{"id":423,"date":"2018-07-19T12:35:26","date_gmt":"2018-07-19T11:35:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/beta-carc\/?p=423"},"modified":"2019-05-29T12:02:24","modified_gmt":"2019-05-29T11:02:24","slug":"g-aegeanimia96-greece-on-imia-kardak-islet-crisis-with-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/2018\/07\/19\/g-aegeanimia96-greece-on-imia-kardak-islet-crisis-with-turkey\/","title":{"rendered":"G-AegeanImia96 – Greece on Imia-Kardak islet crisis with Turkey"},"content":{"rendered":"

Greece on Imia-Kardak islet crisis with Turkey (1996)<\/strong>
\nSuggested Citation: Neophytos G. Loizides, Greek-Turkish Negotiations and Crises 1983-2003 Dataset , Queen’s University Belfast.
\nIn January 1996, Greece and Turkey experience another crisis in the Aegean Sea, this time over the sovereignty of the uninhabited Aegean islet, Imia (Kardak in Turkish). Greece is alarmed by the fact that Turkey claims Greek territory for the first time ever.\u00a0<\/a>[i]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0This crisis that brings the two countries close to war, ends with the withdrawal of both Greek and Turkish troops from the islet. The Greek government claims that Italy ceded Imia to Greece under the 1947 settlement (along with the main Dodecanese islands off the Turkish coast). But Turkey argues that the islet and other similar rocks are not included in the 1947 accord, as they had already been granted by Italy to Turkey under an earlier 1932 convention, which stated that all the Aegean islets within 18 km of the coast belong to the nearest country.\u00a0<\/a>[ii]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0The final status of Imia\/Kardak has not been settled since the January 1996 crisis, but the two countries have agreed to apply to the International Court in The Hague for mediation in the future. For the period 1\/15\/1996 \u2013 2\/15\/1996, Lexis\/Nexis provides 153 results for terms \u201cGreece\u201d and \u201cTurkey\u201d and \u201ccrisis\u201d (full text search under European News Sources).<\/p>\n

Case Study Features<\/strong>
\nIndistinguishability of Offensive vs. Defensive Action: 1<\/strong>
\nBoth Greece and Turkey claim that they are defending their national territory while the other country is attacking them. This argument resonates with both publics, even though neither has ever heard of the two islets before. International media and third governments find it difficult to take a definite position, since the conflict over this islet has not occurred in the past, and little is known of the geography of the region. Most sources talk about a crisis over an obscure, uninhabited islet.<\/a>[iii]\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

Effectiveness of offence versus the defence<\/strong>\u00a0:\u00a0 1<\/strong>
\nOffensive action is superior to defensive in the Aegean Sea, because either of the two countries can create an accomplished fact by effectively seizing a \u201cdisputed islet\u201d first.\u00a0 The Greek side goes on the offensive by moving first and placing flag and soldiers on Imia. Although Greece does not have a military advantage over Turkey in case of a large-scale of war, it can harm Turkey in the EU politically.<\/p>\n

Domestic Challenge<\/strong>:\u00a01<\/strong>
\nKostas Simitis is sworn in as Prime Minister on January 22, 1996 replacing Andreas Papandreou, who has been admitted to hospital in late November with lung and kidney problems. On January 18, Simitis is elected by Pasok deputies as party leader and Prime Minister with a narrow majority, while his opponents still control the ministry of defence.\u00a0 Simitis faces both intra-party and nationwide challenges.<\/a>[iv]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0In addition, he has to deal with the criticism of the Greek military for accepting a US-brokered compromise over the plans of the General Staff.\u00a0<\/a>[v]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0His public approval ratings sink from 80 percent to 36 percent after handling the crisis.\u00a0<\/a>[vi]\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

Enduring Ethnic Rivalries: 1<\/strong>
\nThere are enduring rivalries with Turkey resulting from the crises in Cyprus, Thrace, and the Aegean.<\/p>\n

Confrontational Policies: 1<\/strong>
\nGreece follows a number of confrontational policies after the crisis, such as the use of threat of war against Turkey if it follows similar policies,<\/a>[vii]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0the stalling of EU aid package for Ankara,<\/a>[viii]\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0and the cancellation of US mediation by State Department envoy Richard Holbrooke a month later.\u00a0<\/a>[ix]\u00a0<\/a>. Top of Form The diversionary theory of war is confirmed.<\/p>\n

\n
\n<\/div>\n

<\/a>[i]\u00a0\u00a0\u201cGreece: Turkish claim hinders relations\u201d,\u00a0United Press International,<\/em>\u00a0January 26, 1996.
\n<\/a>[ii]\u00a0\u00a0Elizabeth Neuffer, \u201cGreece Struggles in a Sea of Change: Turkish Rivalry a Turning Point,\u201d The BostonGlobe<\/em>, February 13, 1996.
\n<\/a>[iii]\u00a0\u00a0Financial Times,<\/em>\u00a0\u201cMoves to calm Aegean dispute\u201d, January 31, 1996, p.2.
\n<\/a>[iv]\u00a0\u00a0Agence France Presse,<\/em>\u00a0\u201cPapandreou’s return creates headaches for Simitis,\u201d May 14, 1996;\u00a0United Press International<\/em>, \u201cGreek Socialists move to elect new leader,\u201d\u00a0June 23, 1996.
\n<\/a>[v]\u00a0\u00a0Anthee Carassavas, \u201cDefense-leak scandal rocks\u201d,\u00a0United Press International,<\/em>\u00a0February 8, 1996.
\n<\/a>[vi]\u00a0\u00a0Elizabeth Neuffer, \u201cGreece Struggles in a Sea of Change: Turkish Rivalry a Turning Point,\u201d\u00a0The Boston Globe<\/em>, February 13, 1996.
\n<\/a>[vii]\u00a0\u00a0Elizabeth Neuffer, \u201cGreece Struggles in a Sea of Change Turkish Rivalry a Turning Point,\u201d\u00a0The Boston Globe<\/em>, February, 13, 1996; Greece warns Turkey over new island dispute,\u00a0Agence France-Presse<\/em>, June 06, 1996.
\n<\/a>[viii]\u00a0\u00a0\u201cGreece stalls EU aid for Turkey in islet row,\u201d\u00a0Agence France Presse<\/em>, February 22, 1996;\u00a0European Report<\/em>, \u201cEU\/ Turkey: Greece Blocks Customs Union Funding\u201d, February 24, 1996.
\n<\/a>[ix]\u00a0\u00a0Stephen Weeks, \u201cGreeks vent hurt pride on special envoy Holbrooke,\u201d\u00a0The Herald (Glasgow),<\/em>\u00a0February, 06, 1996,\u00a0p. 8.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

1996<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":778,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-423","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-greek-turkish-crises"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/423","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/778"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=423"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/423\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1049,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/423\/revisions\/1049"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=423"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=423"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/research.kent.ac.uk\/conflict-analysis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=423"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}