

**“Extremist” Rehabilitation: A Fundamental Misunderstanding?  
Divergent Micro and Macro-level Narratives Regarding Motivations of Former  
Guantanamo Bay “Extremists” Participating in the Saudi Arabian De-radicalization  
and Rehabilitation Program**

**By**

**Sheila A. Rom**

*The nature of warfare has fundamentally changed in recent decades. As armed conflicts have increasingly shifted from interstate to intrastate, warring parties no longer have the luxury of not encountering former enemies. To prevent the reemergence of conflict, the international community has instituted programs that integrate both civilians and former combatants into post-conflict societies. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) and rehabilitation programs are charged with the difficult task of helping former militants transition from violent conflict to civil society. The majority of studies on rehabilitation programs measure success solely on the basis of recidivism rates. As numbers are susceptible to manipulation by individuals or organizations with agendas, this study proposes alternative aspects, such as micro-level narratives, need to be incorporated when evaluating the efficacy of a rehabilitation program. Though largely considered successful, the Saudi Arabian extremist rehabilitation program has had numerous former Guantanamo Bay detainees resume violent terrorist activity. By comparing the narratives of Saudi officials and Guantanamo program enrollees, this paper examines the effectiveness of the Saudi program and why this group of participants is returning to the battlefield.*

**Table of Contents**

1. Introduction.....	145
2. Preliminary Research Material .....	147
2.1 Problem Definition .....	147
2.2 Presentation of Research Questions .....	147
2.3 Technical Definitions .....	148
2.4 Literature Review .....	148
3. Study selection and theoretical framework.....	149
3.1 Why Guantanamo and Saudi Arabia .....	149
3.2 Social Movement Theory Multi-Institutional Politics Perspective: Culture, Power, and Resources .....	150
3.2.1 Culture: Constraining and Enabling Movements .....	152
3.2.2 Kinship Bonds as Resources for Mobilization .....	153
3.2.3 Material versus Symbolic Power of Institutions.....	153
4. Methodology, Research Design, Limitations, and Ethical Considerations .....	153
4.1. Methodology .....	153
4.2. Research Design .....	155
4.3. Limitations .....	157

4.4. Ethical Considerations .....	158
5. Government, Power, and Religion .....	159
5.1. Government Monopoly of Religion and Culture .....	159
5.2. State Domination of Religious Institutions .....	159
5.3. Opposition and Islamist Movements in Saudi Arabia .....	160
5.4. Saudi Responses to Opposition Movements .....	162
5.5. Countering Extremism in Saudi Arabia.....	163
5.6. Soft Counterterrorism: De-radicalization through counseling and rehabilitation programs .....	164
6. Analysis .....	166
6.1. The Saudi Authorities' Narrative .....	167
6.2. The Extremist Narrative.....	168
6.3. Narrative Comparisons .....	169
7. Results and Conclusions .....	170
7.1. Targeting the right individuals? .....	170
7.2. Focus of Saudi rehabilitation program on religion.....	171
7.3. Age.....	171
7.4. Increase in radicalization? .....	172
7.5. Length of incarceration.....	175
7.6. Kinship ties .....	172
7.7. Economic factors .....	173
7.8. Overall Assessment .....	173
7.9. Going forward .....	174
Bibliography .....	175
Appendices 1 .....	180
Figure 1: Positioning diamond for Saudi Arabian authorities .....	180
Figure 2: Positioning diamond for ex-Guantanamo Rehabilitation program recidivists .....	181
Figure 3: Release countries for Guantanamo Bay detainees and release countries' total number of prisoners with citizenship .....	182
Figure 4: Age breakdown of Guantanamo detainees released to Saudi Arabia .....	183
Figure 5: Age breakdown of ex-Guantanamo detainee recidivists .....	184
Figure 6: Percentage of recidivists by release date and length of sentence .....	185
Figure 7: Rehabilitation recidivists release date chart .....	186

## 1. Introduction

Authors, such as Mary Kaldor in her often cited *New and Old Wars*, argue that the nature of warfare and armed conflict has fundamentally changed in the past few decades.<sup>1</sup> Armed conflicts have increasingly shifted from interstate to intrastate.<sup>2</sup> Practically speaking this change has brought about equally major shifts on the ground. Unlike previous eras in which there were often greater distances between warring parties post conflict, combatants and civilians no longer have the luxury of not seeing former enemies (term includes all individuals not sympathetic to a group's cause). In an effort to prevent the reemergence of

<sup>1</sup> Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.138

<sup>2</sup> Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, 139

conflict, former combatants are often reintegrated amongst the various opposition forces and civil societies that they previously fought against. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs (DDR) and rehabilitation programs are charged with the difficult task of helping former militants transition from violent conflict to civil society.<sup>3</sup>

Although demobilization and rehabilitation programs are not always planned or implemented in the best manner, these programs have the potential to be an integral part of a society's transition from the conflict to peace. Former combatants and individuals pursuing political violence as a means for political or social change need to be fully reintegrated within civil society to reduce the likelihood of re-eruption of the conflict. Understanding the micro-level elements that can motivate individuals, groups, or communities to engage in political violence is essential to the creation of effective disengagement and reintegration policy initiatives. An awareness of corresponding micro-level triggers which engender a permanent exit from a life of political violence and armed struggle allow rehabilitation programs to better identify suitable candidates for participation in rehabilitation programs as well as identify militants' needs and issues that must be addressed to increase chances for successful return into civil society.

The overwhelming majority of studies on rehabilitation programs determine the success of de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs solely on the basis of recidivism rates. As numbers can be easily manipulated or inaccurately represented, especially by states or programs seeking to garner international support for their efforts, other aspects must be included in order to measure success. Additionally, the literature on state run rehabilitation programs is synonymous with terrorism. While rehabilitation is certainly an important aspect of terrorism studies, terrorism should not be the only focus of rehabilitation literature. The focus on terrorism to the exclusion of all else could prevent more inclusive studies which would have wider implications for DDR and the prevention of political violence more broadly.

The "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) is another significant development that has changed the nature of warfare since the beginning of this century. The so-called terrorist activities, which the United States and other global allies (primarily western nations or nations friendly with the west) seek to combat, encompass a myriad of different conflicts spanning the gamut from internal irredentist struggles to worldwide crusades against perceived colonialist occupiers /oppressors such as the United States and other western nations. Without a unifying cause or method of violent engagement (different guerilla tactics etc.), vague descriptions of GWOT fighters abound, allowing for any number of individuals to be lumped into the GWOT militant category. Some governments rely on this GWOT narrative to rally international support for their internal battle with revolutionary or secessionist movements.

Since the advent of the Global War on Terror, there have been an increasing number of civil liberties, legal rights, and, in some case, human rights, which have been compromised in the name of greater national or international security interests. The United States and its allies have pursued the international threats (both perceived and concrete) leveled against them with the considerable military and political might that they have to bear. On matters related to terrorism, law enforcement, judicial officials and military personnel have, in some cases,

---

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Demobilization and reintegration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 4 (2007): 532."But despite the confidence of policy makers in the impact of DDR programs, there have been few systematic efforts to evaluate the determinants of successful reintegration by ex-combatants after conflict."

been given considerable latitude and flexibility, as far as the law is concerned.<sup>4</sup> The practice of setting aside legal rights because of the mitigating circumstances related to the GWOT has raised numerous ethical considerations and set a worrying precedent for many individuals.<sup>5</sup>

This new era of conflict has raised a host of issues that must now be considered by conflict scholars and policy makers. The impact of extraditions, imprisonments without trial, and possible government endorsed use of torture -particularly against detainees in terrorist prisons (prisons/institutions holding a group of individuals alleged to have participated in acts of terrorism)- requires further investigation. The international community needs to consider whether these anti-extremist efforts have, in fact, promoted (further) radicalization of the populations that have had their rights stripped in the name of protecting the greater good. The focus of this article is the population of Guantanamo Bay detainees released to the Saudi Arabian Extremism Rehabilitation Program. This paper has broad implications for the aforementioned problems created by GWOT.

## **2. Preliminary Research Material**

### **2.1 Problem Definition**

The problematized question addressed in this study is whether potential cleavages(s) between the extremist rehabilitation program participants' (micro-level) narratives and the narratives of Saudi Arabian rehabilitation program authorities (macro-level) contribute to increased extremist activity by former Guantanamo Bay detainees, particularly with regard to the program participants' motivations for engaging in violence. The central hypothesis of this paper is that gaps between narratives of the program officials and program participants may be contributing, in part, to former Guantanamo Bay detainees' return to violent social movements. Theoretically, if micro-level participant narratives regarding extremist's motivations and concerns were fully taken on board, the resultant programming would mitigate the potential for recidivism.

### **2.2 Presentation of research questions / aims of study**

Does the degree to which official state narratives and micro-level participant narratives regarding participation in violent social movements coincide and contribute to the overall effectiveness (reduction of "extremist" activity) of state sponsored de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs?

**R1-** To what extent does the Saudi Arabian government's perception of religion influence the official narrative on "extremists' "motivations for engagement and the subsequent state policy for dealing with these individuals?

**R2-** Is religion the primary motivating factor for Saudi prisoners accused of participating in terrorist/extremist acts?

---

<sup>4</sup> Iver, Nandini. *Returning Home: Resettlement and Reintegration of Detainees Released From the US Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*. DIANE Publishing, 2009. 2

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

**R3-** Are Former Guantanamo Bay detainees more susceptible to reengagement than other program participants?

**R4-** Do motivations of former Guantanamo Bay detainees resemble the motivations that Saudi authorities ascribe to other prisoners?

## 2.3 Technical Definitions

As numerous definitions exist for terms, particularly more contentious terms such as terrorism/extremism, further clarity must be established to prevent misunderstanding. Defining key terms is essential to conducting a comparative analysis of the micro-level and macro-level narratives (program participants and program officials respectively) and exposing discrepancies, where they might exist. For the purposes of this study, specific meanings of a variety of common terms are used and are as follows:

**Extremism/Terrorism** – Within this article the terms extremist, fundamentalist, jihadist and terrorist will all be used interchangeably. These terms are defined here as the active promotion of views or measures which are not in line with culturally accepted behavioral or ideological norms. This definition stresses the relational nature of extremism as the concept relies on a specific cultural context for its meaning. The advocacy of violence as a means of political expression may not be in and of itself an indication of extremism, further cultural analysis must be conducted to determine whether the use of violence falls within culturally accepted norms.

**Recidivism** refers to the act of previously convicted individuals reengaging in the criminally offensive behavior for which they were originally investigated or detained. Just as recovering alcoholics are discouraged from frequenting bars or other establishments which promote the consumption of alcohol, so too are criminal offenders discouraged from frequent contact with individuals, groups or locations which encourage participation in criminal behavior.

**Narrative/discourse** refers to any form of communication which gives an account, official or otherwise, of a particular situation, event, storyline etc. this account is subject to change over time and varies within in organizational structures depending on the individual.

## 2.4 Literature Review

The vast majority of literature concerning extremism or terrorism is focused on the ways in which individuals become engaged in or affiliated with extremist activities or groups; psychological, sociological, and ideological motivations being paramount in these investigations.<sup>6</sup> Traditionally, disengagement and de-radicalization - to a lesser degree- have fallen into the domain of organized crime and gang related studies.<sup>7</sup> In recent years,

<sup>6</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. "The mind of the terrorist: Perspectives from social psychology." *Psychiatric Annals* (1999).

<sup>7</sup> Morris, Madeline et al. "Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Degang and Deprograming." *Institute for Homeland Security Solutions* (2010): 3-4.

individuals in fields related to political violence and armed conflict have begun to investigate de-radicalization and disengagement. Scholars such as Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan are leading experts in this emerging field, but their work is largely concerned with deradicalization and disengagement as they relate to terrorism, rather than to political violence and militancy more broadly.<sup>8</sup>

Inspired by programs within criminal justice systems, countries have started to explore the possibility of rehabilitation and de-radicalization as a moderate counter-terrorism tool. An even more limited number of individuals involved in de-radicalization studies have assessed state-run de-radicalization programs. Rohan Gunaratna and the late Christopher Boucek have made substantial contributions to the limited field on extremist rehabilitation studies.<sup>9</sup> These overviews of state-sponsored de-radicalization or rehabilitation programs are often concerned with the overall effectiveness of the program as a counterterrorism tactic. The weakness of most of the research on rehabilitation programs is that programs are usually evaluated from the top down, drawing primarily from recidivism numbers as a baseline of effectiveness. Few, if any, studies have compared micro and macro level perspectives of rehabilitation programs. This author argues that “buy in” of program participants is critical to preventing reengagement. Without a comprehensive understanding of the mobilizing and staying forces at the micro level, state efforts might set up programs which fail to address micro level beliefs and concern. This article attempts to fill this gap in the literature through the examination and evaluation of both micro (participant) and macro (State) level narratives regarding entrance, stay, and exit violent extremist motivations.

### 3. Study selection and theoretical framework

#### 3.1 Why Guantanamo and Saudi Arabia

Opened in 2001, Guantanamo Bay was chosen as the extremist prison in this study because it is one of the longest operating and one of the most written about prisons in existence.<sup>10</sup> The wealth of data collected over its history as well as the numerous sources of varying viewpoints which have covered Guantanamo Bay, make this prison the best suited for this study. The 779 alleged terrorists that have gone through Guantanamo Bay have come from nearly 50 countries, making it a fairly diverse prison population.<sup>11</sup> Of those countries, only a handful of countries have prisoner numbers (current number of former and current prisoners) in the double digits.<sup>12</sup>

Currently 53 countries have had Guantanamo Bay prisoner released into their care, 11 of which have had 10 or more prisoners released.<sup>13</sup> Four of these countries, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have Islamically inspired de-radicalization programs in

---

<sup>8</sup> Bjorgo, Tore, and John Horgan, eds. *Leaving terrorism behind: individual and collective disengagement*. Routledge, 2008.

<sup>9</sup> Boucek was the leading expert on the Saudi Arabian program while Gunaratna has primarily investigated the program in Singapore.

<sup>10</sup> Al-Jazeera. “Timeline: Guantanamo Prison a timeline of key events at the US-run prison.” 7 October 2009.

<sup>11</sup> Human Rights First. “Guantanamo by the Numbers.” Fact Sheet. Human Rights First. June 2013.

<sup>12</sup> The Guardian. “The Guantanamo Files.” Last updated 25 April 2011.

<sup>13</sup> Scheinkman, Andrei et al. “The Guantanamo Docket.” NY Times. Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia have the greatest number of releases with 199 and 120 releases respectively.

place.<sup>14</sup> However, only Saudi Arabia has a program which is specifically designed to deal with former Guantanamo Bay detainees.<sup>15</sup> As the country with the second highest number of released detainees and the country touted as the leading example of the right way to de-radicalization, Saudi Arabia was chosen as the subject for this study.

The central theme of this paper contends that gaps between narratives of the Saudi Arabian program officials and rehabilitation program participants may be contributing, at least in part, to former Guantanamo Bay detainees' return to violent social movements.

At a fundamental level, the factors that explain the outbreak, the continuation, the end and the consequences of violent conflict are closely interrelated with how people behave, make choices and interact with their immediate surroundings, and how all these factors may shape the lives and livelihoods of those exposed to conflict and violence.<sup>16</sup>

The impetus for this hypothesis is that if micro-level participant narratives regarding extremist's motivations and concerns were fully taken on board, the resultant programming would mitigate the potential for recidivism. This paper attempts to fill a gap in international conflict and security studies literature regarding DDR programs and their presumed goal of evolving in a manner which will reduce recidivism rates among program participants.

### **3.2 Social Movement Theory Multi-Institutional Politics Perspective: Culture, Power, and Resources**

In order to compare the degree and manner to which narratives (regarding extremist motivations for participation in collective violence) coincide, it is necessary to conduct a theoretical examination of both the micro and macro level ideologies. The majority of conflict theory provides an analytical framework that can be used to dissect conflict causes at the national and international levels. A small but growing number of theories enable researchers to examine conflict triggers at the micro level.<sup>17</sup> Currently, there are no foundational theories that provide the basis for a systematic analysis of conflict actors at the different levels while considering the disparate views or goals espoused at each level as potential triggers of conflict.<sup>18</sup> Because of this lack of a comprehensive foundational theory, elements of two iterations of social movement theory are combined and further supported by elements from positioning theory and micro level theory. It is of particular importance to understand how and why these movements develop and under what cultural circumstances this occurs.

---

<sup>14</sup> El-Said, Hamed. (2012). *De-radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States*. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. 4.

<sup>15</sup> House Armed Services Committee "Leaving Guantanamo: Policies, Pressures and Detainees Returning to Fight." HASC Committee Print 112-4: Washington DC. January 2012. 32.

<sup>16</sup> Justino, Patricia, Tilman Brück, and Philip Verwimp. *Micro-level dynamics of conflict, violence and development: A new analytical framework*. No. 138. Households in Conflict Network, 2013. 3.

<sup>17</sup> See Micro-CON, Households in Conflict Network (HICN), see also works of Patricia Justino, Philip Verwimp, and Tilman Brück.

<sup>18</sup> Kenneth Waltz's Levels of Analysis Theory, which acknowledge different ideas or motivations might take precedence at the international, state, and local levels, has been picked up by many scholars. However few advancements have been made in terms of creating an overarching method for comparing these different levels.

There are numerous relational theories of social movement or social identity being used to aid in the understanding of the creation and maintenance of social conditions that are conducive to initiation and endurance of violent conflict. Not exclusively a political science theory, social movement theories advance a set of mechanisms and steps that take place in movements which attempt to address political, social or economic grievance.<sup>19</sup> The majority of the social movement theories, including traditional schools resources mobilization and European new social movement, view the state, and its shortcomings, as the target of legitimate social grievances.

The brand of social movement theory advanced in this study draws upon and modifies the multi-institutional politics approach as advanced by Elizabeth Armstrong and Mary Bernstein in their article “Culture, Power, and Institutions: A Multi-Institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements.” Within this theoretical framework, social movements are defined as “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part.”<sup>20</sup>

The multi-institutional politics approach is an offshoot of European new social movement, which developed in a response to the political process and contentious politics approaches. The multi-institutional politics approach to social movements diverges from traditional social movement theory, particularly political process approach, in several key areas.

One significant point of departure from traditional social movement theories is the supposition that power (political and economic) is controlled and organized by a single source, in most cases, the government.<sup>21</sup> Multi-institutional politics approach disputes this assumption proposing instead “domination [is] organized around multiple sources of power, each of which is simultaneously material and symbolic.”<sup>22</sup> As a result of the fundamental shift away from the traditional state centric organization of power in society, the corresponding scope of multi-institutional politics approach studies differ in the area of movement actors, strategies and goals for the movement.<sup>23</sup>

Multiple institutions are seated with power so the state does not necessarily represent the target of dissatisfaction for social movement participants. In fact, in this view, there is the potential for numerous, seemingly unconnected institutions, to become the objective for social movements.<sup>24</sup> As noted by Foucault, “nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed.”<sup>25</sup> Culture and the distribution of institutional power then dictate the strategies that different movements adopt to challenge the institutions.

<sup>19</sup> Canel, Eduardo. “New social movement theory and resource mobilization theory: The need for integration.” *Community power and grassroots democracy: The transformation of social life* 189:1-2 (1997).

<sup>20</sup> Armstrong, Elizabeth A., and Mary Bernstein. “Culture, Power, and Institutions: A Multi-Institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements\*.” *Sociological Theory* 26(1):84 (2008).

<sup>21</sup> Armstrong “Culture”, 74. Government and state are used interchangeably in this dissertation.

<sup>22</sup> Armstrong “Culture”, 75

<sup>23</sup> Armstrong “Culture”, 76

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. As noted by Armstrong, this can happen as strategy evolves or multiple institutions that are linked to a certain kind of culturally a vested power can be target simultaneously.

<sup>25</sup> Armstrong “Culture, Power, and Institutions”, 84



It is also important to acknowledge that the way in which individuals choose to organize is not developed entirely at the macro level. It is for this reason that, for the purposes of this article, Social Movement Theory is being supplemented by Micro Level Theory in order to further analyze the actions of former Guantanamo detainees. Micro level theory suggests that collective violence and armed conflict can be triggered by any number of factors, but multiple individuals working together using violence as a strategy is a significant factor.<sup>26</sup> Because social movements do not develop in isolation, “a dynamic process of interactions whereby the behavior (or expected behavior) of one group will determine and be affected by the (expected) behavior of other actors” can be initiated when the intentions of another group are known (or assumed).<sup>27</sup> In this manner, the beliefs, assumptions, and subsequent actions of various actors in a conflict are relational. The relational nature of interactions between conflict members has consequences not just for the initiation of conflict but its conclusion as well. “The effectiveness of policy interventions in the areas of conflict prevention and demobilisation is dependent, therefore, on understanding the multiple objectives of individuals and the way in which they and the means to achieve them interrelate.”<sup>28</sup>

### 3.2.1 Culture: Constraining and Enabling Movements

Although other theoretical explanations for social mobilization have sought to diminish the importance of culture, in this study (framework), culture is paramount to understanding the structure and mechanisms at play in a particular society. Culture, or the system of commonly held histories, beliefs, values, practices, and group identities, acts as the base from which players operate and dictates the tactics that individuals or groups must adopt in order to seek change of a particular institution or institutions.<sup>29</sup> By relegating culture to a status of marginal importance, proponents of such ideologies have neglected to recognize the role culture plays in informing and tempering individual and collective actions.

Furthermore, culture is central to the creation of meaning and identity formation in particular contexts. This notion is supplemented here with identity and meaning construction as posited by positioning theorists. Identity and the way that individuals create meaning are filtered through individuals’ cultural frame of reference and are thus constrained by the specific social environment.<sup>30</sup> Due to the fact that identities are indicative of individuals’ assumptions about social values, identities are also infused with a moral component known as rights and duties. Rights and duties pertain to expectations about the appropriate actions in a given situation as well as responsibilities of a person, group, or organization.<sup>31</sup> The expectations of right behavior for institutions or individuals limit and enable the participation of certain individuals in favor of others. If institutions are unable to fulfill their societal duties or engage in inappropriate behavior, as informed by their culturally informed identity,

---

<sup>26</sup> Justino, Patricia, Tilman Brück, and Philip Verwimp. *Micro-level dynamics of conflict, violence and development: A new analytical framework*. Households in Conflict Network, 138:16 (2013).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Adjei, Stephen Baffour. “Discourse Analysis: Examining Language Use in Context.” *The Qualitative Report* 18(50):2 (2013). This is especially true when institutions become linked with cultural values.

<sup>30</sup> Tirado, Francisco, and Ana Gálvez. “Positioning theory and discourse analysis: Some tools for social interaction analysis.” *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* 229-230 (2008).

<sup>31</sup> Adjei, “Discourse Analysis”, 2-3.

this creates an opening for the development of social movements against the perceived malfeasances.

### 3.2.2 Kinship Bonds as Resources for Mobilization

Some scholars have previously suggested that the two main schools of social movement theory, resource mobilization and European new social movement, are incompatible since one school society defines opportunity as a driving factor and the other cites society as the main influence.<sup>32</sup> Using the multi-institutional politics approach in which culture both constrains and facilitates certain actors, methods (strategies), and goals, culture resembles opportunity in resource mobilization theory. In other words, without a certain types of actors, resources, and goals which appropriately target that culture in question, the success of the social movement is decreased. According to social movement approaches concerned with resource mobilization, opportunity is provided by a host of [things] including timing, money, significant players/actors. This paper builds upon the notion of resources and examines familial [and friendship] ties, a strong cultural institution in which is not typically acknowledged as a seat of power, as a potential resource.<sup>33</sup> This paper advances the notion that the presence of family ties or perceived sympathies to social movement may influence potential participants to join and remain within a social movement.

### 3.2.3 Material versus Symbolic Power of Institutions

Another critical aspect of the multi-institutional politics approach is the treatment of material and symbolic power of institutions. Material and symbolic power are mutually reinforcing concepts which are not easily disaggregated. Symbolic power (non-physical) can have material (physical) consequences such as discriminatory policies or unequal access to/distribution of resources. Separating governance, policy, or economic grievances from ideological grievances sidelines the cultural dimension that is essential to understanding how and why events unfold a particular way in a given society. This paper evaluates both material and symbolic implications of institutional power and highlights the interconnectedness of the concepts.

## 4. Methodology, Research Design, Limitations, and Ethical Considerations

### 4.1 Methodology

The theory advanced in the previous section provides the framework necessary for understanding cultural structures and mechanisms, which enable or constrain group formation, group strategies and institutional power relations in society. Micro-level theorists argue that micro and macro-level motivations and thought processes diverge because the actors at various levels often have differing goals and strategies.<sup>34</sup> While the multi-institutional politics approach examines why and how movements unfold at the societal level, the positioning diamond discourse analysis tool highlights narrative creation, actors'

---

<sup>32</sup> Canel, "New social movement theory", 1.

<sup>33</sup> McDoom, Omar. "It's who you know: social networks, interpersonal connections, and participation in collective violence." *Households in Conflict Network*, 140:1-2 (2013).

<sup>34</sup> Justino *Micro-level dynamics of conflict*, 3.

perception of situations, and their subsequent responses at the level of the micro-level (individual or group of individuals). The juxtaposition of the frameworks at two levels of analysis, social movement at the level of society and the micro-level methodology, allows for the narratives of the Saudi authorities and the extremist recidivists to be analyzed separately and within in the broader social context.

The methodology employed in this study is discourse analysis. Although there are a variety of techniques and methods for conducting discourse analysis, all seek to systematically analyze the meaning of terms and concepts through forms of communication within a particular social context.<sup>35</sup> Discourse analysis is well suited to this article, as the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the level of congruency between official state rehabilitation program narratives<sup>36</sup> and individual program participant narratives correlates with a reciprocal (corresponding / correspondent) reduction in the rate of recidivism (participation in extremist activity). The Positioning Diamond technique will be used to explain the complex interaction between the symbolic and physical meaning of (speech) acts and the variance in meanings according to the interlocutor(s).<sup>37</sup>

The positioning diamond is a discourse analysis method that uses universal methods of meaning construction in order to explain why social interactions/events develop in a particular way in a given context. This method for discourse analysis is derived from positioning theory. According to positioning theory, “people discursively construct their versions of social reality from their personally taken positions informed by discursive practices embedded in their socio-cultural environment.”<sup>38</sup> It is through this process of meaning-making or creation of identity/naming (of objects, concepts and individuals) that individuals build meaning which is comprehensible to themselves and others.<sup>39</sup>

The positioning diamond, as explained by its developer, Nikki Slocum-Bradley, identifies four key components of meaning creation (“social forces of discursive acts, storylines, identities, rights and duties”) to be analyzed at three different levels of discourse (“content, narrator-interlocutor, and ideological”).<sup>40</sup> The four components of meaning creation “are mutually-determining in that a change in one of the meanings generally induces a change in one or all of the others.”<sup>41</sup> “Social forces” is a term which encompasses the “illocutionary forces” of communication acts: written, verbal and non-verbal.<sup>42</sup> The second component, storylines, is informed relevant culture practices, which, in turn, dictate appropriate courses of action.<sup>43</sup> Identities, the third category of meaning creation, include the inherent implications and attributes assigned to individuals or objects during the process of

<sup>35</sup> Glynos, Jason, David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Ewen Speed. Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods.” ESRC National Centre for Research Methods Review paper, 6 (University of Essex, 2009). This includes both spoken and physical communication.

<sup>36</sup> The term official state program narrative is employed in this study for the ease of usage. It refers to the collective narratives of the individuals which comprise the Saudi government rehabilitation program staff and Ministry of Interior officials. This term is not meant to suggest that the government is an agentive actor without people steering its decisions.

<sup>37</sup> Slocum-Bradley, Nikki. “The Positioning Diamond: A Trans-Disciplinary Framework for Discourse Analysis.” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 40(1):91(2010).

<sup>38</sup> Adjei, “Discourse Analysis”, 2.

<sup>39</sup> Tirado, “Positioning theory” 229.

<sup>40</sup> Slocum-Bradley “Positioning Diamond,” 91.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Slocum-Bradley “Positioning Diamond,” 93.

<sup>43</sup> Baffour. “Discourse Analysis,” 2.

naming.<sup>44</sup> The last component, rights and duties, considers morality and appropriate behavior as underlying concepts, which inform the process of meaning creation. Rights and duties, or the actions that individuals can or should take in a given society, are determined in a particular setting by the implied moral order.<sup>45</sup> Combined, these components illuminate the specific cultural context, which shapes individuals' creation of meaning for narratives; this allows discourse analysts to understand more fully why episodes played out in particular manner.

The first level of analysis refers to the substance or "content" of a discourse.<sup>46</sup> The second level of analysis draws on situational happenings within the environments of the discourse participants.<sup>47</sup> The third level of analysis compares the facets with pertinent overarching social issues and broader narratives.<sup>48</sup> Of great consequence for this study is Slocum-Bradley's assertion that "some misunderstandings and conflicts, for example, may be well explained by evidence that different audiences have interpreted a narrator's discourse at different levels."<sup>49</sup>

## 4.2 Research Design

To perform this study, a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data analysis was conducted. Quantitative data that was collected and organized in charts and databases was used to supplement that largely qualitative data analysis of different narratives. After identifying the source (if any) of divergence between the narratives, quantitative data is used to demonstrate the degree these narratives coincide with statistics on the age distribution, economic/ social demographics, and radicalization levels of former Guantanamo Bay detainees.

The quantitative data used in this article was collected from a variety of sources, including; academic journal articles, studies by RAND, Carnegie Foundation and International Peace Institute, news articles, TV/radio reports from CNN and NPR, materials from the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, and open source material from the US government.<sup>50</sup> The first step in conducting this study was to sift through open source material to find lists of individuals released from Guantanamo Bay. A Guantanamo detainee demographic spreadsheet/database was constructed by cross referencing websites from the Guardian, the New York Times and Carnegie Foundation's Saudi 11 Briefer which contain relevant country specific lists with data from released classified cables in addition to related news articles on the prisoners.<sup>51</sup> Human Rights First resources were also consulted for information regarding current prisoner information, and released classified information on former Guantanamo detainees. Of the approximately 800 prisoners that were held in Guantanamo Bay, 120 of these individuals were released to the custody of Saudi Arabian authorities. As this study is concerned with the manner in which culture shapes narratives and violent social movements

---

<sup>44</sup> Tirado, "Positioning theory," 229.

<sup>45</sup> Slocum-Bradley "Positioning Diamond," 95.

<sup>46</sup> Slocum-Bradley "Positioning Diamond," 92.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. This includes relevant characteristics and rights and duties applied to both the narrator and the audience.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Slocum-Bradley "Positioning Diamond", 93.

<sup>50</sup> Source material is listed in the bibliography for charts and narratives.

<sup>51</sup> Boucek, Christopher. *Carnegie Guide to the Saudi Eleven*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2011), The Guardian. "The Guantanamo Files." Scheinkman, Andrei et al. "The Guantanamo Docket." NY Times.

in Saudi Arabia, the two non-citizens released to Saudi custody were not included in the study group.<sup>52</sup>

The composition of the database included information on prisoner names and prisoner ID numbers. After gathering further open source information from TV, internet, and other news sources, the data base recorded additional information for recidivist individuals: affiliations with known radicals, inspiration as noted by prisoners, current status (if know) , nature of the recidivist activity, and length of duration in Guantanamo Bay.

The list of detainees was further sorted for release date information. The Saudi rehabilitation program was founded in 2004 and, participation in the program only made a condition of release for Saudi detainees returning to Saudi Arabia, in 2005.<sup>53</sup> Unable to confirm the number of pre-2005 Guantanamo inmates released that were admitted to rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia, only prisoners released after 2005 were included in this study.<sup>54</sup>

Video and text information were also collected from the websites of groups or organizations that the recidivists from Guantanamo Bay are known to have been affiliated. A collection of discourses by members of various groups was created and analyzed as a single body. Collected information was analyzed for content and, if applicable, placed relevant categories for further analysis including; kinship connections, previous engagement, time in Guantanamo, and age at the time of release from Guantanamo Bay. From the amassed information that required further analysis, a collective body of narratives was formed for both Saudi officials and rehabilitation program participants.

The purpose of this study is to analyze micro and macro level narrative differences regarding extremists' participation in social movements. Social movements have been defined in this paper as collective coordinated activities against the power holding institution(s), in which members, in addition to common cultural foundations, organize around core goals and values. Although it is understood that the motivations, beliefs, and goals of a collective group do not correspond entirely with those of constituent group members, there are several basic assumptions that can be made about individuals by knowing their group affiliations and physical discursive actions. Participation in a social movement does suggest certain shared core values and goals. This is not to suggest that an individual must ascribe to every part of a movement's platform but rather that membership/participation reflects some basic beliefs and/or goals.<sup>55</sup> Previous violent struggles, such as Rwanda,<sup>56</sup> have demonstrated that individuals have their own personal motivating factors which, may conflict in part with some of the less significant group beliefs/goals. On their own, these individual motivations do not fully explain participation in collective violence.<sup>57</sup> Positioning theory bolsters this assertion, contending that individuals can have more than one identity.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> Not only is it unclear how long the individuals released to Saudi Arabia had been in the culture and how the system works on foreigners who may have a different set of norms and values but there is no information available which would suggest that foreign citizens have been admitted to the rehabilitation programs.

<sup>53</sup> House Armed Services Committee "Leaving Guantanamo", 32.

<sup>54</sup> Boucek, Christopher. *Carnegie Guide to the Saudi Eleven*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2011). The one exception being Mishal Muhammed Rashid al Shedoky who Saudi Authorities (corroborated by news media) have admitted completed the program before returning to extremist activities with AQAP.

<sup>55</sup> Slocum-Bradley "Positioning Diamond," 98 'Identities'—personal and collective—emerge out of discursive practices in specific contexts."

<sup>56</sup> McDoom "It's who you know", 13-27.

<sup>57</sup> McDoom "It's who you know", 3 Participation is "not merely the product of individual preferences, but also a social function."

<sup>58</sup> Slocum-Bradley "Positioning Diamond".

The compiled categories of discursive acts including both verbal and non-verbal speech acts of Saudi Arabian officials and ex-Guantanamo detainees who participated in the Saudi rehabilitation program were compiled and analyzed using the positioning diamond framework for discourse analysis. The discourse or narratives of the two groups were applied to the creation of charts (see figures 1 and 2). These charts detail the examined discourses at three levels and across four components where pertinent.<sup>59</sup> It is important to note that “position[s] in discourse or social interactions is not static or enduring” so analysis of information gathered from the resultant charts of components and levels are applicable within a limited socio-cultural and temporal range.<sup>60</sup>

### 4.3 Limitations

The most significant data limitation in this article is the relative dearth of available information on Guantanamo Bay detainees and their activities following their participation in the Saudi rehabilitation program. Nearly 120 former Guantanamo Bay detainees were released to Saudi Arabian authorities and underwent the Saudi rehabilitation program.<sup>61</sup> According to the Saudi government, 25 former detainees are either known or suspected to have returned to extremist activities, despite their participation in the rehabilitation program.<sup>62</sup> Of that number, only 15 individuals have been specifically identified. So this article, of necessity, is focused on an analysis of those 15 individuals. Information about the other 10 former detainees, who subsequently pursued extremist activities, would be useful in determining whether the 15 known recidivists are fully representative of the larger group of recidivists, or are somewhat idiosyncratic. In addition, information about the non-recidivists could also be helpful in analyzing radicalization and rehabilitation of extremists, but is only available at the discretion of the Saudi Arabian government, which presents issues about the accuracy of the information.

There are a variety of factors that contribute to the limited available recidivist information, and which to some extent may bias that data. Extremist activities and terroristic acts are obviously “hot button” national security issues. Neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia want to make information public that might compromise their national security interests and considerations. Supposedly sensitive information remains classified and unavailable to the public. For example the Saudi government may not want it publicly known that they knew a particular individual resumed extremist activities, because they may not want to compromise sources of information, or that they are aware of certain terrorist plots.

Both the US and Saudi Arabia have an interest in their policies appearing to be successful, and in avoiding criticism for ineptitude. Accordingly, the US prefers that very few of the detainees were radicalized, or further radicalized, by their experience in Guantanamo Bay. Saudi Arabia has an interest in its rehabilitation policies being viewed as efficacious. There is, therefore, a possibility of bias in the data, in that both nations have an

---

<sup>59</sup> Slocum-Bradley “Positioning Diamond,” 92-93 Creator of the positioning diamond, Slocum-Bradley, explains that not all levels/categories may be pertinent to a specific event or episode. The metric for including a level should be based on “whether each level helps explain unfolding social episodes.”

<sup>60</sup> Baffour. “Discourse Analysis,” 3.

<sup>61</sup> Spencer, Richard. “Saudi Arabia defends al-Qaeda Rehabilitation Scheme” *The Telegraph*. 9 February 2010.

<sup>62</sup> Stemple, Hillary. “Saudi Arabia official reports 25 recidivism cases among ex-Guantanamo inmates.” *The Jurist*. 20 June 2010.

interest in minimizing the number of former detainees who have subsequently pursued extremist activities.

There is also a possibility that the number of former detainees is understated simply because the Saudi government is not aware that the individual has returned to an extremist path. Extremists know their activities will likely get them jailed or killed if they are identified and captured. Many extremists desire to conduct their activities clandestinely, and therefore the governments may not have fully accurate information about these extremists.

To the extent information is made public by the Saudi government, it relates only to the recidivists, not the other rehabilitation program participants.<sup>63</sup> If such data was available, it might help determine which experiences increased and which reduced the rate of recidivism. However, as these individuals have theoretically engaged in some behavior which landed them in prison in the first place, these individuals may face retribution from communities if their names, alleged crimes and whereabouts were released to the general population. Therefore, a potentially significant means of analyzing the data regarding recidivism is not currently available.

Lastly, the Saudi rehabilitation program was only instituted in 2004.<sup>64</sup> Traditionally recidivism rates for criminal activities are analyzed in ten year spans. Not one of the detainees has undergone the program for a ten year timeframe. So the relatively abbreviated time period is also a limiting factor in determining the efficaciousness of the Saudi program. Long-term effectiveness remains unknown at this juncture.

#### 4.4 Ethical Considerations

Among the most important issues to be considered while conducting this study were the ethical ramifications of this research. The very name terrorist conjures certain images although there is still a lack of clarity and cohesion in terms of defining terrorists.<sup>65</sup> However, by labeling an individual a terrorist it delegitimizes the individual and his/her associated causes.<sup>66</sup> Governments have been known to mobilize nearly unlimited resources to pursue “terrorists”.<sup>67</sup> Therefore the issue of naming itself becomes a highly effective means of silencing oppositions should governments seek to discredit them.<sup>68</sup>

The new forms of international counterinsurgency tactics that have been perfected through the global war on terrorism raise significant ethical questions, which deserve careful consideration. The precedent set by regularly suspending law and order in the name of the greater good raises issues regarding modern sovereignty. When traditional “kinetic”<sup>69</sup> methods of operation failed to rid the globe of radical ideology, there was “a growing

---

<sup>63</sup> There are a few examples of non-Guantanamo individuals that have released statements through the Saudi authorities, or during interviews with Saudi officials present. However names and identifying information are not available which makes it difficult to assess the participants’ entry and exit motivations.

<sup>64</sup> al-Hadlaq, Abdulrahman. “Terrorist Rehabilitation: the Saudi Experience.” *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*, New York: Routledge 64 (2011).

<sup>65</sup> Macgregor, Douglas, Marvin Weinbaum, Abdullah Ansary, and Robert Pape. “The “Global War on Terror”: What Has Been Learned?.” *Middle East Policy* 15(4):2 (2008).

<sup>66</sup> Bhatia, Michael V., “The Politics of Naming: Rebels, Terrorists, Criminals, Bandits and Subversives.” *Third World Quarterly*, 26(1):6-7 (2005).

<sup>67</sup> Waxman, Matthew. “Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?.” *Columbia Public Law Research Paper* 08-190:2 (2009).

<sup>68</sup> Bhatia, Michael V., “The Politics of Naming”, 5.

<sup>69</sup> The new term for “wet work” - sanctioned killings.

consensus that countering the ideology that drives this extremism is a critical element in the overall effort to prevent extremist acts of violence.”<sup>70</sup>

The issues of right and duties of the state in term of its ability to decide who needs to be rehabilitated is an issue of great concern. State run programs are able to garner national and international support when they carte blanche decide what is acceptable behavior in a given society. Whether or not these individuals need to be re-programmed is up for debate. If these programs are to continue then further transparency and oversight as to the decision making process on who gets sent to this programs and by whom is necessary.

## **5. Government, Power, Religion**

### **5.1 Government Monopoly of Religion and Culture**

This chapter introduces essential historical themes in Saudi Arabian politics, Islamist (non-)violent resistance movements, and state-run counter-extremism programs. Initially, the link between religion and political legitimacy is traced throughout the history of the kingdom. The nexus between religion and political power is of critical importance to understanding the nature of Saudi Arabian counter-extremism efforts and why ideology is of paramount concern to the regime. The second section provides an overview of Islamism and the nature of Islamist opposition groups in Saudi Arabia.

In the final section, regional political developments and changes in popular support for certain Islamist groups also contribute to the methods that opposition movements employ and, subsequently, how the state chooses to counteract these movements. Overall the material presented in this chapter addresses the relevant historical trends in politics and how those trends have informed the Saudi Arabian counter-extremism efforts today, particularly the rehabilitation and de-radicalization programs.

### **5.2 State Domination of Religious Institutions**

Saudi Arabia is typically considered a bastion of religiously inspired militancy. “Home to 15 of the 19 hijackers in the September 11 attacks, a disproportionate number of Arab fighters cycling through Al Qaeda training camps during the 1990s, and Osama bin Laden himself, the kingdom has become a central focus in the war on terrorism.”<sup>71</sup> The birthplace of Salafism, Saudi Arabia has a long, complex history with Islam and political power. The power dynamics between religion and governance have fostered an environment in which only opposition movements that espouse religious motivation resonate with the populous. However, the analysis of religiosity in Saudi Arabia is often superficial, failing to account for the small number of militants despite a relatively high level of homogeneity in religious ideology.<sup>72</sup> As noted by Thomas Hegghamer, “in the literature on militant

<sup>70</sup> Carpenter, J. Scott, Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. (2009). “Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism.” *Journal of National Security Law and Policy*, 3:301

<sup>71</sup> Bronson, Rachel. “Rethinking religion: The legacy of the US-Saudi relationship.” *Washington Quarterly* 28 (4):121 (2005).

<sup>72</sup> Hegghammer, Thomas. “Terrorist recruitment and radicalization in Saudi Arabia.” *Middle East Policy* 13(4):39 (2006). This is not to suggest that the entire population of the Kingdom shares the same religious beliefs; there are regional and communal variations in faith practice even within the same religious sects of Islam. Compared to other countries which do not have a state sponsored religion, Saudi Arabia has understandably less diversity in terms of religious belief systems.



Islamism, there is even a tendency to fall back on tautological arguments, whereby the extremism of Saudi militants is explained by the fact that they are Saudi...that there is something about the religiosity in Saudi society or the Wahhabi religious tradition which predisposes Saudis for extremism.”<sup>73</sup>

Since its inception in the 1920's, the kingdom and governance of Saudi Arabia has been intimately linked with the practice, teachings and culture of Islam.<sup>74</sup> The kingdom was forged during the 1920s through a combination of physical force, expansionist ideology, and reforms that were marketed in the name of religion.<sup>75</sup> Shortly after Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman united the Saudi chiefdoms under a single banner, he declared Wahhabism as the kingdom's official religion, which effectively allowed the religious authority, *ulama*, to reinforce the legitimacy of the King's rule through Islamic principles.<sup>76</sup> Today, the state's domination of religious institutions and the practice of couching politically motivated decisions in terms of religion to garner public support, remain largely unchanged.

The Kingdom's tight grip over politics and society at large contributes to a system in which “the state then becomes the exclusive target of those dissatisfied groups frustrated with what they perceive as corrupt, incompetent, and oppressive regimes.”<sup>77</sup> The teachings and practices of Islam have promulgated the Saudi regime and consolidated its power. Ironically, it is because of the regime's dependence on religion that opposition groups are likely to engage in religiously framed criticism of the government.<sup>78</sup> “The individuals who support these groups do so not necessarily for religious reasons, but because they desire a radical restructuring of the current order, a change they believe can only be provided by contemporary Islamist movements.”<sup>79</sup>

### 5.3 Opposition and Islamist Movements in Saudi Arabia

Due to the fact that the Saudi Arabian monarchy's authority is derived from Islamic teaching and practice, opposition groups seeking to genuinely challenge the regime must also turn to Islamism to acquire political legitimacy. Islamism or Islamic activism is “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character.”<sup>80</sup> There are numerous variations of Islamism, differing both in terms of religious sect<sup>81</sup> (Sunni or Shiite) and in the manner in which adherent groups believe Islam should be incorporated within a particular society. In spite of the differences among the various kinds of Islamist groups, groups are united in their goal of achieving some manner of social change.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Kostiner, Joseph. (1997). “State, Islam and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The Post-Desert Storm Phase.”

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid

<sup>77</sup> Butko, Thomas. “Unity Through Opposition: Islam as an Instrument of Radical Political Change”, *MERIA Journal* 8(4):3 (2004).

<sup>78</sup> Ibid “Therefore, while the Islamists may espouse and articulate their message within a religious or moral framework, their support is predicated upon the particular socio-economic context of that society.”

<sup>79</sup> Ibid

<sup>80</sup> International Crisis Group. (2005). “Understanding Islamism.” *Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report* No.37:1

<sup>81</sup> The references to Islamism in this paper refer specifically to Sunni Islamism, as the majority of the Saudi population is Sunni it is prudent to study this sect.

<sup>82</sup> Butko “Unity”, 3.

In its “Understanding Islamism” report, the International Crisis Group identifies three distinct iterations of Islamism and cites “different diagnoses of problems faced by Muslim societies” as the root cause of the differing visions for the most appropriate use of Islam in order to affect social change. Political Islamism looks to religion for moral guidance on governance issues but draws a distinction between the religious and political realms.<sup>83</sup> As demonstrated by the recent wave of popular social movements throughout Arab world, political Islamists do not necessarily require an “Islamic State” but rather seek to inform the government structures and laws (namely constitutions and social justice institutions) with popular religious ideology.<sup>84</sup> Political Islamists are sometimes accused by other Islamists of merely using religion as means of achieving political ascendancy.<sup>85</sup>

Conversely, missionary Islamists view the individual intervention as the best application of Islam in society.<sup>86</sup> The preservation of a faithful community through increased devotion on the part of individuals is the primary concern of this group of Islamists.<sup>87</sup> Consequently, missionary Islamism is primarily concerned with preaching and proselytizing activities.<sup>88</sup> Although some missionary Islamists are involved in governments, particularly in governments seeking to appease Islamist dissenters, they are typically involved in an advisory capacity rather than as governing officials.<sup>89</sup>

The third type of Islamism is jihadi Islamism, however, the word jihad is often thrown around by individuals without a proper understanding of the different strains of Islam. Though the terms terrorist and jihadist have become interchangeable in recent years since a number of extremist individuals and groups have begun to use Islam as the justification for their behavior, most jihadist do not fit the international Al-Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taiba mold. Within Sunni jihadi Islamism there are three distinct kinds of Islamist ideology. Internal Jihad, struggling against one’s own government, sometimes referred to as Salafist Islam, against one’s own Muslim government if not devout enough.<sup>90</sup> Irredentist Jihads consist of fighting an occupying force.<sup>91</sup> The most common association for jihad is global jihad, where the struggle is directed against non-Muslim regimes worldwide.<sup>92</sup>

Although there have been different groups which have come to power as the popularity of social movements have waxed and waned, the Islamist groups in Saudi Arabia have primarily been missionary or Salafi Jihadists.<sup>93</sup> Largely due to its presentation in

<sup>83</sup> ICG “Islamism”, 6-7 “Evolution in political thinking has led Islamist political movements away from theocratic conceptions of the Muslim polity, in which sovereignty (*al-hakimiyya*) is conceived as belonging to God alone (*al-hakimiyya li-Llah*), to more or less democratic conceptions which recognise that sovereignty belongs to the people.”

<sup>84</sup> Wright, Robin. “The Middle East: They’ve Arrived.” *The Islamists are Coming: Who They Really are*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2012: 10-11.

<sup>85</sup> ICG “Islamism”, 6.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> ICG “Islamism”, 7.

<sup>88</sup> ICG “Islamism” 11.

<sup>89</sup> ICG “Islamism” 14.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Dekmejian, R. Hrair (1994) “The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia” p.635.

The Islamist groups of Saudi Arabia are an amorphous collectivity who prefer to call themselves *al-Salafiyyun*--the followers of the pious ancestors (*salaf al-salih*)--rather than *al-Usuliyyun*--fundamentalists. Historically they are known as *Ahl al-Hadith*--the puritanical followers of the Prophet’s exemplary life (*sirat*)...Unlike most Islamist groups in the Arab world the Saudi Salafiyyun lack a formal hierarchical structure, possibly due to the government’s opposition to the formation of such an organization.

western media, Wahhabism has been inexorably linked with rise of terrorism and militant Islam. Stripped of the sensationalist stories Wahhabism/Salafiya is, at its core, an austere sect of Sunni Islam, which advocates for the redistribution of wealth, living a modest lifestyle without all the unnecessary materialist trappings of the world, and preserving or returning to community-based values.<sup>94</sup> Unfortunately for the majority of Wahhabism's devout followers, a select group of militants have chosen to publically justify their campaigns with hardline religious teachings issued by fringe elements of the Wahhabist community.

One of the primary sources of tension within the kingdom is the relationship the Saudi government maintains with the west, particularly the US. Despite reservations about the United States' unwavering alliance with Israel, a source of great volatility within the region, the US and Saudi Arabia have maintained a stable political and economic relationship.<sup>95</sup> Since the 1990s, internal tensions have been further exacerbated by the increased US presence in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. The decision to allow the US to use Saudi soil as a staging ground for engagement in Gulf War was not popularly accepted by many citizens.<sup>96</sup> The subsequent US engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have done little to increase its popularity within in the kingdom, in the process creating additional rifts between the regime and the populous.

The opposition to Saudi government policies has been aggravated by the return to Saudi Arabia of militarily trained and battle hardened soldiers who assisted various Muslim armed conflicts in various locations throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Asia.<sup>97</sup> While the Saudi government usually refrains from sending uniformed soldiers into armed conflicts within its neighborhood, it does provide financial and humanitarian aid to assist its fellow Muslims engaged in battle. Saudi youth ostensibly traveling to conflict zones to provide humanitarian aid have sometimes ended up engaging in the conflicts as non-traditional combatants.<sup>98</sup>

#### 5.4 Saudi Responses to Opposition Movements

Despite a complicated history with religiously inspired political activism and hosting numerous veterans from a variety of armed conflicts throughout the Asian and African continents, Saudi Arabia had largely avoided becoming the target of militant resistance for the greater part of its history.<sup>99</sup> Aside from a few isolated incidents, prior to the 2000s Saudi Arabia was not "home to a strong socio-revolutionary Islamist community."<sup>100</sup> Thomas Hegghammer, the leading expert on militancy in Saudi Arabia explains this apparent paradox by tracing the roots of the insurgency to different social movements within Saudi Islamism. "Saudi jihadism has been driven primarily not by regime discontent but by extreme pan-Islamism, and has thus been geared towards fighting non-Muslims."<sup>101</sup> In any event, the

---

<sup>94</sup> ICG "Islamism", 10-13.

<sup>95</sup> Bronson, Rachel. "Rethinking religion", 122.

<sup>96</sup> Hafez, Mohammed M. "Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: Assessing the potential of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia and Yemen." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* no. 1:3 (2008).

<sup>97</sup> Hafez, "Radicalization in the Persian Gulf:", 7.

<sup>98</sup> Hegghammer, Thomas. "Terrorist recruitment and radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13(4):48 (2006).

<sup>99</sup> Hegghammer, "Terrorist recruitment", 27.

<sup>100</sup> Hegghammer, Thomas. "Islamist violence and regime stability in Saudi Arabia." *International Affairs* 84 (4):703 (2008).

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

Saudi government succeeded in warding off resistance movements through a combination of repressing, co-opting and placating the opposition with minor concessions.<sup>102</sup>

While small attacks against western targets within the kingdom were on the rise at the beginning of the 21st century, the 2003 bombings of residential areas in Riyadh represented a significant departure from the historically non-violent political opposition to the government.<sup>103</sup> Although these bombings were in areas heavily populated by foreigners, militants had previously avoided conducting large-scale attacks on Saudi soil.<sup>104</sup> The bombing marked the beginning of Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) violent campaign against the Saudi Arabian establishment.<sup>105</sup> During the period of 2004-2007 approximately 300 people were killed.<sup>106</sup> The growing and violent militant threat to stability within the kingdom elicited a swift and bold response from the government.

The Saudi regime launched an immediate campaign against insurgency in their homeland. These counter-extremism efforts were energetic, aggressive and wide-ranging, incorporating all manners of counter-militancy efforts from preventative media campaigns, to finance reform, to rehabilitation programs and specialized counter-extremism police/military units.<sup>107</sup> "The Saudi policy for tackling extremism and radicalization is outlined in a plan termed the PRAC strategy, which stands for Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare."<sup>108</sup> Each of these counter-terrorism activities serves a distinct target population. Further, the government activities target three primary areas of concern: prevention of future radicalization, disruption of current activities, and rehabilitation/reintegration of former extremists.

## 5.5 Countering Extremism in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia utilizes a two-fold approach to conventional counter-terrorism programs that aim to disrupt ongoing militant activities. The first is the disruption of resources, primarily finances. Over the past decade the government has instituted a series of reforms which increased oversight and placed strict limits on charitable donations.<sup>109</sup> Additionally, Saudi Arabia established a special investigative service within Ministry of the Interior, the Financial Action Task Force, to handle criminal and terrorist financing issues.<sup>110</sup> Further in 2009, Saudi Arabia became a member of the Egmont Group which promotes interaction and information sharing amongst international Financial Intelligence Units.<sup>111</sup>

The second facet of traditional counterterrorism activities is the physical policing of suspected terrorist networks. Lacking the strong state policing and justice apparatus that the

<sup>102</sup> Dekmejian, "The Rise of Political Islamism", 635-637.

<sup>103</sup> Hafez, "Radicalization in the Persian Gulf", 7.

<sup>104</sup> Hegghammer "Islamist Violence", 703.

<sup>105</sup> Hegghammer, Thomas. "Terrorist recruitment", 43 Notably AQAP was formed mostly by veterans of foreign secessionist conflicts.

<sup>106</sup> Hegghammer "Islamist Violence", 703.

<sup>107</sup> Boucek, Christopher. *Saudi Arabia's "soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 97:5 (2008).

<sup>108</sup> Boucek, *Saudi Arabia's "soft" Counterterrorism*, 3.

<sup>109</sup> United States Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism – Saudi Arabia*, 3. Cash donations to charity organizations are now prohibited. Charities are now required register with the Interior Ministry to open a bank account and said accounts must be registered the name of the organization.

<sup>110</sup> Bronson, Rachel. "Rethinking religion", 126.

<sup>111</sup> United States Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism*.

Saudi government has, Yemen is historically home to a more active militant opposition.<sup>112</sup> Militants, particularly those affiliated with AQAP, use Yemen as a training ground and staging area for launching attacks on the Kingdom.<sup>113</sup> As such, border security and policing efforts comprise a substantial portion of Saudi law enforcement's counterterrorism activities.<sup>114</sup>

In addition to efforts to thwart ongoing militant activities, Saudi Arabia engages in proactive counter-extremism measures which attempt to stop radicalization before it occurs. These strategies target those individuals, which the government has determined to be at-risk segments of the population. The Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Ministry of the Interior engage in a variety of preventive measures including aggressive media campaigns,<sup>115</sup> internet de-radicalization programs,<sup>116</sup> religious education,<sup>117</sup> and the monitoring of religious sermons and teachers.<sup>118</sup>

### 5.6 Soft Counterterrorism: De-radicalization through Counseling and Rehabilitation Programs

Founded in 2004, the Saudi counseling and rehabilitation program, sometimes referred to by the name of the center, the Mohammed bin Nayef Centre for Care and Counseling, was established by the Ministry of the Interior as means to combat the ideological aspect of extremism.<sup>119</sup>

The aim of the counselling programme is, "to deal with the wrong convictions of the detained person in order to change and substitute them with correct convictions that agree with the middle way of Islam and its tolerance. This is realised by using the method of dialogue, wisdom and gentle preaching by competent people, specialists in religious, psychological and social sciences, with a follow up by security experts."<sup>120</sup>

<sup>112</sup> Hafez, Mohammed M. "Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: Assessing the potential of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia and Yemen." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 1:18 (2008).

<sup>113</sup> Hafez "Radicalization in the Persian Gulf", 12 "Radical Islamists fleeing arrest in their home countries, especially Egyptians and Saudis, found Yemen to be a hospitable safe haven." Returning fighters from war in Afghanistan during the 1980s became fighters during the Yemeni civil war; many of these individuals now hold positions of power within the government security sector.

<sup>114</sup> United States Department of State, *2012 Country Reports on Terrorism – Saudi Arabia*, 138 "The Ministry of Interior continued to improve border security measures, including the ongoing installation of biometric scanners at entry points throughout the Kingdom; aerial reconnaissance drones to patrol remote areas; thermal imaging systems; and motion detectors and electronic-sensor fencing along the borders with Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan."

<sup>115</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 126. Examples of these efforts include the national solidarity campaign.

<sup>116</sup> Boucek, Christopher. "The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *CTC Sentinel*, 1(9) (August 2008). The Tranquility campaign is an internet based program which mobilizes some of the government approved clerics to interact with potential at-risk individuals online and discourage radicalization

<sup>117</sup> El-Said *De-radicalising Islamists*, 36.

<sup>118</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 127. "Imams who preach intolerance or hate towards others are dismissed, punished, restrained."

<sup>119</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 118. The center is named for its creator, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.

<sup>120</sup> El-Said, Hamed. *De-radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States*. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 37 (2012).

The program represents a major cornerstone of the Saudi Arabian government's effort to combat what it refers to as the "3 M's"; "money, men, and mindset."<sup>121</sup> The Saudi officials and proponents of the rehabilitation experiment cite the program's unique combination of "intense religious instruction, counseling, and post-release monitoring" as the reason for the programs purported success.<sup>122</sup>

At the inception of the program, Ministry of the Interior established an advisory committee composed of four subcommittees; Religious, Psychological and Social, Security and Media.<sup>123</sup> The very structure of the advisory committee supports the emphasis on religion. Within in the advisory committee, approximately 100 clerics and scholars sit on the religious committee, by far the largest subcommittee.<sup>124</sup>

The program begins with al Munasah, or the advising portion of the counseling program, which takes place while participants are still in prison.<sup>125</sup> Participants undergo intensive individual and group counseling/debate sessions designed to have them reflect on and moderate their radical views.<sup>126</sup> "During each session, a committee of two or more counselors and a psychologist meet with prisoners individually or collectively, depending on their case status."<sup>127</sup>

Over the course of the program, extremist prisoners participate in religious re-education classes.<sup>128</sup> Eventually individuals transition to the Care Rehabilitation Center, a halfway house where they are able to interact with family members prior to being released.<sup>129</sup> Following their release, program graduates are monitored by Saudi officials as well as by family member that are briefed on "the importance of proper care."<sup>130</sup>

Of the counter-extremism strategies employed by Saudi Arabia, the state-run rehabilitation program attracts the most international interest and perhaps skepticism.<sup>131</sup> Compared to the Saudi government's traditional hardline approach to justice,<sup>132</sup> the use of "soft" tactics appear conspicuously out of place. Until the recent return to militancy by a handful of former Guantanamo program graduates, the Saudi Arabian de-radicalization program had been touted as the way forward in the battle against extremism.<sup>133</sup> It was only in 2009, after this very public display of evidence to the contrary, that the Saudi officials

<sup>121</sup> Gunaratna, Rohan. "Saudi Initiatives in Countering Terrorism *ICPVTR Visit to Saudi Arabia*." ICPVTR International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism, 4 (2010).

<sup>122</sup> Wagner, Rob. "Rehabilitation and De-radicalization: Saudi Arabia's Counterterrorism Successes and Failures." *Peace and Conflict Monitor*, 1 (2010)

<sup>123</sup> Wagner "Rehabilitation", 2.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> El-Said, *De-radicalising Islamists*, 38.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 120. "The Religious Subcommittee holds individual meetings with the detainee for several sessions and engages him in dialogue over any controversial issues that may arise."

<sup>128</sup> Wagner "Rehabilitation", 2-3.

<sup>129</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 119.

<sup>130</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 120.

<sup>131</sup> See articles listed in bibliography from New York Times, Time Magazine, Al-Jazeera, The Guardian, The Telegraph, The Economist, The Wall Street Journal as well as scholarly works by Christopher Boucek, Jessica Stern, Adam Lankford, and John Horgan to name a few.

<sup>132</sup> Knickmeyer, Ellen. "Saudi Center Aims for 'Life After Jihad' The Wall Street Journal. 24 April 2013, 2 Human Rights Watch and other rights organization say that despite the groundbreaking rehab program, other detainees in Saudi Arabia are subject to torture and ill-treatment. Saudi Arabia denies it.

<sup>133</sup> Porges, Marisa L. "The Saudi De-radicalization Experiment." *Council on Foreign Relations*. Expert Brief, (22 January 2010).

stopped alleging that the program's success rate was 100%.<sup>134</sup> Today, Saudi officials claim that over 4,000 former militants have been reintegrated into society through the Saudi Arabian rehabilitation program.<sup>135</sup>

## 6. Analysis

This chapter applies the multi-institutional politics framework to the extremist and Saudi authority narratives on the rehabilitation program participant's involvement in collective violence. In the following sections, constraining/enabling cultural structures will be compared in relation to social movement actors, strategies, goals and institutional targets as drawn from discourses of the militants and Saudi officials. The extremist and government officials narrative discourse analysis charts created from the body of discourses and the Guantanamo detainee demographic spreadsheet are used here as the basis for the qualitative and quantitative analysis of program participants' reason for involvement in violent social movements following their release from the rehabilitation program.

The multi-institutional politics approach to social movements propagates a culture-centric method for understanding and identifying society specific enablers and inhibitors. Chapter IV laid the foundation of the cultural and structural elements found in Saudi Arabian power holding institutions. As a fairly repressive regime, the state in Saudi Arabia dominates many of the institutions: social, political and economic. In many modern Western states, religion informs some of the values that are codified through legal and governing mechanisms; however in recent years, there is rarely an overt connection between the two institutions of power. The Saudi regime on the other hand, has made a concerted effort to keep the locus of power derived from religious institutions firmly within its grasp. The consequence of co-opting the religious institution, which has traditionally strong social and cultural significance in the region, impacts the nature and kind of opposition movements that the government faces.

As noted in chapter IV, there are several kinds of Islamic activism, many of which have different targets and methods to affect their goal of social change. Unlike Islamist groups in other majority Arab nations, Islamists in Saudi Arabia are predominately not political Islamists. Even the Al-Sahwah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Awakening), the group often cited as the core example for political Islamism in Saudi Arabia is concerned with the acts of the individual<sup>136</sup> and was forced to shift its focus because of the cultural constraints on social movements.<sup>137</sup>

As evidenced by social forces and storylines of the Saudi authorities' narrative, the Saudi monarchy, in contrast, does not make a clear distinction between individuals trying to affect social change by opposing the state and individuals with political grievances against the state. As will be demonstrated in the following analysis, the Saudi authorities view these groups of challengers as outliers that have a corrupting influence on the general population of the kingdom. In the following sections, the Saudi authorities' discourse is juxtaposed with the

<sup>134</sup> Ghosh, Bobby. "Can Jihadis be Rehabilitated?" Time. (27 January 2009).

<sup>135</sup> Stern, Jessica. "Mind over martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist extremists", 95.

<sup>136</sup> Ansary, Abdullah, F. "Combating extremism: a brief overview of Saudi Arabia's approach." *Middle East Policy* 15(2):111.2 (2008). Though the tactics and memberships to the movement would shift in the coming decades at its inception in the late 1960s it "started as a nonviolent, symbolic, apolitical movement that confined its activities to individual acts, such as listening to tapes of the Quran."

<sup>137</sup> Social constraints as filtered through multi-institutional politics approach would be the lack of ability to freely express religious opposition.

Guantanamo detainee demographics spreadsheet in effort to elucidate the degree to which the various claims of both parties are rooted in reality.

## 6.1 The Saudi Narrative

In 2004 following a coordinated campaign of violence by AQAP militants, Saudi Arabia was forced to reexamine its methods for engaging extremists.<sup>138</sup> Since this time, the rehabilitation program has been the linchpin in the country's efforts to de-radicalize current individuals espousing radical ideology. Saudi officials have created a program which boasted remarkable success rates for much of its existence (and is still considered successful by criminal standards). Officials attribute this success to their ability to understanding the root problem and seeing the issues through the eyes of the participants of movements which use collective violence.<sup>139</sup>

It is evident from the intense and wide ranging strategies, techniques and goals of the counter-extremism programs, particularly, the rehabilitation program, which the Saudi authorities equate any form of religiously-based activism as tantamount to a threat to the state. Given the traditional association between religion and political legitimacy, the perceived sense of threat by the government is unsurprising. Rehabilitation program officials General Mansur al-Turki and lead psychologist Turki al-Otayan, have given numerous interviews (reflected in the discourse) which cite inaccurate representations of religion as the catalyst for the inappropriate behavior, even though other issues exist as well. While the rehabilitation authorities acknowledge and target other underlying socio-economic conditions, (poverty, lack of career opportunities, and lack of education) the emphasis on religion is clear in its extensive program targeting the correction of false or improper ideology.<sup>140</sup>

Official Saudi narratives, including government literature on counterterrorism efforts as well as interviews of top rehabilitation program officials, have publicized an image for the typical Saudi radical. The average extremist is painted as young, relatively poor, possibly abused or possessing psychological problems, and lacking religious education.<sup>141</sup> These individuals are also thought to come from relatively difficult upbringings where parental oversight, due to a high number of siblings or absent father figure, is limited.<sup>142</sup> Dissatisfied with their economic situations and lacking the proper foundation of religious knowledge and/or family support system these individuals are susceptible to corrupted or improper teachings of Islam.<sup>143</sup> Within this subset of outliers, the truly dedicated extremists are considered pariahs that use the lack religious education and desire for social connections to lure misguided youth further astray. The identities built within the Saudi authorities' narrative

<sup>138</sup> Boucek, Christopher. *Saudi Arabia's "soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 97:3 (2008).

<sup>139</sup> in Damman, Saad al-Abdallah "Psychology professor Turki al-Attayan: Saudi Munasaha programme reached advanced stages".

<sup>140</sup> El-Said *De-radicalising Islamists*, 36.

<sup>141</sup> Mcevers "A Test for Saudi Arabia's Terrorist-Rehab Program."

<sup>142</sup> al-Hadlaq, Abdulrahman. "Terrorist Rehabilitation: the Saudi Experience." *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*, 59 (New York: Routledge 2011). "A study conducted by the Advisory Committee is Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Interior about the typical profile of security detainees... indicated that, first, most of the radical offenders are single young men in their early to mid-twenties who come from lower or middle class families with seven to fifteen siblings."

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.



reflect the notion that the typical young radical, though disadvantaged by his/her personal life only becomes dangerous once coupled with inappropriate ideology; so the individuals are not so much a threat as the ideology itself.<sup>144</sup>

As detailed in the discourse analysis chart (Figure 1) the rights and duties as well as the identity that the Saudi officials ascribe to themselves/the government across all levels have indicated the high level of control that the officials feel that Saudi Arabia has the right to exercise over its citizens. According to the Saudi program officials' narrative, the government has a right and duty to protect itself and its citizens from the threat of violent Islamic extremism which threatens the region. In this view, the Saudi Arabian government as the dominant institution is the only authority legitimately able to define proper religious beliefs and practice.<sup>145</sup> In addition to correcting the religious beliefs, the program also rallies family and community connections in an effort to ensure that the rehabilitation participant does not fall back on old habits.<sup>146</sup>

## 6.2 The Extremist Narrative

The speech and speech acts of the recidivist rehabilitation members of Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are indicative of goals, strategies and targets for the social change the group is trying to bring about.<sup>147</sup> An examination of the body of the narratives analyzed using the positioning diamond technique is populated by religiously inspired references. Noticeably absent are statements and acts in which the individuals of AQAP are seeking political power within Saudi Arabia.<sup>148</sup> The lack of dialogue concerning the acquisition of power or references for specific policy changes suggests that the movements are not battles for political power<sup>149</sup>, as the government's reactions would indicate. Rather, according to the discourse storylines and rights and duties, the collective violence is a tactical maneuver designed to expel western inference and corruption, thereby restoring the culture and society that AQAP members deem to be deteriorating under the current religious/cultural apparatus.

The recidivist narrative on the identities of conflict actors stands in opposition to the Saudi authorities' narrative. According to the recidivist narrative, the fighters are not youth that have fallen on bad times or criminals that fail to understand the situation at hand because of skewed religious doctrine. On the contrary, the recidivists see fellow group members of AQAP as individuals with great personal conviction and fortitude, who are trying to help preserve the cultural, religious and values norms from the onslaught of immorality that is sweeping the globe.<sup>150</sup> The fighter's allegations of indoctrination mirrors the accusations that

<sup>144</sup> Figure 1 Identities are not markedly different between level 1 and 2.

<sup>145</sup> Figure 1 There is a time and a place which is at the discretion of the king.

<sup>146</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 120.

<sup>147</sup> Pape, Robert A. "The strategic logic of suicide terrorism." *American political science review* 97(3):344 (2003). Terrorism has been widely acknowledge as strategic tool for advocating/creating social change, though there is much debate to whether this technique is actually effective.

<sup>148</sup> Figure 2.

<sup>149</sup> Outside of defining character attributes, personal qualities and religious motivations, the recidivist say little both in terms of verbal and non-verbal speech acts regarding other possible motivations. Socio-economic motivations are not directly covered, however, this does not mean these motivations do not exist on a personal level.

<sup>150</sup> Kohlman, Evan. "NEFA Foundation: Video Transcript of Former Gitmo Detainees Swearing Allegiance to Al-Qaida in Yemen." Counterterrorism Foundation." 1 February 2009. Former Guantanamo detainee and an

the government had made about the militants brainwashing impressionable youth, however here it is seen in reverse, this time in reference to the efforts of the government's religious reprogramming/co-opting efforts.<sup>151</sup>

The discourse revealed in the Guantanamo recidivist positioning diamond demonstrates that level 3, the link to the greater GWOT narrative, is of particular significance to the everyday struggle of these individuals.<sup>152</sup> In so far as the recidivist narratives are concerned, the intentions and associations of the government are quite clear. The AQAP recidivists contend that the government and religious establishment manipulate Islam in order to suit their best interests and fail to use it to tackle the imminent crisis of culture. The government's refusal to abide by the appropriate Islamic doctrines is worsened by its active recruitment of all means necessary to stop the opposition groups.

### 6.3 Narrative Comparisons

The narratives of the Saudi authorities and those individuals engaging in extremist activity are often on opposite ends of the spectrum even when there appears to be mutual recognition of the greater geopolitical environment in which both parties are operating. Islamic beliefs feature prominently in the discourses of both the extremists and Saudi authorities. However, there is substantial disagreement regarding the proper interpretation and application of the religious teachings and doctrines. Both narratives also take divergent stances on the appropriate actors (including rights and duties of said actors) and the appropriate tactics to be used.

Militants see outside forces, aided by the government, as the actors, which have incited the violence and conflict on the Arabian Peninsula. The narrative of the AQAP members illustrates that their use of violence is largely a retaliatory measure and is made necessary because of harsh tactics of the opposition. Concepts such as takfir support the militant's efforts against the insufficiently devout and therefore, illegitimate, government.<sup>153</sup> The government and religious institutions have a duty to protect the individuals and values in the society. When this does not occur the militants have a duty to depose the source of the problem to ensure the survival of the virtues and culture that face persecution. The AQAP narratives illustrate that they are willing to use all means at their disposal including the family and companion ties, which the government has not been adequately addressing as the source of radicalization.

The government stands strongly opposed to this interpretation of events citing the warped beliefs of the extremists as the cause for the turmoil in the country and the region at large. The government is the legitimate entity entrusted with the ability to exercise force and make determinations about what constitutes religiously acceptable behavior. If the level of opposition dictates it, all of the considerable means of the state will be deployed to correct the

---

AQAP leader, Said Al Shihri expressed enduring commitment; "by Allah, our imprisonment has only increased our persistence and adherence to our principles... Here we are today... [in] the land of Yemen and faith."

<sup>151</sup> Mcevers, Kelly. "A Test for Saudi Arabia's Terrorist-Rehab Program." Morning Edition News Broadcast. National Public Radio. February 15, 2010.

Also in an AQAP video appearance, former Guantanamo prisoner Muhammed Al Awfi "[warned] our fellow prisoners against the rehab program we were used but thank god we were able to escape their power."

<sup>152</sup> Figure 2 Across all three levels of analysis the militant narrative remains largely the same, reflecting this group's identification with the larger global threats as manifesting themselves in the daily lives of the militants.

<sup>153</sup> Ansary, "Combating extremism", 126. Takfiri ideology advocates challenging their rulers, viewing them as abusers of wealth and power who do not rule according to the Quran.

problem. The ideological malfeasance is a source of serious danger to society and should, except for extreme cases, can be handled by reeducation and intensive counseling. Family relationships and follow up care are necessary to preventing recidivism.

## 7. Results and Conclusions

### 7.1 Targeting the Right Individuals?

An analysis of the Saudi Arabian authorities' narratives and militants' narratives reveals several significant disparities between the subjects in question. The most egregious of these disparities concern the profile and motivations of program enrollees. Despite the Saudi authorities' assertions to the contrary, many of the Guantanamo program recidivists are not simply poor, misguided youth who have been subject to incorrect Islamic instruction and alienated from close family and friends. This lack of understanding on the part of government officials is one of the variables that has the potential to negatively impact the rehabilitation of the former Guantanamo detainees, as well as their potential to re-engage in extremist activity.

The absence of available data about the "other" ten Guantanamo program recidivists limits the ability to draw concrete conclusions about the recidivist group because the 15 known recidivists may not accurately represent the narratives of the other ten recidivists. Without further data about the Guantanamo program non-recidivists, we are unable to determine if there are other factors at play or the importance of certain factors in the likely success of the program on certain classes of participants. Notwithstanding the data limitations, it is evident that the known Guantanamo program recidivists do not fit the Saudi profile of a prototypical extremist. Many of the former Guantanamo detainees are in their late 20s and 30s (see figures 4 and 5), with active and significant kinship connections.<sup>154</sup> In fact, it is frequently family members or close friends that have mobilized these connections in order to turn the participants into (or back into) extremists.<sup>155</sup>

Despite evidence, which demonstrates a clear difference between the former Guantanamo militants and the profile put forward by the program officials, the incentives and methods used to re-integrate former Guantanamo detainees into society do not appear to differ greatly from those used for non-Guantanamo detainees. One of the most notable discrepancies between Guantanamo Bay detainees and other program enrollees is that individuals within the Saudi prison system have the choice to attend the rehabilitation program, while those released from Guantanamo do not. "All [former Guantanamo] detainees who have returned to Saudi Arabia since 2005 have gone through the program, which starts in prison and eventually results in the movement to a halfway-house called the Mohammed bin Nayef Centre for Care and Counseling."<sup>156</sup> This failure to recognize a major difference amongst program attendees (attendance by choice or by decree) encapsulates the nature of misunderstandings that pervade the Saudi rehab program, in spite of its successes.

---

<sup>154</sup> Guantanamo Bay Detainee Demographics Database Of the total 117 prisoners known to have gone through Guantanamo Bay.

<sup>155</sup> Guantanamo Bay Detainee Demographics Database following individuals were brought back by kin or friends Adnan Mohammed Ali, Othman Ahmed Othman al Omairah, Mohammad al Awfi, Yusef Mohammed Mubarak al Shihri, Sa id Ali Jabir al Khathim al Shihri.

<sup>156</sup> House Armed Services Committee "Leaving Guantanamo", 26.

## 7.2 Focus of Saudi rehabilitation program on religion

As noted previously, Islamic religious education is a central feature of the Saudi program. Analysis of the Guantanamo program recidivists' narratives reveals that religion, or the threat of its deterioration, is a primary motivating force for their engagement in extremist activity.<sup>157</sup> Militants identify the growing corrosive effects of western decadence and corruption on their culture and society as reasons for their commitment to their cause. They seek to rid their nation, and ultimately their region of this deleterious influence. They rarely identify seizure of political power as their primary goal. So to the extent that the Saudi program seeks to re-educate extremist Muslims to accept an interpretation of the Quran which permits, relatively speaking, a more moderate and less violent interpretation of the Quran, they may well be successful in re-integrating the extremist into society. This success, however, is largely dependent on how amenable individuals are to additional, seemingly contradictory religious instruction.

Even if Saudi officials are able to convince or coerce rehabilitation program participants to accept the official Saudi version of Islam, controlling how millions of Saudis interpret and understand (the general Saudi populous' interpretation) the Quran is no simple task. Lacking the clearly defined hierarchy and system of training education found in many other religions, the Sunni iteration of Islam allows some individuals to read the Quran and decide for themselves how it should be interpreted. If one is so inclined, there are literally thousands of internet sources providing views about the Quran and Islam. There are sermons and articles by imams interpreting the Quran, as well as newspaper, television, and radio programs with contrary interpretations and positions. For this reason, the Saudi authorities engage in many different activities to control the spread of the allegedly false version of Islam, detailed in Chapter 3. While the Saudi authorities pursue widespread controls on religious interpretation, the reality is that with currently available technology it will be difficult to fully eradicate the skewed radical interpretation of Islam -practiced by a minority of the population throughout the Middle East- and its concomitant violence.<sup>158</sup>

## 7.3 Age

Figure 5 details the actual age distribution of known former Guantanamo program recidivists. The age distribution of known recidivists stands in contrast to the age demographic information promulgated by the Saudi government in its extremist profile. Of the over 100 Guantanamo detainees that have been through the program only 54% met the expected age range. (Figure 5) Roughly 53% of Guantanamo program recidivists fall well outside the typical age range put forward in the Saudi government study. (Figure 5) It is unknown, because of the lack of publicly disclosed data, whether the Guantanamo program recidivists tend to be older than their non-recidivists counterparts. If further data illustrating an age differential between Guantanamo program recidivists and non-recidivists can be gathered, further research on the effect of age on the Saudi program should be conducted and analyzed.

---

<sup>157</sup> Figure 2.

<sup>158</sup> Wagner "Rehabilitation and De-radicalization", 3.

#### 7.4 Increase in radicalization?

While it can be reasonably asserted that a recidivism rate of 20% means a success rate of 80% for the Saudi program, the recidivists appear to present a greater threat than most extremists. An analysis of the Guantanamo program recidivists demonstrates that many become actively involved in violent organizations and in violent plots. Further, the recidivists tend to assume more prominent leadership positions in these extremist organizations.<sup>159</sup> Many of the recidivists are featured on various “most wanted” lists.<sup>160</sup> The increase in activity or level of participation beyond mere foot soldier or facilitator suggests that the recidivists are perhaps even more radicalized and committed by their Guantanamo and/or Saudi program experience. Therefore, those who become recidivists tend to be among the most violent and most committed extremists. In this manner, the Saudi program is not only ineffective for these participants, but may actually be counter-productive, and drive the participant to greater levels of extremist commitment. The Saudi authorities have suggested that hatred and commitment to jihadist causes by former Guantanamo detainees has been fomented by the scarring experiences that they have endured there.<sup>161</sup> However it does not appear that this belief has translated into effective programmatic action. Further research must be done to examine the ramifications of personal trauma experienced in violent conflict and during a protracted prison sentence with possibility of psychological and physical torture.

#### 7.5 Length of incarceration

Analysis of the Guantanamo program recidivists shows that there is an increased likelihood of recidivism when the detainee has spent a longer period of time incarcerated at Guantanamo. (Figure 6) This data supports the notion that the longer the Guantanamo incarceration, the more radicalized the detainee becomes. However, an alternative explanation is that the more dangerous and committed the detainee, the longer the period of time that officials would seek to have the individual incarcerated. A further investigation into this relationship should be conducted when and if more data becomes available.

#### 7.6 Kinship ties

Both the Saudi officials and the members of militant groups have tactfully employed family connections to attract individuals to their respective causes.<sup>162</sup> The family plays integral role in Saudi society. Family members, even those of terror suspects, have been known to reign in the behavior of the rogue individual. As the primary building block of society, family bonds can be quite strong. The Saudi profile of an extremist is someone without strong family connections.<sup>163</sup> But as noted earlier, the Guantanamo program recidivists do not fit that mold. In fact, the family connections are sometimes a primary

<sup>159</sup> Guantanamo Bay Detainee Demographic Database. Of the 15 known recidivists 5 took on a significant leadership roles (such as commander, operational leader or spiritual advisor) and 4 played integral roles in high profile tactical operations such kidnapping of Saudi officials and bombings.

<sup>160</sup> Joscelyn, Thomas ““The Long War Journal: Saudi Gitmo recidivists” The Long War Journal. 21 June 2012.

<sup>161</sup> Mcevers. “A Test for Saudi Arabia” Rehabilitation program psychologist Turki al-Otayan, claims that hatred drove Mohammed Al-Awfi back to militancy.

<sup>162</sup> Militant Chart (Figure 2) and Saudi Authority Chart (Figure 1).

<sup>163</sup> al-Hadlaq “Terrorist Rehabilitation”, 59.

connection to the world of extremism. Several of AQAP's most prominent recidivist members returned to extremism through a kinship tie related by blood or marriage.<sup>164</sup> Further research into the overall impact of the family on extremists is warranted. Is it primarily a means to control extremist behavior or does it primarily serve to engender extremism?

### 7.7 Economic factors

The Saudi profile of an extremist is someone from a relatively impoverished environment and/or someone with limited economic opportunities. There is insufficient data to confirm or dispute the alleged significance of poverty in the creation of an Islamic extremist. Though there are many general studies on the subject of poverty and Islamic extremism, more data and research is necessary to determine the degree to which economic factors impact recidivism.

### 7.8 Overall assessment

The Saudi program is largely a successful program. Approximately 80% of the Guantanamo program participants are considered to be non-recidivist according to publically available information. So the multi-faceted approach, with a strong focus on religious re-education, is working with a significant percentage of the participants. Because the program has not been in effect for as long as ten years, the long-term success rate is unknown. Even if some small percentage of non-recidivists return in the future to extremism, the fact that they were not engaging in acts of violence or supporting extremism for some period of time, is beneficial even for the limited period of time.

It is equally clear that the program was unsuccessful with approximately 20% of the participants.<sup>165</sup> Most troubling is that many of the recidivists are taking active and leadership roles in the extremist movement, suggesting a deeper commitment to the cause. So to the extent that the program is not de-radicalizing the Guantanamo participants, it may affirmatively be serving to help radicalize them.

While economic and political factors may play a role in the Guantanamo recidivists' motivation, the research and data clearly suggest that Islamic religious principles are viewed by the extremists as a primary justification for their activities. They view their culture and society being contaminated by the decadent and corrupt western, non-Islamic values. They seek to rid their society of those influences and return the society to what they perceive to be pure Islamic values and principles. Thus, the Saudi program's focus on religious re-education is justified by the available data. The problem is that trying to contain the spread of a different and more fundamental Islamic ideology is like trying to control the flow of water coming through a dam with multiple breaks. Despite the energetic and broad based efforts of the Saudi authorities to control what they see as a misinformed interpretation of Islam, they are surrounded by nations in their region that are either unable to suppress the militant Islam or perhaps even propagating it. The Saudis may not be able to control the flow of ideas enough to keep their populace away from radical Islam.

Another possible factor to consider is social stigmatization. Unlike their non-Guantanamo counter parts, former Guantanamo Bay detainees do not have the luxury of anonymity. With well-publicized stories of their alleged terrorist activities as well as the

---

<sup>164</sup> Boucek, Christopher. *Carnegie Guide to the Saudi Eleven*.

<sup>165</sup> Wagner "Rehabilitation and De-radicalization", 3

alleged abuse they suffered while imprisoned, this social stigmatization might further ostracize these individuals from civil society.<sup>166</sup> Additionally, this isolation might further emphasize communal bonds forged with other Guantanamo detainees, which increases the likelihood of multiple individuals from the social network returning if one member decides to return to extremism.<sup>167</sup>

## 7.9 Going forward

Countering manifestations of violent extremism is an ongoing process for the Saudi government as well as many other world governments and international organizations. While a program may be wildly successful, the shortcomings of a program are more likely to make newspaper headlines than any success stories. At the time that this work is being completed, the United States has chosen to close 22 of its embassies throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia due to the imminent threat of terrorist attacks by AQAP. The geopolitical climate is such that the threat of extremism will likely continue to grow in the coming years.

It is important for the young Saudi rehabilitation program to evolve to address the needs and push/pull factors of all the militants it seeks to help. In order to achieve a one hundred percent success rate, the Saudi government will likely have to reach out and assist neighboring countries with their rehabilitation programs, realizing that international borders do little to hinder the spread of violent extremist views and ideology. A coordinated effort and sharing of best practices ~~will~~can only help to strengthen these programs and hopefully reduce the instances of violent extremism in the region.

---

<sup>166</sup> Iyer, *Returning Home*, 4.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid.

### Bibliography

- Aaron, David. *In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad-Compilation and Commentary*. Rand Corporation, 2008.
- Adjei, Stephen Baffour. "Discourse Analysis: Examining Language Use in Context." *The Qualitative Report* 18, no. 50 (2013): 1-10
- al-Hadlaq, Abdulrahman. "Terrorist Rehabilitation: the Saudi Experience." *Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism*, New York: Routledge (2011): 59-69.
- Al-Jazeera. "Ex-Guantanamo inmates 'fail rehab' Several freed detainees have returned to violence after rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia." 20 June 2010. Accessed 10 July 2013. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/06/201062013047249951.html>
- Al- Jazeera. "Timeline: Guantanamo Prison A timeline of key events at the US-run prison." 7 October 2009. [Accessed on 10 July 2013] <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/07/20097221092685420.html>
- Ambinder, Marc. "The New Term for the War on Terror." *The Atlantic*. May 20, 2010. Accessed June 15, 2013 <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/the-new-term-for-the-war-on-terror/56969/>
- Ansary, Abdullah, F. "Combating extremism: a brief overview of Saudi Arabia's approach." *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 2 (2008): 111. 1-25.
- Armstrong, Elizabeth A., and Mary Bernstein. "Culture, Power, and Institutions: A Multi-Institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements\*." *Sociological Theory* 26, no. 1 (2008): 74-99.
- Bernard, Cheryl ed. "Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Extremist Groups: the Case of Racist Sub-Cultures." In *A Future for the Young: Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, WR-354 (2006). [http://www.rand.org/pubs/working\\_papers/WR354](http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR354).
- Bhatia, Michael V., "The Politics of Naming: Rebels, Terrorists, Criminals, Bandits and Subversives." *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005): 5-22
- Bjorgo, Tore. "Processes of Disengagement from Violent Groups of the Extreme Right." In *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, edited by Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan. New York, NY: Routledge (2009).
- Boucek, Christopher. *Saudi Arabia's "soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare*. Vol. 97. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.1-28
- Boucek, Christopher. *Carnegie Guide to the Saudi Eleven*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2011). Accessed 3 June 2013. <http://interactive.carnegieendowment.org/constellation/main.php?graphID=5&selectedNodeID=135>
- Boucek, Christopher. "The Sakinah Campaign and Internet Counter-Radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *CTC Sentinel*. Volume 1, Issue 9, August 2008.
- Bronson, Rachel. "Rethinking religion: The legacy of the US-Saudi relationship." *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 4 (2005): 121-137.
- Butko, Thomas. "Unity Through Opposition: Islam as an Instrument of Radical Political Change", *MERIA Journal* 8,no. 4 (2004): 33-48, accessed 1 February 2013. <http://www.gloriacenter.org/meria/2004/12/butko.html>



- 
- Canel, Eduardo. "New social movement theory and resource mobilization theory: The need for integration." *Community power and grassroots democracy: The transformation of social life* 189 (1997).
- Carpenter, J. Scott, Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. "Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism." *Journal of National Security Law and Policy*, Vol. 3 (2009): 301-327. [http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol3no2/\\_05\\_CARPENTER%20ET%20AL.pdf](http://www.jnslp.com/read/vol3no2/_05_CARPENTER%20ET%20AL.pdf).
- Christiansen, J. "Four stages of social movements." *Research Starters: Academic Topic Overviews, EBSCO, Ipswich, MA* (2009): 1-7.
- Cohan, John Alan. "Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism." *Stetson L. Rev.* 35 (2005): 903.
- Connell, Robert W., and James W. Messerschmidt. "Hegemonic masculinity rethinking the concept." *Gender & society* 19, no. 6 (2005): 829-859.
- de Vries, Hugo and Nikkie Wiegink. "Breaking up and Going Home? Contesting Two Assumptions in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants." *International Peacekeeping*, 18, no. 1 (2011): 38-51
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair. "The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Journal* 48, no. 4 (1994): 627-643.
- Denbeaux, Mark et al. "National Security Deserves Better: Odd" Recidivism Numbers Undermine the Guantanamo Policy Debate." *Seton Hall L. Rev.* 43 (2013): 643-843.
- El-Said, Hamed. *De-radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States*. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2012. 1-47
- Fink, Naureen Chowdhury, and Ellie B. Hearne. "Beyond terrorism: Deradicalization and disengagement from violent extremism." *International Peace Institute* (2008): 1-27.
- Ghosh, Bobby. "Can Jihadis be Rehabilitated?" *Time*. 27 January 2009. Accessed 21 July 2013. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874278,00.html>
- Gilmore, Jonathan. "A kinder, gentler counter-terrorism Counterinsurgency, human security and the War on Terror." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 1 (2011):21-37.
- Glass, E. & Yeoshua, Y., "Saudi's Arabia's Anti-Terror Campaign. The Middle East Media Research Institute; Accessed 24 February 2013. <http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA42508>
- Glynos, Jason, David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Ewen Speed. *Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods*. ESRC National Centre for Research Methods Review paper. (2009). p.1-41 Centre for Theoretical Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Essex
- Goldstein, Joshua S. *War and Gender, How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- The Guardian. "The Guantanamo Files." Last updated 25 April 2011. Accessed 3 July 2013. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/apr/25/guantanamo-files-guantanamo-bay>
- Gunaratna, Rohan. "Saudi Initiatives in Countering Terrorism *ICPVTR Visit to Saudi Arabia*." ICPVTR International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism. (2010). 4
- Hafez, Mohammed M. "Radicalization in the Persian Gulf: Assessing the potential of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia and Yemen." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* no. 1 (2008): 6-24

- Hannah, Greg, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin. "Radicalization or Rehabilitation." RAND Corporation Technical Publication (2008).
- Hassan, M. "Key Considerations in Counter-ideological Work against Terrorist Ideology." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 6 (2006): 561-588.
- Hegghammer, Thomas. "Terrorist recruitment and radicalization in Saudi Arabia." *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 4 (2006):39-60.
- Hegghammer, Thomas. "Islamist violence and regime stability in Saudi Arabia." *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2008): 701-715.
- Hellmich, Christina. "Al-Qaeda—terrorists, hypocrites, fundamentalists? The view from Within," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): pp.39–54.
- Horgan, J. "Deradicalization or Disengagement: A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 4 (2008): 5. Accessed via <http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv2i4.pdf>
- Horgan, John. *Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009.
- House Armed Services Committee "Leaving Guantanamo: Policies, Pressures and Detainees Returning to Fight." HASC Committee Print 112-4: Washington DC. January 2012. 1-70
- Human Rights First. "Guantanamo by the Numbers." Fact Sheet. Human Rights First. June 2013. 1-2. [accessed 10 July 2013] <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/law-and-security/resources/#gitmo>
- Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Demobilization and reintegration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 4 (2007): 531-567.
- in Dammam, Saad al-Abdallah "Psychology professor Turki al-Attayan: Saudi Munasaha programme reached advanced stages" 28 December 2012 Accessed 1 July 2013. [http://al-shorfa.com/en\\_GB/articles/meii/features/main/2010/12/28/feature-01](http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/main/2010/12/28/feature-01)
- International Crisis Group. "Understanding Islamism." *Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°37*. March 2005. ICG p.1-27
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, "Rehabilitating the jihadists: Saudi Arabia Tackles the Radical Threat from Within", Volume 14, Issue 5, May2008. <http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-14-2008/volume-14-issue-5/rehabilitating-the-jihadists/>
- Iyer, Nandini. *Returning Home: Resettlement and Reintegration of Detainees Released From the US Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*. DIANE Publishing, 2009.
- Joscelyn, Thomas ""The Long War Journal: Saudi Gitmo recidivists" The Long War Journal. 21 June 2012. Accessed 03 June 2013 [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/saudi\\_gitmo\\_recidivi.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/saudi_gitmo_recidivi.php)
- Justino, Patricia, Tilman Brück, and Philip Verwimp. *Micro-level dynamics of conflict, violence and development: A new analytical framework*. No. 138. Households in Conflict Network, 2013.
- Kaldor, Mary. *New and old wars*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Kiefer, Francine. "Terrorist rehab in Saudi Arabia: A success?" *Christian Science Monitor*. 2 November 2010. Accessed 24 February 2014. <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-Board-Blog/2010/1102/Terrorist-rehab-in-Saudi-Arabia-A-success>

- Kohlman, Evan. "NEFA Foundation: Video Transcript of Former Gitmo Detainees Swearing Allegiance to Al-Qaida in Yemen." Counterterrorism Foundation." 1 February 2009. Accessed 10 June 2013.  
[http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/nefa\\_foundation\\_video\\_transcri.php](http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/02/nefa_foundation_video_transcri.php)
- Kostiner, Joseph. "State, Islam and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The Post-Desert Storm Phase." *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal* 2 (1997):1-16
- Kraidy, Marwan M. "Hypermedia and governance in Saudi Arabia." *First Monday* (2006): 1-17. Accessed 7 June 2013.  
<http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1610/1525>
- Lusher, Dean and Garry Robins. "Hegemonic and Other Masculinities in Local Social Contexts" *Men and Masculinities*. vol. 11 no. 4 (2009): 387-423
- Macgregor, Douglas, Marvin Weinbaum, Abdullah Ansary, and Robert Pape. "The "Global War on Terror": What Has Been Learned?." *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 4 (2008): 1-25.
- McDoom, Omar. "It's who you know: social networks, interpersonal connections, and participation in collective violence." No. 140. Households in Conflict Network, 2013
- Mcevers, Kelly. "A Test for Saudi Arabia's Terrorist-Rehab Program." Morning Edition News Broadcast. National Public Radio. February 15, 2010. Accessed 15 July 2013.  
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123661284>
- Morris, Madeline et al. "Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to Findings in the Literatures on Deganging and Deprograming." *Institute for Homeland Security Solutions* (2010): 1-13.
- Pape, Robert A. "The strategic logic of suicide terrorism." *American political science review* 97, no. 3 (2003): 343-361.
- Porges, Marisa L. "The Saudi De-radicalization Experiment." *Council on Foreign Relations*. 22 January 2010 Accessed 24 February 2013.  
[http://www.cfr.org/publication/21292/saudi\\_deradicalization\\_experiment.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/21292/saudi_deradicalization_experiment.html).
- Robertson, Nic. "'Jihadi Rehab' is a possibility for post-Gitmo." CNN International. January 2009. [accessed 24 February 2013]  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/27/saudi.jihadi.rehab/>
- Saudi Embassy. "Interior Ministry Issues List of Extremists Wanted for Extradition" Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Washington DC. 3 February 2009. [accessed 24 February 2013] [http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest\\_news/news02030902.aspx](http://www.saudiembassy.net/latest_news/news02030902.aspx)
- Scheinkman, Andrei et al. "The Guantanamo Docket." NY Times. [accessed 20 July 2013] Available at <http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/>
- Sinai, Joshua."How to define terrorism." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 2, no. 4 (2010): 9-11
- Slocum-Bradley, Nikki. "The Positioning Diamond: A Trans-Disciplinary Framework for Discourse Analysis." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 40, no. 1 (2010): 79-107.
- Spencer, Richard. "Saudi Arabia defends al-Qaeda Rehabilitation Scheme" The Telegraph. 09 February 2010. [Accessed on 24 2013]  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudi-arabia/7195400/Saudi-Arabia-defends-al-Qaeda-rehabilitation-scheme.html>
- Stemple, Hillary. "Saudi Arabia official reports 25 recidivism cases among ex-Guantanamo inmates." The Jurist. June 20, 2010. Accessed 24 February 2013.  
<http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/06/saudi-arabia-official-reports-25-cases-of-recidivism-among-ex-guantanamo-inmates.php>

- 
- Stern, Jessica. "Mind over martyr: How to deradicalize Islamist extremists." *Foreign Aff.* 89 (2010): 95.
- Tirado, Francisco, and Ana Gálvez. "Positioning theory and discourse analysis: Some tools for social interaction analysis." *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung* (2008): 224-251.
- United States Department of State, *2009 Country Reports on Terrorism – Saudi Arabia*, 5 August 2010, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c63b625c.html> [accessed 24 February 2013].
- United States Department of State, *2010 Country Reports on Terrorism – Saudi Arabia*, August 2011. p.102-104 available at <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/index.htm> [accessed 24 February 2013].
- United States Department of State, *2011 Country Reports on Terrorism – Saudi Arabia*, April 2012. p.119-121 available at <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/index.htm> [accessed 24 February 2013].
- United States Department of State, *2012 Country Reports on Terrorism – Saudi Arabia*, May 2012. p.18-140. available at <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/index.htm> [accessed 15 June 2013].
- Veldhuis, Tinka M., and Eelco JAM Kessels. "Thinking before Leaping: The Need for More and Structural Data Analysis in Detention and Rehabilitation of Extremist Offenders." International Center for Counter-Terrorism The Hague (2013).
- Wagner, Rob. "Rehabilitation and De-radicalization: Saudi Arabia's Counterterrorism Successes and Failures." *Peace and Conflict Monitor* (2010). [accessed 24 February 2013] [http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id\\_article=735](http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=735).
- Waxman, Matthew. "Administrative Detention of Terrorists: Why Detain, and Detain Whom?." *Columbia Public Law Research Paper* 08-190 (2009): 2-46.
- Worth, Robert F. "9 Alumni of Saudi Program for Ex- Jihadists Are Arrested." *New York Times*. January 2009. [accessed 20 March 2013].  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/world/middleeast/27saudi.html?\\_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1374957976-VVT3/iayisuxAid60FHszw](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/world/middleeast/27saudi.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1374957976-VVT3/iayisuxAid60FHszw)
- Wright, Robin, ed. "The Middle East: They've Arrived." *The Islamists are Coming: Who They Really are*. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2012: 1-12
- Yehoshua, Y. "Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia," *Middle East Media Research Institute: Inquiry and Analysis Series*, No. 260 (2006). Accessed 24 February 2013.  
<http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/1582.htm>.
- in Dammam, Saad al-Abdallah "Psychology professor Turki al-Attayan: Saudi Munasaha programme reached advanced stages" 28 December 2012 Accessed 1 July 2013.  
[http://al-shorfa.com/en\\_GB/articles/meii/features/main/2010/12/28/feature-01](http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/main/2010/12/28/feature-01)

	Content	Narrative-Discourse Participant Context	Overarching Themes
Social Forces	Extremists are engaging in religiously informed violence. Gov't is responding with counter-terrorism measures.	Counterterrorist activities are launched by Saudi Arabia and its regional/global allies. Extremists seek changes for grievances through attacks on gov't.	Sends message of public condemnation of "jihadist" behavior to internal/external agitators as well as allies.
Storylines	Militants led astray, express grievance by engaging in violence against the state and the west in hopes of bettering their lot. Elimination of ideology is key to bring extremist back into the fold. SA is committed to reform of the 3Ms (men, money, mindset)- use of both hard and soft policies Goals: end extremism, preserve and uphold the government and ideals	Violence is creating instability. Previous Islamist groups mostly eschewed violence, damaging experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Guantanamo as well as harsh punishments in SA prisons make ordinary tactics useless are not as effective in attacking ideology. Rehabilitation is useful except in the most extreme cases.	Extremists from organizations such as AQAP have brainwashed young disaffected youth. Radical Islamist ideology poses an international threat. Reintegration and de-radicalization will bring stability.
Identities	Militants= poor, uneducated, misguided, possibly victims of abuse, misunderstanding of perceived problems, warped religious motivation. Goals: overthrow the government and diminish influence of the west in foreign affairs (destroy it). SA= protector of people, has an accurate understanding of social problems, religious motivation is correct	Young militants-Thirst for belonging drove them to militants groups or lack of money drives them to militancy. Saudi society- suffers from terror can supportive of CT efforts especially if they get something in exchange Terror groups- prey on poor and misguided.	The West, particularly the US supports counterterrorist campaigns. Terror groups are alluring for youth, particularly poor youth seeking camaraderie and money.
Rights and Duties	Violence by militants is wrong. Islam does not support the overthrow of the government or unsanctioned jihad. SA has a right to make decisions about the religious affiliation of its citizens.	Family and society need to be mobilized in order to prevent a fall back into crime. Monetary resources and individual attention should be used in place of harsh punishment for less radical prisoners. Youth need to be taught better.	Harsh tactics alone are not the answer. SA must stop the extremists to keep power. Only legitimate authorities can make religious decisions.

Figure 1: Positioning Diamond for Saudi Arabian Authorities

	Content	Narrative-Discourse Participant Context	Overarching Themes
Social Forces	Declaration of war (by both parties.) Former GITMO detainees combat with force, media campaigns, and religious doctrine.	Dissatisfied with the trends in the social environment created by foreign parties. Islamic community/family forms the basis of threatened society. Reject rehabilitation.	The government is in collusion with international regimes which are meddling in the internal affairs of other countries and destroying morals and culture in the region
Storylines	Engaging a battle with the institutions that are corroding society.	Society is deteriorating with the advance of liberalism and use of religion to justify ill-informed foreign policy. The power holding institutions that have the ability to change the current policies are unwilling to do so. SA GOAL: preserve status quo Militants are brave, bold warriors Fighter GOAL: Preserve source of culture to preserve community and morals.	Islam forms the basis for social understanding in society. Other cultures are amoral, including other Muslim societies using religion to justify wrong doing.
Identities	Militants: in opposition to corruption. Strongly committed to cause Gov't: corrupt working with the enemy. Willing to use any means necessary to keep power, uses both physical and mental violence.	Militants: protectors of Islam who fight against corruption of the religion and those who fail to put it at the forefront. Gov't: Corrupt, concerned with money and international alliances. Religious establishment is co-opted and dominated by the government for use as political tool. Using Islam to remain in power, selling out to the west.	A battle over who practices the purest form of Islam rages and the militants view themselves as doing violence on behalf of all Muslims to maintain the traditions and teachings of the Koran.
Rights and Duties	Corruption is not right. Government brainwashing opposition is unjust. Violence is necessary to achieve goals.	Anyone who threatens Islam is an enemy that must be dealt with swiftly and violently. Militants: have a duty to protect religion and culture from destruction	Devout Muslims must fight to preserve the sanctity of their religion in the face of governments who have corrupted the practice of Islam in favor of wealth.

Figure 2: Positioning Diamond for ex-Guantanamo Rehabilitation Program Recidivists




Figure 3.

Sources: The Guardian. “The Guantanamo Files”, Scheinkman, Andrei et al. “The Guantanamo Docket.” Released=the total number of detainees released to the country including non-citizens. Total Citizens= A country’s total number citizens that are current or former inmates.




Figure 4. Age breakdown of Guantanamo detainees released to Saudi Arabia






Figure 5. Age breakdown of ex-Guantanamo detainee recidivists




Figure 6. Percentage of recidivists by release date and length of sentence




Figure 7. Rehabilitation Recidivists Release Date Chart