policy and security.¹⁰⁷

The analysis of narratives and discourses in Poland identified the frequent use of specific political myths in the construction of the political landscape since 2008. The language and use of symbols structured the formation of security strategies and the direction of foreign policy. Certain political myths functioned as axioms in the construction of foreign policy and determined its shape.

The successful foreign and security policy is measured not only by international recognition.¹⁰⁸ The achievement of the main aims of the policy is equally important. Both the EaP and TSI were designed to achieve balance and stabilization in Eastern Europe. The case of Ukraine 2014 and Belarus in 2020 can be seen as examples of how intended policies do not always bring expected results. Therefore, alternative definitions and approaches should be introduced and discussed openly as part of public debate. The reconceptualisation of the main security approaches, however, is not always possible. Identity politics and use of political myths serve an important

¹⁰⁴ IEA 2020, Najarian (2017)

¹⁰⁵ Behravesh (2011)

¹⁰⁶ Theys (2018)

¹⁰⁷ Theys (2018)

¹⁰⁸ Tsygankov (2014)

domestic function. They mobilise certain interests' groups who set the broadly accepted meta-narrative and a vision of national identity and its interests. The main assumptions of those narratives are anchored in symbolic, mythical events and figures. Hence, the formation of alternative approaches and symbols cannot always easily emerge. In these circumstances, the arrival of any alternative formulations or approaches may be seen as acting against the interests of the state. The example of Poland shows how identity politics and the use of political myths designed for domestic purposes can affect the formation of the security and foreign policy agenda.

Effective national identity doesn't have to be based on negative, stereotypical or binary opposition construction of 'Self' and 'Others'.¹⁰⁹ New and effective strategies should rather look for ways to overcome these simplistic constructions. Domestic and international identity construction can also take place through more positive and more nuanced identity formation. The strategies¹¹⁰ build on the past 'Self' and 'Other' characteristics have not succeeded. The future solutions require more creative construction of otherness and more accurate accounts of 'Self' and 'Other' relations.¹¹¹

It is important for scholars to talk about the effects of tactical communication. Narratives and discourses imbued with political myths set powerful interpretations. Often this type of communication hampers the open deliberation of all available ideas and solutions. Any type of critical approach is seen as suspicious and sometimes even threatening. Identity politics and mythmaking are at the core of many government communications strategies. For example, 'Make America Great Again', 'Make Britain Great Again', and the way the subject of immigration is sometimes presented and framed are found aplenty in international politics today. Those political debates can be also characterized by reliance on political myths. Further research about the role, functions and effects of political myths, and distribution of the results is important. The wider public needs to be made aware of the effects and mechanisms involved in a certain type of political and tactical communication. This will help to make the public more resistant to this type of rhetoric and to prevent mobilisation based on identity politics and myths. Many artists, filmmakers, journalists, and historians often subscribe to the mythologised narratives and create works in line with the current political agenda. These types of messages polarise societies, limit true deliberation, and impede critical debate.

The aim of this research is not westernisation of Polish debate, further spread of liberal democratic values or the deconstruction approach to history. This work is not leading to 'uncovering' the objective 'truths' behind the myths. Myths are neither 'true' nor 'false', they are just a matter of politics.¹¹² The aim of this work is to raise public awareness, identify processes and their effects so the public will be less prone to be swayed by this type of rhetoric.

¹⁰⁹ Lebow (2008)

¹¹⁰ Lebow (2008)

¹¹¹ Berenskoetter (2011)

¹¹² De Guerva (2016)

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DARYA SAVATEEVA¹¹³ – The problem of unequal access to higher education in Germany at the beginning of the 21st century

Human security is a state of protection of a person from danger factors at the level of his personal interests and needs, protection of life, health, dignity of each person, etc. A broader approach is needed to consider the topic of human security in a globalizing world. This is reflected in the topic of this paper, which touches upon unequal access to higher education for different groups of the German population at the beginning of the 21st century. The system of higher education makes a decisive contribution to the realisation of the concept of equality of opportunity, the underlying social state. Ensuring accessibility of higher education for all segments of the population is one of the key goals of the Bologna Process, in which Germany has been participating since 1999. The social function of education is an important direction in educational policy. The German higher education system is considered to be one of the best in the world. However, by the beginning of the 21st century, the existing system had begun to falter. This was owing to economic changes, the consequences of German reunification and the expansion of the European Union area. Today, the system of modern Germany exists and develops in the context of ensuing acute social problems.

At the beginning of the 21st century, there was a trend towards unequal access of different segments of the population to higher education. This conclusion can be made based on the 18th report of the Society for Mutual Aid of Students. In 2007, the Society carried out a survey of 17,000 students. The data from this report show how social status affects approaches to education. In families where parents have higher education, 83% of young people get higher education, while in families from working backgrounds only 20% access higher education. Another important factor is the parents' profession. A great impact on this situation is the cost of training, since only a small proportion of students receive education at the expense of the state.¹¹⁴

To solve this problem, Germany has one of the most developed systems of financial support for students: the state mechanism in this area is the Law on Assistance in Education. This programme is funded from the state and federal budgets. When considering the possibility of obtaining this scholarship, the greatest attention is paid to the financial situation of the student (his earnings, parents' income, and living conditions etc.). The amount of payments also depends on several criteria, such as the cost of renting housing and having children. The average size of the financial aid rate is 430 Euros per month, throughout the entire period of study (approximately 9 semesters).¹¹⁵

Grants and loans are provided on concessional terms and are payable within 20 years from the date of grant. Only half of the amount is subject to repayment, the rest is a grant. It is also possible to reduce a part of the government loan due to high academic productivity. Since 2009, not only state funds but funds from private companies have

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¹¹⁴ Jahresbericht 2007

¹¹⁵ Bundesgesetz über individuelle Förderung der Ausbildung [Electronic resource]// Bundesministerium der Justiz für Verbraucherschutz.de.

begun to flow to the subsidy fund in order to support gifted youth. Beneficiaries and foreign students are expected to receive payments in the amount of 300 Euro. This measure caused a number of criticisms. Ruth Seidl, assistant policy of higher educational institutions of the 'Greens' party, said: "The priorities of private companies will dominate, and the state government will only transfer funds. As a result, it turns out that financial aid does not always reach the person who really needs it".¹¹⁶ Scholarships would be more effective for those for whom higher education is not available at all for financial reasons.

The analysis of German research on the topic allows us to conclude that regarding the equality of chances guaranteed by the welfare state for all its citizens, including in the field of access to educational services, three most problematic groups can be distinguished:

- immigrants and young people from immigrant families;
- people with disabilities and other representatives of socially vulnerable groups;
- different categories of women.

In recent years, when discussing the problems of the education system, German specialists have relied on data obtained through international research. Based on the results of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) study, it can be concluded that in no country that took part in the research apart from Germany did the chances of getting education for children and adolescents depend to such a large extent on their social status and parents' origins.¹¹⁷

Discrimination of immigrant youth can be proved only in very few cases. However, there is ample evidence that this is indeed happening. OECD research carried out in 2015, shows that children from socially disadvantaged families or immigrant families have less chances to receive higher education than other children.¹¹⁸ Research also suggests that immigrant students must work harder than their non-immigrant classmates to get a recommendation for admission in higher education institutions.

The United Nations and the Council of Europe also find discrimination in education in Germany. In 2015, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination made a number of recommendations for Germany, for example, counteract segregation of "ethnic minority" in education and to take more measures to ensure that minority of students have equal access to education.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ *Государство поддержит талантливых студентов с помощью частных спонсоров* (The State supports talented students with aim of the private sponsors).

¹¹⁷ *OECD-Wachstumsbericht: Weitere Strukturreformen unverzichtbar – aber mit sozialem Augenmaß* (OECD Growth Report: Further structural reforms are indispensable - but with a social sense of proportion)

¹¹⁸ OECD Report Immigrant students' performance in school (2015)

¹¹⁹ *Internationales Übereinkommen zur Beseitigung jeder Form von rassistischer Diskriminierung* (International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination)

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance noted the following points in its 2014 report.¹²⁰ Teachers in Germany are three times more likely to recommend a child to secondary school if he is from a higher socioeconomic class. This negatively affects children with a migrant background. Most of the federal states do not have their own anti-discrimination departments. Since education is a matter of the federal states, there is insufficient anti-discrimination protection in this area.

The problem of discrimination concerns people from immigrant families who lose to children from German families in the competition for places in educational institutions. Research data indicates a high educational motivation in children and adolescents from an immigrant environment. However, a significant part of young immigrants does not achieve a decent professional qualification and therefore have low chances in the labour market. Consequently, in this group of the population there is a high level of unemployment and dependence on social benefits.

Currently in Germany there are a number of programs initiated to overcome social inequalities in access to educational services, such as scholarship programs like those offered by the Robert Bosch and Karl Markel foundations. Their goal is to support talented students from immigrant backgrounds during their studies at school, as well as to assist in continuing education. Particular attention is paid to the development of specific abilities and talents required for successful intercultural communication in a united Europe. The Robert Bosch foundation was founded in 1964 and is one of the largest entrepreneurial foundations in Germany. The Foundation sponsors innovative programs and projects in areas such as healthcare, understanding between peoples, charity, education and upbringing, culture and art, as well as research in the field of psychology, social and natural sciences. From the first days of its existence, the foundation has been actively involved in helping children and adolescents of foreign origin in obtaining school, higher, and professional education. In 1985, the Robert Bosch and Karl Markel foundations drew the attention of German society to the need to help the children of immigrants to get education and professions and developed a special scholarship program for gifted adolescents of foreign origin living in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg. The Karl Markel Foundation was founded in 1920 by a German-English industrialist. The main goal of the foundation is personal counselling and care, as well as financial support for children and adolescents in obtaining higher and professional education.

Depending on where you come from, the chances of earning a degree in education vary. People with a migrant background are still underrepresented in universities, and their share in the total number of students is lower than their share in the total population in their age group. In 2016, about 20% of students had a migrant background, in the total population aged from 15 to 25 – about 33%; however, compared to the data for 2005 it was only about 15%. We see the dynamics of an increase in the number of immigrant students in the total number almost doubled.¹²¹

¹²⁰ European Commission against Racism and Intolerance

¹²¹ Migration und Integration

One reason for the low level of participation in the study is that young people with a migrant past are less likely to finish high school than their counterparts without a migrant background (17% compared with about 23%). The decision to study often depends on social background. Children of academic families go to university in 79 out of 100 examples, whereas in non-academic families, the number is only 27. This social “restriction” is often called an “education funnel”. One thing is for sure, in families where none of the parents studied, the likelihood that young people themselves go to a higher educational institution is immediately reduced.

Also, there is evidence to suggest that students without German citizenship drop out of school more often than students with a German passport. In 2016, 46% dropped out of the bachelor's degree compared to 28% among German students. Experts thus identify the social status and the associated financial problems in the learning process as possible reasons for this disparity.¹²²

People with disabilities should have access to general tertiary education and training throughout life, without discrimination and on an equal basis with others. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities obliges you to do so. More and more universities and student unions are taking on this challenge.¹²³ However, structural, communication and didactic barriers continue to make it difficult for students with disabilities to learn. The data shows that students with disabilities take longer to complete tertiary education and are more likely to drop out and change subjects or university more often than their non-disabled peers. Therefore, universities and student unions have agreed to remove barriers and develop appropriate measures. The overall goal is to create fair access and learning conditions for students with disabilities.¹²⁴

A nationwide survey by the German Student Union, called “Learning Problems”, made it particularly clear in 2011 that many students with disabilities who find learning difficult do not know and do not use their rights and offers of support. Almost all universities and many student unions have representatives and consultants specializing in learning disabilities. These groups can provide targeted information, provide one-to-one support, and are required to maintain confidentiality in counselling situations. The tasks of the university representatives also include bringing structural problems to the university leadership and advising decision-makers in other areas. In addition, university professors can contact these commissions with questions. Depending on their needs, students depend on support from the administration of the student union hostel, the examination committee of the faculty or the international office of the university. This makes it clear that creating a fair learning environment is

¹²² Bildung in Deutschland 2018 [Electronic resource]

¹²³ *Empfehlung der 6. Mitgliederversammlung am 21.4.2009* (Recommendation of the 6th general meeting on 21.4.2009) [Electronic resource]

¹²⁴ *“Eine Hochschule für Alle” - Handlungsstrategien der Studentenwerke zur Umsetzung von UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention und HRK-Empfehlung* (“A university for everyone” - action strategies of the student unions for the implementation of the UN disability rights convention and HRK recommendation) [Electronic resource]

not the task of individual representatives but requires the support of all members of a university and student union: teachers, administration and students.

In the second half of the 20th century, the education sector turned out to be the sector in which typical gender inequalities could be reduced more quickly and in an efficient way. The existence of discrimination in the German education system based on gender and in connection with social origin has been confirmed by numerous studies, but this has not been proven. For several decades, equality between men and women has been an integral part of official policy in Germany in various fields, including higher education.

Article 10 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Women obliges contracting states to ensure gender equality in education. There are interconnections with the Convention against Discrimination in Education of 15 December 1960, which the German Bundestag approved by law of 9 May 1968.¹²⁵ The concept of discrimination, as defined in Article 1 of this Convention, includes, among other things, “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on sex which has the purpose or effect of abolishing or prejudicing equal treatment in the field of education...”. In particular, the contracting states have undertaken to ensure equal opportunities, equal treatment and equal access to all universities for pupils.

With regard to the obligations mentioned in Article 10 of the UN Convention on Women’s Rights, there are no differences between men and women in the Federal Republic of Germany – at least according to the letters of the law. The elimination of stereotypical roles in textbooks, curricula and teaching methods as required by Article 10 is an ongoing task.

The 8th education report, which was presented on 23 June 2020, describes the overall development of the German education system and partly addresses the differences between the sexes. The focus of the report is “Education in a digitized world”. The education report appears every two years. The education report does not devote a separate chapter to the gender differences in the German educational landscape, but instead addresses them in the individual sections such as “Early Education” or “University”.

Some results from the education report:

- Educational level of the population: The positive development of the educational level differs according to the sexes. While men in the older cohorts have a higher level of education, the ratio is reversed among 40 to under 45-year-olds with regard to university entrance qualification and among 30 to under 35-year-olds the proportion of women with university entrance qualification is 51 percent, well above that of men (46 percent). With regard to university degrees, there is a reversal of the gender ratio among 30 to under-35 years old.

¹²⁵ UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 December 1960

- University (enrolment): With a view to the transition to university, there are gender differences, but this time in favour of men, unlike the previously reported rate of university entrance qualifications. Male university graduates take up university positions more often than women. Although women acquire higher education entrance qualifications more often than men (57 vs. 45 percent), they use it less often to start studying. This also explains why the gender share among first-year students in Germany is still almost balanced despite the clear lead among women in acquiring higher education entrance qualifications.
- University (choice of subject): There are still gender disparities in higher education, especially with regard to the choice of subjects by women and men. The lowest proportion of women - despite slight increases - continues to be found in engineering (25 percent). But there are also great differences within individual subject groups. The proportion of women in the engineering subjects of computer science, electrical engineering as well as traffic engineering science is less than 25 percent, while in architecture it is 55 to 62 percent. The humanities, arts, human medicine and health sciences, psychology, social affairs, educational science and veterinary medicine have an above-average proportion of women of 60 to over 80 percent.

The education report, which has been published every two years since 2006, is produced by an independent group of scientists. The goal of the education report is to present the various areas of education in the course of life in their context and with the aid of indicators over longer periods of time, thus making challenges in the German education system visible.

In this context, the inclusion of women and minorities in science and academia has become a pressing issue in most industrialized countries, including Germany. According to the majority of German researchers, the modern educational system of unified Germany does not create preconditions for people with abilities, perseverance and energy to become socially successful. Nevertheless, education, especially higher education, is the privilege of the wealthiest and status strata of German society. Despite the expansion of education and increased number of students in all social classes, the education system has not implemented the principle of equal opportunities. Causes and social mechanisms responsible for the origin and longevity of social inequality in the educational system are still not entirely clear. Thus, we see the need to reform the higher education system, despite all its advantages.

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UGO GAUDINO¹²⁶ – Security and Left-wing parties: governing Mediterranean immigration through humanitarian securitization

Introduction

Immigration is undoubtedly one of the main security concerns in Western Europe. Feelings of unease, insecurity and overt xenophobia gained traction after a series of critical junctures occurred in the mid-2010s, such as the jihadist attacks committed in name of the so-called Islamic State, the Mediterranean refugee crisis of 2015, and a series of controversies regarding women safety (the New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Germany in 2015-16). Against this backdrop, an increasing number of parties have called into question immigrants' loyalty to host European states and cultural affinity with Western values. Despite unfavourable views about Muslims seem to be dropping¹²⁷, anti-Muslim racism is still widespread in the West. For instance, the British Home Office has reported a constant increase in hate crimes from 2012 to 2020, with 50% of all offences directed against Muslims in 2019/2020¹²⁸. In particular, parties on the Radical Right stoke fears about creeping Islamization that could undermine the European Christianized public sphere, as well as its secular and liberal normative framework. While this fact is quite expected, in light of the longstanding conflictual encounter between Europe and Islam¹²⁹, what is more surprising is that many centre-Left progressive parties (ex. France, Italy, Denmark, the UK) have indulged into Right-wing discriminatory discourses and policies against extra-European immigrants. Chiefly among them, Muslims often appear as "suspect communities" that need to be patrolled to tame their alleged religious fundamentalism.

What I ask in this working paper is: are centre-Left's security discourses and policies turning into a facsimile of Right-wing ones, or do they carry a specific ideological meaning? Western social-democratic, Labour, and communist parties have historically promoted the pursuit of socio-economic equality and solidarity, independently from ethnic and cultural characteristics.¹³⁰ Why do some of them impose security vocabulary to deal with immigration, as the Right has traditionally done? Some authors maintain that Left-wing securitarian U-turn represents a process of "taboo-breaking" caused by Right-wing dangerous ideas or an instrumental ploy to either win electors back or persuade those who are on the fences¹³¹.

Explications based on structural factors are relevant, but they should be integrated by deeper studies of partisan ideologies that help to trace how parties justify the use of

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¹²⁷ <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/10/14/minority-groups/>

¹²⁸ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/925968/hate-crime-1920-hosb2920.pdf

¹²⁹ Mavelli (2012)

¹³⁰ Berman (2006)

¹³¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/14/why-copying-the-populist-right-isnt-going-to-save-the-left>

extraneous semantics. When progressive parties adopt the jargon and the measures flagged by the Right, they certainly betray some of their core values. However, they try to adjust the extraneous product into their own legacy, as social-democratic parties and the British *Labour* did with neoliberal economic policies at the end of the Nineties.¹³²

When it comes to some heated questions like terrorism and immigration, that the Right has for long time imposed as 'security problems', it seems that the centre-Left turned its back to its traditional inclusive attitude towards ethnic minorities and to its historical conceptualization of security as something related to socio-economic issues. As a result, Centre-Left parties have enacted tough security policies against immigrants. To set a distance from the Right, yet, the Left has wrapped such policies into a cosmetic version that attempts to fit the language spoken by its electoral constituencies and party members. This is possible, I argue, because the rationale behind securitization is rooted in their genetic codes, such as urging immigrants to emancipate from religion and patriarchal values and use humanitarian rhetoric to curtail immigration flows in the name of immigrants' life. In other words, the centre-Left does not copy the Right but *translates* the vocabulary and the policies of its competitors into its own linguistic form and policy rendition.

The paper consists of three main parts. The first section holds that securitization theories have dedicated less attention to partisan ideologies that are significant to understanding the different translations of contested issues such as immigration. The second section clarifies the meaning of translation to grasp how securitization travels across parties. The third section excavates the securitization of immigration as translated by the Left through the case study of the *Democratic Party* in Italy. The party has securitized the governance of Mediterranean refugee crisis by using a unique ideological register that merges humanitarian concerns of immigrants with security worries raised by potential Muslim radicalization. The conclusions summarise the main findings and implications that the analysis of political parties has for the study of security in a critical fashion.

Including political parties and ideologies in securitization theory

Securitization theory captures how immigrants are constructed as security threats and governed as suspicious subjects. I define securitization as an inter-subjective fabrication of security discourses, policies, and practices by political agents, who are endowed with enough power to impose coercion against an enemy. The purpose of securitization is to indicate that an issue has become so compelling to require security measures. Not every problem can be securitized: the threat must be bounded to a context that is historically marked by hostility between the securitizing agents and the

¹³² Buckler, Dolowitz (2009)

threat – evidenced by the spike of Islamophobic discourses and acts in the West, as reported by the Runnymede Trust.¹³³

This section states that studies inspired by the Copenhagen and Paris “schools”¹³⁴ of securitization leaves a partial gap regarding the ideological mobilization of beliefs, norms, and identities that Right and Left-wing parties deploy to justify securitization. This is a partial gap that critical security scholars have not completely filled. According to Williams: *“the recent concentration on neoliberalism, technification, governmentality and related themes has reinforced the gap between explicitly ideological politics and critical security studies, stressing the powers of ‘liberal reason’ while downplaying the importance of explicitly ideological confrontation”*.¹³⁵ Despite apparent bipartisan consensus in the management of security issues, I hold those political ideologies – conservatism, liberalism, populism, etc. – affect how policymakers interpret and respond to them. In particular, the security culture of parties and their historical development influence the way the parties on the Right and Left construct the nexus between security and immigration.

According to the Copenhagen School (CS) framework, security threats are identified by their outcome: the enshrinement of exceptional policies beyond the political rules of the game to protect some *“referent objects”*, namely *“things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”*.¹³⁶ State officials are privileged units of analysis because the referent object of security is the invulnerability and survival of the State.¹³⁷ This analytical choice owes much to the realist tradition of international relations. This is necessary, according to Waever¹³⁸, to retain the standard codes inherent in the field of traditional security studies. Nonetheless, the question that the CS leaves unaccounted for and that deserves more attention is how partisan agents that may represent the State in a different ideological way conceptualize the security and survival of the institutions.¹³⁹

Party ideology matters to provide a security meaning to highly contested issues such as the governance of Islam in a secularized public sphere, the management of migration, and the nexus between religion and terrorism. The ideological anchoring does not erase the fact that parties are also pragmatic actors that may embrace each other’s narrations as a way to tactically strengthen their arguments. Even then, they do so by deflecting the extraneous concept into their ideological background to present

¹³³ Elahi, Khan (2017)

¹³⁴ A full review of the literature falls outside my scope. However, by Copenhagen School, I mean first and foremost the pioneering works of Waever (1995), and Buzan, Waever, De Wilde (1998). By Paris School, I mean works published by scholars such as Bigo (2002) and Balzacq (2005), that I consider as the most representative authors of this approach.

¹³⁵ Williams (2019)

¹³⁶ Buzan (1998)

¹³⁷ Buzan (1998).

¹³⁸ Waever (1995)

¹³⁹ Despite Buzan (1998) admit the possibility that *“some group, movement, party or elite acts with reference to the nation and claims to speak or act on behalf of the nation”*.

it as better than the original. The CS framework poses obstacles in appreciating such nuances because it reifies the identity of securitizing actors into agents of the State – as scholars of “ontological security” noticed.¹⁴⁰ I propose instead to study identity as something in motion and stretched along divergent ideological lines – from the ethno-nationalist of the Right to the liberal-progressive and social-democratic of the Left.

Regarding the Paris School (PS), securitization is conceived of as an institutional and bureaucratic process based on normalized practices of exclusion and management of risks through statistical analyses, big data, and technological devices. The emphasis on security bureaucracies and the expertise of professionals and practitioners is pivotal in the fabrication of security issues, even more than the agency of political decision-makers. In a seminal study, Bigo analysed how law-enforcement agencies (military, police, intelligence) are the very artisans of security threats such as the securitization of immigration.¹⁴¹ Security bureaucracies fabricate the threat of immigration to preserve their socio-cultural capital and expertise. In this regard, the nexus between migration and criminality is considered as a framework of knowledge that is less produced by the racism of the Far Right and more manufactured by State bureaucracies independently from the political pressures of parties. This argument is valid but seems to portray only one side of the picture.

Securitization scholars have tried to design alternative frameworks that highlight how different ideas and identities influence the concept of security. For instance, it has been shown that the political identity and the national security culture of the State are crucial variables to understand how security is differently translated.¹⁴² Likewise, provided an ambitious attempt to incorporate ideas and identities in a securitization framework.¹⁴³ Such a valuable contribution notwithstanding, the ideational analysis of national security needs further engagement with historical problematization of how this can be differently shaped by political actors. An ideological reconstruction of partisan alternative security jargons allows to retrace affinities and differences across the Right and Left. This question that has become extremely relevant after decades of attempts by Right-wing populist parties and leader to hijack state agencies and target particular enemies – as Trump did with the *Department of Homeland Security* and the *Immigration and Custom Enforcement*¹⁴⁴.

The travel of security concepts across parties can be studied through a politicized approach that overcomes the de-politicized logic of emergency (CS) and the focus on

¹⁴⁰ McSweeney (1999)

¹⁴¹ Bygo (2002)

¹⁴² Stritzel (2014); Hayes (2016)

¹⁴³ Sjöstedt (2013)

¹⁴⁴ <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-arrests-and-deportations-have-changed-under-trump/> ; <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/01/dhs-removes-official-who-oversaw-intelligence-reports-on-journalists-390042>

bureaucracies (PS).¹⁴⁵ Both schools downplay the possibility that security threats are connected to the way political parties modulate it. This is necessary for many contested issues such as the governance ethnic minorities and the heated question of Muslim radicalization, that are imagined differently as long as parties lean towards a conservative or progressive configuration of the integration of minorities.¹⁴⁶ By giving more analytical purchase to political parties, I focus on the discourses, practices, and policies that the centre-Left used to securitize Mediterranean immigration flows. It does so by introducing *translation* as an innovative conceptual tool to explain how securitization moves across parties.

Translation: how securitization travels from the Right to the Left

This section explains that the concept of translation enriches securitization theory because it explains how security concepts travel across time and space. To understand how parties reformulate motives usually belonging to their competitors, I define translation as transfer of meaning in which Right and Left-wing parties reshape an issue in their own linguistic form (e.g. “immigrants” threaten the ethno-religious homogeneity of the West, for the Right; some civic values, for liberals; the welfare state, for social-democratic) and policy rendition (e.g. surveillance, restrictions on borders, deportation). Regarding immigration flows, centre-Left parties have translated discourses (the discursive nexus between security, immigration, jihadism and Muslim integration) and restrictive policies that were privileged turf of the Right. Conversely, they have not translated either the referent objects to secure (secularism, gender and LGBTQ equality, civic nationalism), nor the practices (arrangement of humanitarian corridors for migrants) and the rhetoric (immigrants as a possible asset, language inspired to human security concepts, rejection of populist arguments).

This section has two scopes. Firstly, to foreground the differing connotations of “translation”. By focusing on how a signifier is translated in differing ways by political parties in one single national context, I privilege the *intra-linguistic* meaning. Yet, this operation follows a first *inter-linguistic* translation of Islam as a non-Western construct translated by Western political agents. The non-linguistic shape of the translation shall also be included, as it is crucial to understand how securitization materializes from discourses to practices and policies. Secondly, I define the main elements of translation, which is an active, ideological, collective, and contextual transfer of meaning across securitizing agents who portray the otherness of Islam in distinct ways but with the same coercive purpose – the governance of immigrants.

According to the definition in the *Cambridge Dictionary*, translation means:

¹⁴⁵ The point is raised by scholars such as Neal (2012), Hegemann and Kahl (2018).

¹⁴⁶ Croft (2012).

- 1) to change a set of words or a speech from one language into another language, or, within the same language, from one register into another one. The focus in both cases is on the linguistic dimension of translation, whereas content and substance are unaltered. The linguistic meaning is threefold¹⁴⁷: *intra-lingual* (rewording by verbal signs of the same language), *inter-lingual* (interpretation through verbal signs of another language, sometimes through the incorporation of totally different code-units), and *inter-semiotic* (transmutation of verbal signs by using non-verbal sign systems).
- 2) a non-linguistic modification of a thing into a different form. For instance, transforming abstract knowledge into a practical or material shape - theories into policies, a hypothesis into an experiment, etc.¹⁴⁸ This second meaning also refers to body language, cultural-rooted practices, and all the semiotic repertoire involved in communication, that could need to be “translated” to fit comfortably in another context. Hence, translations are methodologically conveyed throughout many communicative tools. It is possible to seek linguistic translations in speeches and texts, as well as in non-linguistic gestures and silent practices.

This paper puts the analysis of translation as *intra-linguistic* transfer of the construct “immigrant=security threat” across political parties’ languages at the forefront. Islamic fundamentalism is a security threat against both the alleged Western ethno-religious homogeneity (for the Right), and the secular, liberal and social-democratic values (for the Left). Linguistic translations invest the rhetorical style too (use of scientific register or demagogy). Translation finally occurs as a non-linguistic process when parties shape linguistic discourses in practices (silencing or vocalizing an issue) and policies (strategies of coexistence, integration, or assimilation of Islam).

In making the case to study securitization as translation, I propose two main dimensions of translation that try to strike a balance between party agency and structural factors. On one side, translation is active and ideological; on the other, translation is collective and contextual.

Firstly, translation is active and ideological, two features that are tightly connected. Each translation is active: the translating subject adds something new to the original text, without reproducing it mechanically in another linguistic code. The embeddedness in a context does not obscure the perimeter of action conceded to the translator. This interpretation has been widely accepted in translation studies¹⁴⁹ and by scholars studying how norms and frame travel across countries.¹⁵⁰ Political parties appropriate the security vocabulary coming from the other side in a way that is neither

¹⁴⁷ Jakobson (1959)

¹⁴⁸ Freeman (2009).

¹⁴⁹ Wolf, Fukari (2007)

¹⁵⁰ Acharya (2004)

a passive copy nor a mere pragmatic choice. In the last decades, some critical junctures related to the management of immigration flows put Left-wing parties in front of ambivalent choices. If the party passively mimics its competitors, it runs the risk of betraying its core values.¹⁵¹ If it stays silent, it will be accused of inaction. Translation disentangles this puzzle and helps parties to fit uncomfortable discourses into their historical heritage. The latter comprises distinct ideological repertoires - the nativist and religiously inspired jargon of the Radical Right; the conservatism of centre-Right parties; the liberal-progressive and social-democratic vocabulary of many centre-Left parties. Political ideologies should be seen as an assemblage of beliefs, norms, and identities that craft the security culture of Right and Left parties. Hence, translation dynamizes the ideological factors because it relocates them in constant negotiations and conceptual transfers of meaning, which occur both inside and outside parties.

Secondly, translation is a complex collective move rather than an individual endeavour. A political party that gradually adopts alternative security languages is attached to the endorsement of the move by its constituencies and by internal party factions. As a result, parties act as plural persons. Translation is often spearheaded by individual political leaders who wrap a security discourse with distinct ideological garbs. Yet, the move is collective because it must avoid triggering centrifugal factionalism inside the party, as some sub-groups might reject the ideological rebranding of the electoral agenda. The collective industry of party members is not undermined by the personalization of politics because factions who propose translation are often led by party sub-leaders and sub-cadres, who might jar with the official position of the majority. When it comes to Left-wing parties today, it is important to remember that many are the critical voices – especially from the radical populist left¹⁵² - raised against “security entrepreneurs” who pander to Right-wing slogans. Likewise, it is not uncommon that some heterodox party members push the translation of nativist tones too far and end up encountering resistance inside the party – and risk the possibility of expulsion¹⁵³.

Thirdly, translation is a social practice attached to the contextual cultural conditions in which translated concepts are nested. Translation is decided by collective agents who transport a concept between at least two *loci*.¹⁵⁴ This process is entangled with spatial and temporal contexts surrounding the operation. Regarding the securitization of immigration, translation occurs in a first spatial context is the national one, with its specific characteristics – presence of ethnic minorities, institutional setting, party

¹⁵¹ Bale (2013)

¹⁵² On de-securitization of Islam and immigration, the positions of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France, Jeremy Corbyn in the UK and Bernie Sanders in the US are particularly instructive. See Katsambekis, Kioupkiolis (2018).

¹⁵³ The most significant example come from the expulsion of Thilo Sarrazin from the German SPD. See <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-center-left-spd-ousts-anti-islam-writer/a-49555323> and <https://www.dw.com/en/thilo-sarrazins-hostile-takeover-an-islam-experts-take-on-the-book/a-45346358>

¹⁵⁴ Palonen (2003)

system, political regime, political and security culture. The second spatial context is the political spectrum where the competition between Right and Left happens and produces alternative modalities of securitization. The temporal context encompasses three categories: recent moments of crisis that raised the perception of Muslims as a security threat (Mediterranean refugee crisis, jihadist attacks), as well as the historical sedimented context of Western anti-Islamic misperceptions, and the setting of political interactions across parties.¹⁵⁵ Contextual meanings play out in securitization as they serve to persuade the audiences of how severe the Islamic threat is.¹⁵⁶ Further, the translators must convince the audiences that translating another language creates a real and better alternative to the original and that the final product coheres with the beliefs, norms, and identities of the translating party. The necessity of ideological coherence explains the selectivity of translation. Parties appropriate only specific sections of the message coming from the other side, whereas the least compatible ideological aspects are excluded from the translated version.

This paper advances the notion of translation in security studies by showing that political parties are active-ideological and collective translators that securitize in a particular context. It is necessary to unpack these characteristics of translation. The next section equips the reader with an example that gives texture to my theoretical discussion.

The Democratic Party: humanitarian securitization

This section tries to unpack the uncomfortable relationship that the Left has with the domain of security - at least when it comes to the cultural dimensions of security. In my view, Left-wing parties have securitized foreign minorities by embracing values that historically belonged to a shared understanding of “being Leftist” – such as solidarity, freedom, and equality. Otherwise, translating Right-wing policies would upend the identity of the Left and erase its singularity. Following this logic, I posit that the centre-Left is more prone to translating securitization of immigration – specifically from Muslim majority countries – as a religious threat to secularism and liberal-progressive values such as gender equality rather than as an ethnic threat to Western demographic balance or as a cultural threat to Western traditions (e.g. the controversies on *halal* food spurred by Right-wing parties)¹⁵⁷.

In this respect, the governance of the Mediterranean refugee crisis by the Italian centre-Left *Democratic Party* (PD) illustrates what I mean by ideological translation of securitization from Right to Left and why I claim that translation is active – ideological, collective, and contextual. Although the case study relates to immigration and not specifically to Islam, the two issues have been entangled in the European political

¹⁵⁵ Balzacq (et.al. 2011).

¹⁵⁶ Ciută (2009)

¹⁵⁷ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/24/pope-franciss-heretical-pasta/>

debate because of the geographical origins of migrants. Additionally, this illustration shows the sophisticated selectivity of the process. Parties do not translate discourses, policies, and practices as a whole. They adopt them in different phases to avert mimicking the original, with the purpose to accommodate borrowed concepts into an ideological congruent version.

The PD is the most representative party that currently occupies the Left pole of the Italian political spectrum. It was created in 2007 as a result of the fusion between a Christian-Left / social – liberal party (Democracy is Freedom- The Daisy) and a social-democrat party (Democrats of the Left). It governed in coalition with smaller centrist and leftist parties from 2013 to 2018. During this period, the centre-Left party translated some discourses of Radical Right parties (*North League*, LN; *Brothers of Italy*, FdI) into its social-liberal ideological pillars.¹⁵⁸ Among the contextual reasons, the civil war that collapsed Libyan stability and determined a tremendous spike in the number of economic migrants and asylum seekers arriving at Italian coasts. The unprecedented number of arrivals raised several puzzles for the PD Cabinets of Matteo Renzi (2014-16) and Paolo Gentiloni (2016-18), especially in front of the vehement calls for law and order by Extreme Right movements (*CasaPound Italia*, *Forza Nuova*) and Radical Right leaders Matteo Salvini (LN) and Giorgia Meloni (FdI). All of them have consistently attacked the Government for its inability to stop the “invasion” and “Islamization”¹⁵⁹ of Europe.¹⁶⁰ Two leitmotifs were repeated by Right-wing parties and press: the accusation against NGOs of being in cahoots with human smugglers¹⁶¹; and the nexus between migration and possible infiltration of jihadist terrorists, above all after the attacks of 2015-17¹⁶².

Therefore, Right-wing securitization of immigration and Muslims solicited the PD to translate some discourses, policies, and practices from the Right, in the context of increasing preoccupation and unfavourable attitudes of Italians of immigration¹⁶³. In particular, two policies signal the “*harsh stance increasingly taken by the PD on immigration*”¹⁶⁴, but also an ambivalent purpose of governing the flows in compliance with the respect of human-rights: 1) the military operation *Mare Nostrum* (2013-14), and 2) the *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)* signed by the PD Government with the Libyan Government of Al-Sarraj in 2017.

¹⁵⁸ Vampa (2009); Massetti (2014)

¹⁵⁹ For instance, see the “Annual Report on Islamization of Europe” presented in the Parliament by Brothers of Italy: <https://farefuturofondazione.it/editoria/primo-rapporto-sullislamizzazione-deuropa/>

¹⁶⁰ Bobba, McDonnell (2016); Bulli (2019)

¹⁶¹ <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/cos-scafisti-scortano-i-migranti-fino-navi-delle-ong-1390028.html>

¹⁶² <https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/cronache/allarme-infiltrazioni-i-flussi-migranti-1242883.html>

¹⁶³ European Social Policy Network (2016) *Refugees and immigrants: A challenge for Italian legislation but a solution for demographic trends?* European Commission. 2016/19.

¹⁶⁴ Castelli Gattinara (2017)

1. The Italian Government launched *Mare Nostrum* shortly after those two dramatic shipwrecks (3 and 11 October 2013) caused the death of 636 people near the island of Lampedusa (Sicily). The operation responded to both military and humanitarian purposes from the very beginning.¹⁶⁵ In spite of a decades-long militarization of Central Mediterranean border controls by Italian Cabinets¹⁶⁶, the PD extolled *Mare Nostrum* as a mission to rescue migrants in distress in a sea-zone comprising Italian and Libyan waters. Indeed, the Italian Navy often intervened outside its Search and Rescue Region (SRR) to save lives, bring shipwrecked immigrants to Italian shores and insert them into the national centres of reception. However, the inclusionary power of humanitarianism cohabited with an exclusionary security rationale, given that the ships were used to identify people, detect smugglers, and as “floating” detention centres.¹⁶⁷ The EU governance of immigration in the Mediterranean has been described as a regime of capture and dispossession of human lives that aims to ensure internal security through rigid border controls.¹⁶⁸ In this regard, Tazzioli has powerfully argued that the EU agencies (such as Frontex), the Member States and other non-governmental actors transformed the Mediterranean into a space of governmentality, where the “humanitarian” is evoked as a discourse to channel human mobility.¹⁶⁹

While I am sympathetic with such criticism, I reckon that there is an unequivocal difference in the ways that the PD and the competing Right-wing parties interpreted the mission. It could be said that such distinction is a mere rhetorical device to strengthen the humanitarian goal of *Mare Nostrum* – showcased by photographs and videos published by Italian soldiers.¹⁷⁰ Yet, compared to the previous military mission (*Constant Vigilance*) involved in patrolling the Strait of Sicily and in search and rescue operations since 2004, *Mare Nostrum* scaled up its rescue capacities by increasing vehicles and troops.¹⁷¹ Such efforts earned the mission the homage of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the UNHCR, Amnesty International and *Médecins sans Frontières*.

In trying to strike an indelicate balance between protection of human rights and international law, on one hand, and border surveillance, on the other, the PD translated the security imperatives stressed by the Right because it wrapped a restrictive policy of control with a humanitarian façade congruent with the values cherished by the party. While the underlying rationality of

¹⁶⁵ Tazzioli (2016)

¹⁶⁶ Campesi (2018)

¹⁶⁷ Cuttitta (2017).

¹⁶⁸ Jeandesboz (2015)

¹⁶⁹ Tazzioli (2016).

¹⁷⁰ Musarò (2017)

¹⁷¹ Cuttitta (2017)

control converges with Right-wing nationalist agenda, its translation into Left-liberal vocabulary entails an ideological rebranding that strongly affects the rhetorical tools. As shown by the content analysis of Centre-Left discourses, the PD has represented the refugee crisis as a humanitarian and structural problem, without buying into the securitarian tones of the Right.¹⁷² Additionally, there is some evidence to claim that integration measures drove a wedge between the Right and Left, while entry policies seem to speak a similar language of securitization.

2. The *MoU* that the Gentiloni Government sealed in 2017 with Al-Sarraj and several Libyan tribal chiefs aimed to jointly patrol Libyan coasts and fight human trafficking and irregular migration (mostly from Muslim majority countries; see Table 1). The deal has attracted severe criticism from many political voices¹⁷³. One drawback lies in the fact that Libya has never signed the UN 1951 Refugee Convention: a factor that could explain the inhumane living conditions that migrants have suffered in the temporary detention camps arranged by Tripoli¹⁷⁴. What is relevant for my argument is that the most progressive faction of the PD contested the apparent right-ward securitarian shift of the Cabinet and advocated to reject the *MoU* because it furthered the xenophobic narration peddled by Salvini¹⁷⁵. The latter seemed to reproduce the bilateral agreement that the Right-wing Berlusconi Government had signed with Khadafi in 2008.¹⁷⁶ Internal dissent shows that translation is a complex collective move that has to satisfy a plurality of external and internal audiences. Hence, the Italian Minister of Interior Minniti (PD) framed the policy into the liberal-progressive and social-democratic ideological standpoints that could eventually justify to the PD what appeared as an adjustment of chauvinist tools to stem cross-border movement¹⁷⁷.

¹⁷² Gianfreda (2017)

¹⁷³ See the criticism leveraged by the Catholic magazine *Avvenire*, very close to positions of the Vatican <https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/Pagine/litalia-non-firmi-lintesa-libia-caos-sui-profughi>
Also, see the condemnation by Amnesty International, in <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/01/libya-renewal-of-migration-deal-confirms-italys-complicity-in-torture-of-migrants-and-refugees/>

¹⁷⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti>

¹⁷⁵ https://www.agi.it/cronaca/rinnovato_memorandum_libia_migranti-6467001/news/2019-11-02/http://www.strettoweb.com/2018/10/partito-democratico-rossi-minniti-salvini/762641/

¹⁷⁶ Paoletti (2010)

¹⁷⁷ Numbers of arrivals on the Italian coasts: 170,100 in 2014, 153,842 in 2015, 181,436 in 2016, 119,369 in 2017, before plummeting in 2018 (23,370) due to the policies promoted by Minniti and in 2019 (11,471) due to the even harsher policies by Salvini (NL), Minister of Interior from 2018 to 2019. Data gathered from UNHCR (2018). *Operation Portal. Refugee Situation. Mediterranean Situation* (<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>).

Italy – immigration flows through Central Mediterranean Route




Table 1. Italy – immigration flows through the central Mediterranean Route. Most of asylum seekers and economic immigrants came from Muslim majority countries. Data: UNHCR, *Operation Portal. Refugee Situation. Mediterranean Situation*, 2018(<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>).

Minniti has outlined several reasons to consider the *MoU* as part and parcel of a Left-wing conception of security alternative to the nativist refrains uttered by the Right. His receipt describes migration as a long-term structural phenomenon rather than an emergency.¹⁷⁸ In his words, migration needs to be governed multilaterally, through foreign aid and cooperation with the country of departures¹⁷⁹. In this respect, migrants and refugees seem to embody an ambivalent risk rather than a security threat for the ethno-national identity cherished by the Right. Minniti avoids typical reactionary references to the white European civilization jeopardized by Islam, as well as the controversial nexus between immigration and jihadist terrorism.¹⁸⁰ Yet, when a journalist asked him about the detention facilities in Libya, Minniti vindicated the necessity to eradicate human traffic and to prevent dangerous journeys that could kill migrants or end up crashing their hopes. As he stated: *“Accommodation has its limits in its capacity of integration. A young guy from the Sahara who travels to the North is motivated by the radical hope of a better life. If this hope is upended by radical disillusion, his constructive force becomes a destructive force against the society that disappointed him. He must arrive in Italy legally (...) This will be possible if we defeat irregular immigration”*.¹⁸¹

Such emphasis on migrant’s life can be read as an attempt to instrumentalize an asymmetrical conception of human-centred security to condone tougher border

¹⁷⁸ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45575763>

¹⁷⁹ <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/world/europe/africa-migrants-europe.html>

¹⁸⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/07/italian-minister-migrants-libya-marco-minniti>

¹⁸¹ <https://www.interno.gov.it/it/stampa-e-comunicazione/interventi-e-interviste/interventi-e-interviste-raccolta-anni-precedenti/solidarieta-nazionale-combattere-terroristi-e-trafficienti-uomini>

controls and strict co-optation of NGOs in fighting illegal immigration.¹⁸² This discourse is influenced by the concealed orientalist idea of violent immigrants, whose life must be “protected” to prevent their radicalization against Italian society. The presentation of immigrants as potentially fanatics reproduces the picture of the wild and savage non-white world that generates exploitation and violations of human rights, committed for instance by the smugglers.¹⁸³ Concerned that immigrants would pose possible threats to public order and security, the PD invested in immigrant detention centres as a useful tool to ease deportation policies. As Campesi underlines, Minniti justified the rearrangement of detention policy to control “*those who are of an irregular status and may be considered a danger*”, even if they have not committed a crime.¹⁸⁴

Despite the ambiguous use of orientalism, the PD has translated some Right-wing policies without buying into ethno-nationalism. The reference to demographic changes points to the “limits of accommodation”. By mentioning the “threshold of tolerance” in the national capacity to accommodate foreign bodies, the PD wraps its discourse with a sort of scientific and technical jargon. This is sharply at odds with the nativist and populist alarms that the Far-Right raises about a putative ethnical substitution of white Europeans with immigrants from the Global South.

Overall, the PD’s referent objects map onto a distinct political-ideological heritage that stirs humanitarianism, neoliberal policies arranged with multilateral institutions (the *Marshall Plan for Africa*), and civic nationalism (gender equality and secularism as pillars of Italian national identity, as stated in the *National Pact for an Italian Islam*¹⁸⁵). To the contrary, Italian Radical Right parties – such as the *League* and *Brothers of Italy* – vocally criticized *Mare Nostrum* for its significant financial burden and for being a potential pull factor for irregular immigration. Therefore, the conception of security affirmed by the PD stands out as far more inclusive compared to the Right, both in words and in the policies implemented.

Conclusion

The paper has argued that it is important to seek out partisan differences even when Cabinets claim to act in the name of bipartisan “national security”, with the purpose to understand if parties imitate or translate each other’s concepts. A deeper inquiry on the beliefs, norms, and identities of parties serves to elicit how conservative and progressive use alternative lexicon with the same purpose to securitize immigrants and reproduce their subalternity. Translation allows us to understand how the Right and the Left discursively translate the threat associated to immigration in alternative

¹⁸² <https://www.thelocal.it/20170731/ngo-migrant-boats-due-to-sign-controversial-code-of-conduct>

¹⁸³ Cuttitta (2017)

¹⁸⁴ Campesi underlines (2020)

¹⁸⁵ https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/patto_nazionale_per_un_islam_italiano_1.2.2017.pdf

images, policies, and practices, which cohere with their ideological understanding of the threat

The PD in Italy is a case study that helps to illuminate how Western European parties handle security discourses and policies about extra-European immigration and Muslim minorities. The PD borrowed from the Right the discursive entanglement between immigration, terrorism, integration of Muslims and insecurity: yet, it has translated it into its proper ideological register based on humanitarianism and liberal-progressive values. Such translation occurred collectively, as Minniti negotiated with a faction of his party, and was nested in the context of unprecedented immigration flows and growing insecurity of Italian electors. An aesthetical divergence exists in the choice of referent objects and rhetorical devices selected to describe Muslim immigrants. Regarding entry policies, there seems to be a growing convergence between Right and centre-Left towards the logic of securitization, although the latter has framed immigrants more as a risk than as a threat. However, the PD has marked its different approach with respect to integration policies, as witnessed by the advocacy to reform the Italian citizenship law¹⁸⁶ - so far based on a strict *ius sanguinis* - and by organizing humanitarian corridors for refugees with the IOM, the UNHCR, and the Vatican.¹⁸⁷

The reflection on party ideologies and security discourses has wider implications for other approaches to security studies, such as human security. Scholars of human security can reap many benefits from the analytical engagement with partisan security agendas as they disclose rather divergent versions of what a “people-centred” response to security challenges might look like in the eyes of parties. While the conventional definition of human security aims to equally protect all people from both military and non-military sources of insecurity (UNDP 1994), the example of the PD shows that even genuine humanitarian solutions conceal coercive securitarian measures against subaltern subjects. A dialogue with scholarship on political parties would also disclose how the original universal emancipatory meaning of a “people-centred” approach can be hijacked by an exclusionary and ethno-nationalist conception of the “people”, that is at the kernel of Right-wing populist security mindset.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/08/29/news/minniti_sui_migranti_ho_temuto_per_la_tenuta_democratica_paese_-174164861/

¹⁸⁷ <https://www.interno.gov.it/it/sala-stampa/interventi-e-interviste/italia-jihad-mai-cosi-pericolosa>. It is important to bear in mind that many critical scholars have raised concerns about the practice of selective corridors. The arbitrary decision to admit only the weakest subjects – usually women and children – can be seen as a biopolitical mechanism justified in the name of humanitarian logics. On the pitfalls of selective inclusivity, see Mavelli (2017).

¹⁸⁸ Destradi, Plagemann (2019)

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NARGIZA SODIKOVA¹⁸⁹ – Impact of the pandemic on the resilience of EU: the main problems and shortcomings

Introduction

New challenges and threats always pose a number of difficult tasks for humanity. The world is currently in a difficult situation. The coronavirus pandemic has demonstrated the fragility of the established world system and has presented humanity with a number of new challenges that can significantly change the situation in the world, ranging from political and economic relations at the international level to relations at the household level. At all levels, the human factor plays the most important role. The pandemic has adversely affected all areas of human life. Both developed and developing states are faced with an urgent task to make quick decisions to solve the current critical situation. The EU, like all regions of the world, has experienced challenges, risks and certain consequences of the new threat in its domestic and foreign policy.

External cooperation of the EU with partners, including with the Central Asian countries, is based on mutually beneficial interests. The EU strategy for Central Asia has been welcomed with great enthusiasm by the countries of the region. However, the coronavirus pandemic has shattered the EU's actions as a single actor, both internationally and within the organization itself. An uncoordinated course and an unsystematic approach in the fight against the pandemic have called into question the existing worldwide perception of pan-European solidarity and unity.

The main purpose of this study is to examine the EU's activities from an international relations perspective. The study will consider the internal European position at the beginning of the pandemic, as well as its impact on the EU's image in the world community, changes in priority sources of EU funding in connection with Covid-19, and the implementation of the concept of resilience in the internal and external policy of the EU in the context of the crisis.

Theories of neoliberalism and neorealism in the context of the implementation of EU political activities

International relations as a discipline are mainly concerned with what states do on the world stage and how their actions affect other states. The EU is an organization that currently consists of 27 states with common goals and objectives to ensure stable and sustainable development of the member states, and the association. According to international relations theories, the state is the foundation of neorealism¹⁹⁰ and institutional neoliberalism.¹⁹¹ Most analysts and experts focus on states and their interactions to explain the observed patterns of world politics. Accordingly, states are a common subject of analysis in theories of international relations. This work uses the theories of neoliberalism and neorealism, which determines the complex theoretical

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¹⁹⁰ Waltz (1979)

¹⁹¹ Keohane (1984)

nature of the topic under study. In my opinion, the comparative application of the two theories will serve to better understand and examine the EU's activities in international relations in the current situation.

In the conditions of international anarchy, the relations of states are based on the desire of states for cooperation. According to Keohane and Nye, who are representatives of the theory of neoliberalism, world politics is entering the stage of transnationalization, which implies an increase in the permeability of state borders, the role of international markets, the role of interstate and non-profit organizations in the international arena, all of which have led to qualitative changes in the political structure of the world.¹⁹² This position is in line with the EU's efforts to follow the principles of neoliberal theory. Due to the fact that the EU seeks to promote an unobtrusive foreign policy towards partner countries, supports cooperation through the promotion of "soft power", and promotes development through the implementation of the concept of resilience, the actions of the organization show the undeniable presence of neoliberal approaches and the desire of the organization as a whole to follow them.

However, the internal disagreements in the organization bring this desire into question. This is because each member-state, despite the common goals and objectives of the organization, primarily tries to proceed from their national interests. A striking example is the coronavirus pandemic, which has clearly demonstrated the quality of solving many important issues at the national level. The behaviour of states, based on their national aspirations, impedes the implementation of the EU's activities based on neoliberal theory, although the organization believes that it is in line with neoliberal approaches.

The theory of neorealism, proposed by Waltz in 1979¹⁹³ and considered outdated against the backdrop of neoliberal theory, also fits the EU's position today. According to Waltz, there is no higher decision-making power to maintain the system and enforce the rules of the game. The world is in a state of anarchy. The mobilization of state resources is the foundation of the international system. States rely only on themselves to protect their national interests. Based on his convictions, Waltz believed that anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system and the hallmark of international relations. The endless debate between neorealism and neoliberalism did not show the superiority of one theory over another, on the contrary, perhaps the debate drowned out many problem-oriented studies at the right time.

Nevertheless, there are opinions that do not contradict either theory. For example, Inis Claude, a leading scholar in the field of international relations and international organizations, suggested that liberalistic and realistic theories would be appropriate to view not as opposing theories, but rather as complementary theories¹⁹⁴. One of the proponents of this statement was the American scholar on international relations and law, John Hertz, who agreed with Claude's position, and described the system as

¹⁹² Nye J., Keohane R. Relations and world politics. Moscow, scient. ed. and comment. Tsygankov P.A. "Gardariki" Publ., 2002. 152-167 p.

¹⁹³ Waltz K.N. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove, Illinois, 1st Edition, Waveland Press Publ., 2010.

¹⁹⁴ Claude I. Comment on Political Realism Revisited. International Studies Quarterly. 1981. Vol. 25. pp. 198, 200.

“realistic liberalism”.¹⁹⁵ At present, the situation in the EU can fit that description, when military-political superiority is excluded, but the presence of national interests, which is a component of the supporters of realism, in the activities of the EU is allowed, while the organization fully promotes the principles of neoliberal theory.

The current situation has caused significant damage to the image of the EU. This is primarily due to the perception of the EU as a united organization. Problems within the organization itself affected the EU's response to the pandemic as the virus began to spread. The situation in the EU countries, such as Italy, Spain and France, demonstrated the fragility of the established EU system and the level of the EU's readiness to accept and respond to new challenges and threats. These states were among the first to be hit by Covid-19. Not having enough experience in the fight against the new virus, they took a position of self-isolation, began to act alone to avoid the spread of the virus. In this case, there was an acute lack of pan-European solidarity and unity. It was this phenomenon that called into question the existing idea of unity within the EU, since states began to act at national levels, not relying on mutual assistance, which is one of the basic principles of the EU. The adoption of measures at the state level, the closure of internal borders and the introduction of certain restrictions has demonstrated the existing internal problems of the European continent. This proved to be a test for the EU as a single subject of international relations.

A number of objective and subjective circumstances caused an untimely response to the problem. The rate at which the virus spread determined how EU countries chose to protect their populations, i.e., almost all states were busy taking stock of their stocks of masks, sanitary and hygienic supplies, the capacity of intensive care units, and provisioning for the treatment of patients with coronavirus infections. For its part, the European Commission was also not ready to respond so quickly to the changing epidemiological situation in the bloc, which was due to the lack of funds and powers to respond quickly to such crises. Russia and China sent aid to Italy, which at that time was a hotbed of infection on the European continent, which served to improve their image.

The current situation prompted the EU to change its uncoordinated course and ad hoc, unsystematic response in the fight against the virus. Further isolation of countries and action only at the national level, without the support of the EU as an organization as a whole and isolated approaches in the fight against the pandemic caused a change in the perception of the EU as a single actor, which can lead to a weakening of its position at the international level in the future. Since the EU seeks to position itself precisely as an actor in international relations, the need arises to confirm its unity. One example of easing the situation within the EU is the speech at the April 2020 session of the European Parliament by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, where she apologized on behalf of the EU to the residents of Italy. She stressed that the European Union is once again united and has become an example of solidarity for the whole world; Europe should apologize to Italy because it did not help her at the very beginning in the fight against coronavirus¹⁹⁶, where almost a thousand people

¹⁹⁵ Herz J. Political Realism Revisited. *International Studies Quarterly*. 1981. p. 202.

¹⁹⁶ Coronavirus: EU offers 'heartfelt apology' to Italy. 16 April 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52311263>

died every day, because hospitals were overcrowded and lacked protective equipment and medical equipment, which made residents feel abandoned at times of need.¹⁹⁷

However, following the speech by the President of the European Commission, there were several objections from sceptics who believed that the burning issue of unity within the EU could be exacerbated when Europe shifts from fighting the virus to economic recovery. For example, the leader of the French Eurosceptic, Marine Le Pen, said that the EU fell as the first victim of the coronavirus¹⁹⁸.

The situation in the EU regarding the existing disagreements with Hungary and Poland also plays an important role in preserving the organization's image. According to the arguments of the European Commission and the European Parliament, the principle of separation of powers in these states is violated, in which there is a desire to expand the control of the executive power over the judiciary and the press, and there is also discrimination against political opponents and minorities. For their part, Poland and Hungary refused to accept the EU's seven-year plan for 2021-2027, because it spelled out a mechanism for monitoring the observance of the principles of the rule of law in the countries of the community, with which both countries do not agree. Brussels intended to create a system in which money would be allocated to EU member states depending on their observance of the principles of the rule of law, which was unacceptable for the ruling right-wing parties in Poland and Hungary. At a meeting of the permanent representatives of the EU countries, Poland and Hungary vetoed the draft EU budget and the creation of a fund to help national economies affected by the coronavirus pandemic. However, at the summit on December 11, the leaders (Germany, Poland and Hungary) agreed to end the blockade.

The exit of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter the UK) from the EU is also important. The UK, which was one of the leading EU member states, with the exit from this organization changed the general internal situation of the organization. This applies primarily to contributions to the organization's budget since the UK was one of the EU donor countries. Also, given the significant geostrategic experience and capabilities of the UK (not least its nuclear arsenal), it is extremely important for Europe to avoid a complete break with this state¹⁹⁹. The Brexit crisis and the superimposed coronavirus have shaken attempts to build internal EU cohesion.

At the same time, the situation within the organization itself remains controversial. For example, many nationalists recognize that European cooperation is the only way to keep their national structures up to date, while many cosmopolitans agree to strengthen Europe's own strategic sovereignty rather than relying on global multilateral institutions²⁰⁰. According to a survey conducted by European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR), compared with people who actively intervene in the government

¹⁹⁷ The EU's corona marathon: moving on all tracks. 19 April, 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/77754/eu%E2%80%99s-corona-marathon-moving-all-tracks_en

¹⁹⁸ Marie Le Pen. Rumors of EU death from coronavirus have been exaggerated. Until. 23 April 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-52381623>

¹⁹⁹ Europe after Brexit and COVID-19. 13 January, 2021. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/01/13/commentary/world-commentary/europe-after-brexit/>

²⁰⁰ Europe's pandemic politics: How the virus has changed the public's worldview. 24 June 2020. https://ecfr.eu/publication/europes_pandemic_politics_how_the_virus_has_changed_the_publics_worldview/

after the crisis, there has been an increase in the number of people who, on the contrary, have lost confidence in the government's capabilities²⁰¹. The survey also expressed the opinion that there was no proper support from the EU, multilateral institutions or major economic partners to EU citizens. In this regard, external partners, including Central Asia, may have doubts about the consolidation of the EU's foreign policy and the organization's readiness to implement strategies effectively and systematically in various regions²⁰². Based on this, it becomes necessary to revise the form of cooperation.

Cooperation of the partner countries, including Central Asia, with the EU is conditioned both with the organization as a whole and on a bilateral basis. Due to the current situation within the EU, the partner countries face the task of revising the opportunities for cooperation. The partner countries were faced with the dilemma of choosing efficiency from cooperation with the organization as a whole or cooperation with EU member states in a bilateral format. Internal contradictions between the EU members, insufficient provision of timely mutual assistance and actions to combat the crisis at predominantly national levels, made people question solidarity of the EU, one of the basic principles of the organization. The gradual negative impact of the crisis on the organization's image has contributed to the mobilization of the EU, the adoption of serious objective decisions in order to avoid possible subsequent contradictions and the desire to ensure a sustainable way out of the crisis.

Under the influence of the current situation, the EU is revising its priorities in matters of financing foreign policy programs. The heads of state and government of the EU countries in July 2020 at the summit, which lasted for several days, agreed on a draft budget for 2021-2027 in the amount of more than one trillion euros (€ 1074.3 billion). It was also decided to create a fund for the economic recovery of the EU countries that have suffered from the coronavirus pandemic, and for this it was supposed to allocate another 750 billion euros, of which € 390 billion will be distributed in the form of grants to member states and € 360 billion in loans²⁰³. This package, which has been agreed with Parliament, includes:

- a targeted reinforcement of EU programs, including Horizon Europe, EU4 Health and Erasmus+, by €15 billion through additional means (€12.5 billion) and reallocations (€2.5 billion) during the next financial period, while respecting the expenditure ceilings set out in the European Council conclusions of 17-21 July
- more flexibility to allow the EU to respond to unforeseen needs and crises
- greater involvement of the budgetary authority in the oversight of revenue under Next Generation EU
- higher ambition on efforts towards biodiversity and strengthened monitoring of biodiversity, climate and gender related spending
- an indicative roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources²⁰⁴.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ EU leaders agree on the long-term budget for 2021-2027 and the recovery plan. 17-21 July. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/the-eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget-2021-2027/#:~:text=EU%20leaders%20agree%20on%20the,the%20digital%20and%20green%20transition> S.

²⁰⁴ Next multiannual financial framework and recovery package: Council presidency reaches political agreement with the European Parliament. 10 November 2020.

The long-term budget will cover seven areas of expenditure. This will provide the basis for funding nearly 40 EU spending programs over the next seven years. In addition, the EU will spend 132.8 billion Euros on the single market, innovation and digital technologies and 377.8 billion Euros on cohesion, resilience and value. These amounts will increase to 143.4 billion and 1.099 trillion Euros, respectively, through additional funding under the Next Generation EU program, including loans to member states. Another 356.4 billion Euros of funding will be directed to the natural resources and environment. Expenditures in the areas of migration and border management will amount to 22.7 billion Euros over the next seven years, while 13.2 billion Euros will be spent in the areas of security and defence. Neighbourhood and global funding will total € 98.4 billion²⁰⁵. By comparison, the previous EU budget for 2014-2020 was up to 959.51 billion Euros in liabilities and 908.40 billion Euros in payments during its term²⁰⁶.

The issue of the organization's budget, reduction or redistribution of financial costs with a change in priority costs based on the current situation was sharply considered. In 2021, the main expenditures of the EU's general budget will be directed to the recovery of the economy, undermined by the coronacrisis, to projects related to agriculture, health care system and the socio-economic sphere, to help migrants, to combat climate change, and will not finance traditional energy sources but focus on the continuation of the previously adopted "Green Deal" (transition to renewable sources, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, improvement of energy efficiency).

The Green Deal, adopted by the EU in December 2019 and continues to be on the organization's agenda, is aimed at tackling climate change. Climatic and environmental problems have shown their relevance during a pandemic. In this regard, cooperation in this direction also takes place in joint actions of the EU with partner countries, including the Central Asian region²⁰⁷. The European Green Deal affects all sectors of the economy, namely: transport, energy, agriculture, housing, and industries such as steel, cement, ICT, textiles and chemicals. Chairwoman Ursula von der Leyen said: "The European Green Deal is our new growth strategy, for growth that gives more, not takes away. It shows us how to transform our way of living and working, producing and consuming so that we live more a healthy life and our business to be innovative We can all be involved in this transition, and we can all take advantage of these new opportunities"²⁰⁸. For the European continent, issues of climate change,

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/10/next-multiannual-financial-framework-and-recovery-package-council-presidency-reaches-political-agreement-with-the-european-parliament/>

²⁰⁵ Multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027 adopted. 17 December 2020.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/17/multiannual-financial-framework-for-2021-2027-adopted/>

²⁰⁶ Long-term EU budget 2014-2020. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/the-eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget-2014-2020/>

²⁰⁷ The EU and Central Asia coordinate efforts on environment and climate amidst the pandemic, 15 June, 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uzbekistan/80882/node/80882_en

²⁰⁸ The European Green Deal sets out how to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050, boosting the economy, improving people's health and quality of life, caring for nature, and leaving no one behind. 11-12-2019 <https://www.euneighbours.eu/ru/east-south/stay-informed/news/evropeyskiy-zelenyy-kurs-opredelil-kak-evropa-mozhet-stat-pervym>

global warming, environmental protection, waste recycling, water and air pollution, rational use of energy resources, conservation of biodiversity, conservation of endangered species of wild animals have traditionally been the priority areas of international cooperation. The EU works with the Central Asian countries to strengthen regional cooperation on environmental protection and water resources.

Humanity must realize that the planet's resources are limited, it is necessary to gradually minimize the consumption of plastic products, replacing them with environmentally friendly alternatives, to reduce hydrocarbon emissions by creating environmentally friendly technologies, create conditions for cycling, and improve conditions for public transport. Accordingly, even in the context of a pandemic, issues related to climate change are not ignored and actions are being coordinated. The European Council has endorsed the EU's binding target of a net reduction in domestic greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990²⁰⁹. Stimulating sustainable economic growth, creating jobs, contributing to the long-term global competitiveness of the EU economy with the promotion of green innovation are the main goals in realizing the EU's climate ambitions.

The EU's foreign policy activities regarding financing before the pandemic were carried out with partner countries at different levels. For example, cooperation with the countries of Central Asia was implemented within the framework of the EU Strategies for the region or on a bilateral basis. For the periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 the EU allocated 750 million Euro to the Central Asia region²¹⁰ and 1 billion Euro²¹¹. These figures show that the financial support from the EU is rather modest. At present, due to the existing problems and circumstances within the EU, the EU policy towards the Central Asian countries does not show particularly large investments in the region, the rapid development of relations or any ambitious actions. But Central Asia has always been in the EU's field of vision and, in order not to lose its position and maintain its influence in the region, the EU adheres to the principle of not imposing "its own policy", building trusting relations and achieving its goals by extending its "soft policy" over the long term, taking into account the influence of other large players. As part of promoting the development of Central Asian countries and in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, the EU has established a humanitarian aid package for the Central Asian region in the amount of 124 million Euros. As part of this package, the EU launched the € 3 million COVID-19 Central Asia Crisis Response (CACCR) assistance package aimed at meeting the needs of Central Asian countries in the fight against the pandemic. The package budget is 3 million Euros for the three Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. At the same time, Kazakhstan will receive 1.6 million Euros²¹².

²⁰⁹ European Council, 10-11 December 2020.

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2020/12/10-11/>

²¹⁰ The European Union and Central Asia: the new partnership in action. June, 2009 r.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30828/en-strategyasia_int.pdf

²¹¹ Council conclusions on the EU Strategy for Central Asia Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 22 June 2015, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/st_10191_2015_init_en.pdf

²¹² EU launches a EUR 3 million program to combat COVID-19 in 3 Central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Turkmenistan. 21 July, 2020.

https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uzbekistan/83199/eu-launches-eur-3-million-program-combat-covid-19-3-central-asian-countries-kazakhstan-kyrgyz_en

The current crisis has demonstrated the discrepancy between the promotion of the concept of resilience to stress and the presence of systemic problems within the EU, demonstrating the lack of resilience of the continent itself. The EU has successfully promoted the concept of resilience around the world, including in Central Asia, which has become a new way to advance the value agenda, which allowed the EU to maintain its position as a source of regulatory borrowing and a model, especially for neighbours and developing countries. However, the coronavirus pandemic has affected this EU activity. Within the EU itself, the need for transformation has arisen. The roadmap for recovery called "Paving the way towards a more resilient, sustainable and fair Europe after COVID-19"²¹³ had to be established. In the current conditions, it is advisable to promote the concept of stress resistance not only in developing countries, but also in developed countries, including within the EU. This is because sustainable development and response to ongoing processes directly affect the formation of the EU's image in the world community.

Initially, the term "resilience" meant "preparation, confrontation, adaptation and quick recovery from stresses and shocks, depriving at the same time the long-term prospects for their development by individuals, households, communities, countries or regions"²¹⁴. A more active use of the concept of resilience in EU discourse and politics began in 2011. Following the UN, the European Commission in 2011 proposed a combination of humanitarian aid and development policy, where the main emphasis was placed on the formation of their own stress resistance in developing countries, including Central Asia, which may face disasters of various kinds. An example is the 2011 program of support for the Horn of Africa hit by drought²¹⁵.

The concept of resilience, which has long linked the EU's relationship with developing countries closely, has contributed to the perception of the EU as a role model in building resilience. For a more in-depth and effective development of relations, the EU sought to cooperate, in addition to official structures, with the civil society in partner countries (in this case, developing countries). Before the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, the use of the term "resilience to stress" was largely limited to certain specific areas. With the adoption of the Global Strategy, this term reached the level of a key concept, which, on the one hand, characterized the presence of challenges, on the other hand, the presence of opportunities to overcome them.

In 2016, the EU Resilience Concept formed the basis of the EU Global Strategy and became the core of a renewed approach to the Union's security problems. The EU Global Strategy replaced the previous document of such a plan - the 2003 European Security Strategy, becoming the basis for promoting the EU's activities around the world. The EU seeks to strengthen resilience by eliminating imbalances in governance within the organization for greater internal value and normative cohesion, developing the EU's ability to carry out foreign policy activities in the international arena autonomously to promote values and principles, and to help create stress-resilient

²¹³ Roadmap For Recovery: Paving the way towards a more resilient, sustainable and fair Europe after COVID-19. 12 May, 2020 By Justine Lambert. <https://aer.eu/roadmap-for-recovery-paving-the-way-towards-a-more-resilient-sustainable-and-fair-europe-after-covid-19/>

²¹⁴ Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries. 2013-2020. 19 June, 2013. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2013_227_ap_crisis_prone_countries_en.pdf

²¹⁵ European civil protection and humanitarian aid operations. https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/share-horn-of-africa_en

economies, societies and states. Assistance in building resilience in developing countries, including the Central Asian region, has remained unchanged. It should be noted that the authors of the Global Strategy pay attention to the spread of the European model of stress resistance as a universal one.

Greater emphasis is placed on challenges and threats which the EU can neither isolate nor eliminate, and to which it must be resistant. This is due to the threats of terrorism, misinformation, cyber threats, and the instability of energy supplies. However, the coronavirus pandemic has made changes in this area as well. If before the pandemic the main issues were internal sustainability, normativity, assistance to third countries, countering existing threats to minimize risks, with the spread of the coronavirus, the EU's focus on sustainability and stability has somewhat been altered. This has primarily affected internal transformations. The pandemic has demonstrated the vulnerability of EU countries to the virus. States were not prepared to act quickly in response to the new threat. Fear, confusion, panic and isolation at the national level have clearly shown that the readiness to accept unforeseen challenges can lead to uncoordinated actions. In this regard, on December 18, 2020, the Council and Parliament reached a preliminary agreement on the Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF), which is worth 672.5 billion Euros. It is at the centre of the EU's emergency recovery efforts, Next Generation EU (NGEU) plan of accumulating 750 billion euros, agreed by EU leaders in July 2020²¹⁶. The main goal of the fund is to help member countries to overcome the economic and social consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and the gradual transition of the EU economies to green and digital technologies, while becoming more resilient. To receive support from the Fund, EU countries need to prepare national recovery and resilience plans, which should clearly outline the reform and investment programs until 2026.

Environmental friendliness of the energy sector and improving the health care system are priority areas in ensuring stress-resistant development and overcoming the crisis. The second wave of the virus demonstrated once again that there are gaps in taking coordinated decisions. Premature easing of measures contributed to an increase in the number of people infected and dying from Covid-19. Due to the increase in the number of infections, European countries again restricted passenger traffic and restored certain restrictions. At the present time, when the impact of globalization and the ongoing climate change is not the same, in order to become more responsive and sustainable, there is a need for rethinking governance where sustainability contributes to a better understanding of the challenges of the global order²¹⁷. For its part, the EU recognizes that it is impossible to eliminate challenges and threats like a pandemic, but the organization seeks to create the conditions, primarily in the region, for sustainable development in such situations.

Today, the European side believes that it was able to fully mobilize itself in all areas and that the EU is aware of the need for joint action and solidarity, where the principle

²¹⁶ A recovery plan for Europe. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-recovery-plan/>

²¹⁷ Elena Korosteleva, Trine Flockhart. Resilience in EU and international institutions: Redefining local ownership in a new global governance agenda. 11 Feb 2020.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2020.1723973>

of multilateralism and partnership should operate²¹⁸. Counteracting the spread of coronavirus infection alone by nation-states did not bring the expected effective results compared to coordinated actions in the fight against the pandemic together with other EU members. First, this concerns joint measures of economic stimulation and regulation within the organization and the establishment of certain criteria for the provision of state assistance. To get out of the crisis, while maintaining its position in the international arena as a subject of international relations, the EU needs to continue its policy of mutual support within the organization. Internal consolidation, joint coordinated actions in the fight against the pandemic, including the development of an effective vaccine and its rollout among the population, point to the concept of resilience to stress within the EU which will preserve the confidence of the partner countries in the EU to continue long-term cooperation.

It should be noted that assistance to developing countries and the implementation of goals and projects, both planned and unplanned, with partner countries, in particular with Central Asia, also continue to function during a pandemic. The pandemic has caused significant damage to the economies and prosperity of the countries of Central Asia, the restoration of which will need money and time. Coordinated actions of all parties, adherence to established norms and obligations will speed up the process of implementing the set goals and objectives, both at the regional level and in a bilateral format. The new EU strategy should serve as an important framework for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia to address many of the issues that are important for post-crisis recovery. For their part, it is advisable for the CA countries to effectively and efficiently distribute financial assistance and support provided by the EU in order to strengthen cooperation and trust between the parties.

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²¹⁸ The EU's corona marathon: moving on all tracks. 19 April 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/77754/eu%E2%80%99s-corona-marathon-moving-all-tracks_en

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