{"id":511,"date":"2018-07-19T12:28:00","date_gmt":"2018-07-19T11:28:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/beta-carc\/?p=511"},"modified":"2019-05-29T12:07:08","modified_gmt":"2019-05-29T11:07:08","slug":"g-aegeanoil87-greece-on-aegean-oil-crisis-with-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/2018\/07\/19\/g-aegeanoil87-greece-on-aegean-oil-crisis-with-turkey\/","title":{"rendered":"G-AegeanOil87 – Greece on Aegean oil crisis with Turkey"},"content":{"rendered":"

Greece on Aegean oil crisis with Turkey (1987)<\/strong>
\nSuggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Greek-Turkish Negotiations and Crises 1983-2003 Dataset , Queen’s University Belfast.<\/p>\n

Case Summary:<\/strong>
\nThis case study looks into Greek reactions to the Aegean oil crisis with Turkey in March 1987. A crisis over the demarcation of oil-search and oil-drilling rights in offshore waters between the Greek islands of the north-eastern Aegean and the Turkish coastline has been simmering since at least November 1973. Additionally, in a border clash in December 1986, two Turkish and one Greek guard are killed. The March 1987 crisis is caused by a dispute over oil-drilling rights in the North Aegean, off the island of Thassos, where a Greek-based international consortium is planning to start drilling. The Turkish government claims that these operations contravene the Berne Agreement of 1976 between the two countries.<\/a>[i]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0The two countries agree in 1976, in a secret meeting in Bern, Switzerland, on a formula to deal with disputes arising over the Aegean,<\/strong>\u00a0but later on Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou renounces this agreement.<\/a>[ii]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0Turkey’s National Security Council, headed by President Kenan Evren and dominated by soldiers, orders the oil exploration vessel Sismik-1 to sail through the Dardanelles under naval escort. In Greece, Papandreou vows to stop Sismik-1 by force.\u00a0<\/strong>PM \u00d6zal who is still on his way home from a heart operation in Texas, cancels Sismik-1 operations and diffuses the crisis after securing an assurance from the Greek government that it will also refrain from drilling in disputed areas.<\/a>[iii]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0In a full text search for keywords \u201cGreece\u201d and \u201cTurkey and \u201ccrisis,\u201d Lexis\/ Nexis produces 45 results for the period 3\/1\/1987- 4\/1\/1987 (under category European News Sources).<\/p>\n

Case Study Features:<\/strong>
\nEffectiveness of Offensive Policies<\/strong>\u00a0: 1<\/strong>
\nDespite its relatively smaller size, Greece has a number of political and military advantages. Firstly, it receives the indirect backing of neighbouring Bulgaria. Secondly, it successfully mobilises its air and naval forces. Thirdly, it orders the closure of the US base at Nea Makri \u2013 thus forcing NATO and the US to intervene on its side (eventually US and NATO officials press the Turkish Government not to continue with the Sismik-1 challenge, and to back down). Finally, with forward deployment of its newly-acquired interceptors, and by moving first, the Greek air force can win a limited victory in the Aegean (this according to a retired USAF expert familiar with both sides in the conflict).<\/a>[iv]\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

Offensive vs. Defensive Signals Indistinguishable: 1<\/strong>
\nThis is a classic case of indistinguishability of offensive from defensive action, recognised here by third parties. According to the New York Times<\/em>, there is little readiness on either side to read the other’s signals. The Greek government wants to take control of a Canadian consortium to prevent it from causing an international incident by drilling oil in disputed waters, 11 miles east of the Greek island of Thassos. Turkish officials, however, interpret the Greek move as evidence of Athens’s intention to drill. So when Turkey issues licenses to its own state oil company to explore in disputed waters, Ankara depicts its action as a response to the Greek ones, while the Greeks read it as aggression.<\/a>[v]\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

Domestic Challenge<\/strong>:\u00a01<\/strong>
\nWhen national elections take place in 1985, the government of Andreas Papandreou faces a number of domestic challenges. It institutes an unpopular package of economic stabilisation at the end of 1985 following high levels of inflation, and successfully defends the package against the worst series of strikes in its 5.5 years in power; these strikes are organised by both leftist and right-wing trade unions (January and February 1987). Then, the Chernobyl nuclear accident contaminates Greece’s entire 1986 production of wheat, while in the fall of 1986, an earthquake in the southern port city of Kalamata leaves thousands of inhabitants homeless.<\/a>[vi]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0In addition to economic problems and strikes<\/a>[vii]\u00a0<\/a> Papandreou faces a trial of strength with Greece’s Orthodox Church over plans to seize church land.<\/a>[viii]\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

Enduring Rivalries<\/strong>:\u00a01<\/strong>
\nThere is an element of \u201cenduring rivalries\u201d between Greece and Turkey resulting from the events of 1974, the unilateral declaration of TRNC in 1983 and the failure of Cyprus negotiations to produce a settlement.<\/p>\n

Confrontational Policies: 1<\/strong>
\nThe Papandreou policies towards Turkey are confrontational at the level of both rhetoric and policy. This is particularly true because of the Greek insistence not to negotiate on the Berne agreement (a reversal of a previous agreement) and its decision to destroy Turkish vessels (threat of war).<\/a>[ix]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0The case confirms the diversionary theory and the security dilemma.<\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

<\/a>[i]\u00a0\u00a0Robert Mauthner,\u00a0\u201c<\/strong>More Obliging To Friends Now\u201d,\u00a0Financial Times,<\/em>\u00a0April 6, 1987, p. 19.
\n<\/a>[ii]\u00a0\u00a0Jim Anderson, \u201cHow war was avoided between Greece\u00a0and Turkey,\u201d\u00a0UPI Spot News<\/em>\u00a0Weekender<\/em>April 5, 1987
\n<\/a>[iii]\u00a0 \u201cGreece and Turkey:\u00a0A Nasty Squall in the Aegean\u201d,\u00a0The Economist,\u00a0<\/em>April 4, 1987, p. 50.
\n<\/a>[iv]\u00a0\u00a0\u201cThe Aegean dispute and the Middle East\u201d,\u00a0<\/strong>MidEast\u00a0Markets<\/em>, April 13, 1987.
\n<\/a>[v]\u00a0\u00a0Alan Cowell, \u201cGreek Leader\u2019s Gambit\u201d,\u00a0The New York Times,<\/em>\u00a0March 30, 1987, p.2.
\n<\/a>[vi]\u00a0\u00a0Andriana Ierodiaconou, \u201cGreece, Pragmatism Pays Off\u201d,\u00a0\u00a0Financial Times<\/em>, April 6, 1987, p. 17.
\n<\/a>[vii]\u00a0\u00a0Kerin Hope, \u201cNationwide Strike Brings Greece to Standstill,\u201d\u00a0<\/strong>Associated Press,<\/em>\u00a0January 15, 1987.
\n<\/a>[viii]\u00a0\u00a0,\u00a0<\/em>\u201cGreece and Turkey:\u00a0A Nasty Squall in the Aegean\u201d,\u00a0The Economist<\/em>\u00a0April 4, 1987, p. 50.
\n<\/a>[ix]\u00a0 The New York Times reports thatGreek PM Andreas Papandreou stirs\u00a0nationalist\u00a0feelings against Turkey and the U.S. in order to bolster his internal political position and calls for responsible Greeks to restrain their volatile Prime Minister, or better, in their own interest, find a statesman to replace him. Flora Lewis, \u201cTo the Brink in Athens\u201d,\u00a0The New York Times,<\/em>\u00a0March 30, 1987, p.19<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

1987<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":778,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-511","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-greek-turkish-crises"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/511","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/778"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=511"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/511\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1063,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/511\/revisions\/1063"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=511"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=511"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=511"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}